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INTRODUCTION
The first substantial impetus for state economic control of milk and
its derivative products came about as the result of the Great Depression
of the fourth decade of the present century. Out of the vicissitudes of
this period came a demand for greater state control of industry and a
desire to stabilize the economy. Politicians sought ways of preventing
great fluctuations in the business cycle. The farmers had been badly
hurt and legislators and economists alike were desperately trying to
find some way of alleviating their distressing plight. Many tenants
found it impossible to make a living on the farms and started the great
migration to the urban centers, thereby creating an excessive labor
supply and increasing the overloaded bread lines. Prices of farm com-
modities, including milk and its derivatives, sank below the cost of
production in many regions, and there was cutthroat competition with
respect to those markets that had not vanished. There was real suffer-
ing among certain segments of the population. In an effort to bring
some order out of the economic chaos the New Deal was born. The
National Recovery Administration and its state counterparts repre-
sented an effort to establish a degree of government control over most
of the nation's economy. It was only natural that conservative elements
in the population should object to such drastic changes in the doctrines
concerning the relations of business and government. Typical of this
conservatism was the attitude of a majority of the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court and some of the state courts as well. The phi-
losophy of the past century was very much in evidence in the judicial
utterances of many federal and state judges in the early days of the
New Deal. Much of the conflict of this period came about as the result
of the reluctance of judges to deviate from time-honored concepts of
constitutional relationships.
Against this background of economic disaster and conflict, public
sentiment arose for a controlled economy and a degree of government
supervision which would have been impossible a few years earlier.
The cutthroat competition in the dairy industry was perhaps worse
than in industries whose products were less perishable. Even before
the Depression there had been some effort on the part of states and
municipalities to set up varied forms of regulations by statute or ordi-
nance. Thus Maine legislators enacted an early statute requiring milk
dealers to pay for purchases semi-monthly and providing for punishment
by fine in case of default. This statute was ruled unconstitutional as
class legislation violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' It was said that classifications of businesses and occu-
pations, to be valid, must be based upon a real and not an arbitrary
1 State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 Atl. 578 (1916).
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difference. On the other hand, it was held that a Baltimore ordinance
regulating the production and distribution of milk and milk products
in the interests of cleanliness and health was valid under the city charter
and not unconstitutional as depriving milk dealers of their property
without due process of law.2 The court ruled that there was no improper
delegation of authority and no lack of proper hearing or notice. It
made the additional point that the ordinance was not invalid because
it would confer upon the Commissioner of Health too much discretion
in granting, refusing, or revoking dealers' permits. These cases illus-
trate types of issues which have continually arisen since milk control
became a problem of increasing importance in the fast changing economy
of the nation.
The typical milk control law, whether it sets up an independent agency
like a milk commission or establishes a division in an existing agency
such as a state Department of Agriculture, has its inception in a time
of economic instability. For this reason legislators may enact statutes
which are not fully protective of the interests and rights of all groups
concerned. Thus the producer, consumer, or even the distributor may
be neglected in some manner by a statute primarily enacted to alleviate
the plight of just one group. Since the consumers lack organization and
have no lobby to guard their interests, their effective participation in
the preparation of control legislation is practically nil, although the
control agencies usually have members who, nominally at least, are
appointed to protect their rights. With this situation definitely in
mind a group of Georgia milk consumers filed a petition asking that
the Milk Control Board be enjoined from acting under a statute which
was alleged not to be fair in this respect. The petition averred that
the board was composed of two producer-distributors, one ordinary
distributor, one state licensee, and only one consumer. It was claimed
that consumer representation was inadequate and that the board was
therefore not impartial. The prices set by the board were claimed to
be excessive and unlawful. It was alleged that the concept of due
process of law had been violated. However, the state Supreme Court
would listen to no such argument and affirmed the lower tribunal's
decision dismissing the petition.3 A very real and disturbing disregard
for democratic principles is evident here. Justice would seem to demand
that the regulations governing an industry's relations with consumers
should not be made and enforced by the industry's representatives.4 A
sounder view was taken in a case involving a Michigan statute setting
up an administrative board consisting of the Commissioner of Agricul-
' Creaghan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 442, 104 Atl. 180 (1918).
'Fleisher v. Duncan, 195 Ga. 309, 24 S.E.2d 15 (1943).
' See Carter, State Regulation of Milk in the Southeast, XXIV So. ECON. JOUR.
63 (1957).
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ture and four other members to be appointed by the Governor, the state
Senate being given the right to confirm or disapprove the appointees.
The act provided that two of the board members were to be milk pro-
ducers not connected with the distributive aspects of the industry except
as representatives of bona fide producer co-operative associations. Both
of these producers were required to earn their principal livelihood
from dairies. One of the remaining members was to be a distributor
and the other a consumer not connected in any way with the production
or distribution of milk. This portion of the statute was declared to be
fatally defective in that it failed to provide for an impartial board.5
Here consumers were not the only group discriminated against, and
this fact might very well be significant.
While certain affected persons may not have proper representation
on the controlling agencies, they do not lack the protection of procedural
safeguards. A person coming before an administrative body in charge
of a milk control program has a right to a full, fair, and orderly hearing,
and the proceedings must follow prescribed rules.6 There must be a
degree of formality and a detailed record should be kept of anything
relevant to the controversy. 7 The opportunity to present evidence and
to sustain a challenge through argument is essential, and the action
taken cannot be based upon undisclosed evidence or information which
the parties have had no chance to explain, rebut, or test for trust-
worthiness.8 However, the technical rules surrounding the admissi-
bility of evidence in courts of law are not to be rigidly enforced.9 There
must be a true attempt to disclose the facts and the findings can be
supported only if they have a substantial and reasonable basis in the
evidence.'0
Where there is evidence to support administrative findings no court
should interfere, but there would be a different situation where no such
testimony existed." There is nothing in the usual milk control statute
to indicate any intention to make administrative findings final. It
would appear to be beyond question that any attempt to make such
findings final would be invalid. A Michigan statute stating their finality
and yet providing for a review of questions of law by the state Supreme
Milk Marketing Bd. v. Johnson, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
6 Buhler v. Department of Agriculture and Mkts., 229 Wis. 133, 280 N.W. 367
(1938).
7 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775
(1938).
8 National Dairy Prods. Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 133 N.J.L. 491, 44 A.2d 796
(1945).
ilk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers' Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d
818 (1949); Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1
A.2d 775 (1938).
"0 National Dairy Prods. Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 133 N.J.L. 491, 44 A.2d 796
(1945).
"White Way Pure Milk Co. v. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 265 Ala.
660, 93 So. 2d 509 (1957).
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Court has been held not to violate the concept of due process. 12 Of
course the findings here would not be final at all, since the term "ques-
tions of law" would include such questions as whether there was com-
petent evidence to support the findings. One court stated that judicial
review is quite well established and that erroneous findings cannot be
final.' 3 It remarked that the issues should be decided judicially and
not arbitrarily.
Proper notice of a hearing must be given, and the methods used by
administrative officials in notifying parties concerned may sometimes
be questioned. The action of California agricultural officials in pro-
ceeding with the formulation of a marketing and stabilization plan for
the milk industry in response to an expression of opinion obtained by
the sending of individual postcards accompanied by plan-supporting
letters was said to satisfy the demands of procedural due process.
14
During a serious emergency in New York milk officials devised a
plan to notify three thousand milk dealers by a press release and the
posting of a notice in the office of the Milk Control Board. Under the
circumstances of emergency this notice was held to be sufficient.15
The agencies established for the regulation and/or supervision of
the milk industry can be classified into several well-defined groups. In
a few states there are two or more bodies, some with overlapping and
interrelated functions. Special supervisory agencies are set up under
the federal program and the laws of twenty-four states. Most of the
jurisdictions in this category have milk commissions or similar bodies.
In this classification are the agencies of the federal government 6 and
the states of Alabama, 17 Florida,'8 Georgia, 19 Maine,20 Massachusetts,
21
Montana,22 Nevada,23 New Hampshire, 24 New Jersey,25 New York,
26
North Carolina,2 7 Pennsylvania,28 Rhode Island,29 South Carolina, 0
"2 Milk Marketing Bd. v. Johnson, 295 Mich 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
"3 Andes Co-op. Dairy Co. v. Baldwin, 238 App. Div. 726, 266 N.Y. Supp. 18
(1933).(13Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).
Baldwin v. Dellwood. Dairy Co., 150 Misc. 762, 270 N.Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct.
1934)." 49 Stat. 753 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7C) (1958).
7ALA. CODE fit. 22, § 207 (Supp. 1955)." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.03 (Supp. 1959).
"0 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-525 (1957).
"0 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. chi. 33, § 2 (Supp. 1959).
" MASS. ANN. LAWS ci. 94A, § 2 (1954).
"MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 27-404 (Supp. 1959).
" NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 584.420 (Supp. 1959).
"N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 183:1, :3 (1955).
"N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 4:1-24 to -41 (1959)."N.Y. AGic. & MKTs. LAWS §§ 252.
'T N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.7 (Supp. 1959).
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-201 (1958).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN §§ 21-4-2 (1956).
"S.C. CODE § 32-1610.1 (Supp. 1959).
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South Dakota,3 ' Vermont, 2, Virginia,"3 and Washington. 4 In an-
other group are the states which have milk or dairy commissioners,
including Arizona, 5 Connecticut, 6 Kansas,37 New Mexico," North
Dakota,3 9 and Tennessee.40 In California41 and Texas42 local boards
operate under the state departments of agriculture, a practice somewhat
similar to the set-up in Utah where the administration is left in the
hands of the State Board of Agriculture 4 while the local boards handle
the marketing44 with the state board in a supervisory capacity.4 Idaho
has a Director of Dairying46 but puts inspection in the hands of the
Departments of Health47 and Agriculture48 while investing the Depart-
ment of Health alone with the licensing power.40 Iowa has a Dairy
Industry Commission50 with promotional and statistical duties and an-
other agency with certain inspection duties which is known as the State
Dairy Association. 1 The established control agencies are variously
related to pre-eminent authorities such as departments of agriculture
under the federal statute and in California, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and Tennessee, and there is a special departmental dairy
division in Oklahoma.5 2 State departments of agriculture have a general
and to a certain degree varying authority over the milk industry in
another group of states. This power takes the form of general super-
vision and sanitary regulation in Colorado,53 Illinois,"4 Louisiana, 5
"S.D. CODE §§ 4.2202 (Supp. 1952)."VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, ch. 2503 (1958).
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-347 (Supp. 1958).
WAsH. REV. CODE § 15.44.020 (Supp. 1959).
"Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-602 (1956).
"CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-206 (1958). In 1959 the functions of the admin-
istrator were transferred to the Commissioner of Agriculture. CONN. GEN. STAT.
Rwv. § 22-206a (Supp. 1959).
'1 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1401 (1949).
"N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-13 (Supp. 1959). In 1959 the duties of the State
Dairy Commissioner were transferred to the Board of Regents of the Newv Mexico
College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, operating within the State Department
of Agriculture.
N.D. Rxv. CODE §§4-1701, -1702 (1943).0 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-2007 (Supp. 1959).
"CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 4251.
"Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 165-2, § 3 (1959).
"UTAH CODE ANN. § 5-2-4 (1953).
"UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 5-3-8 to -10 (1953).
"UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 5-3-2 to -7, -9 (1953).
"IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-501 (1948).
' IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-302 (1948).
"IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-401 (Supp. 1959).
"IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-802, -804 (1948).
'" IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 179-2 (1949).
"IOVA CODE ANN. §§ 178-1 (1949).
"OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 7-1 (Supp. 1959).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-1 (1953).
"IL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, §238 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
"LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:882, :883 (1951), as amended, LA. Rtv. STAT.
ANN. § 40:882 (Supp. 1959).
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Maryland,56 Michigan, 57 Minnesota,58 Mississippi,5" Missouri,0 Ne-
braska,61 Ohio,62 Oregon, 63 West Virginia,64 Wisconsin,6 5 and Wyo-
ming.60 The State Board of Health seems to be entrusted with super-
visory authority over the milk industry in Arkansas67 and Indiana
68
and to a certain extent in Maryland,69 Oregon, 70 and Texas.71 Medical
milk commissions have been established in a few states.72 As far as the
administrative control of the milk industry is concerned, there has been
little or no effort in Kentucky on a statewide basis.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
When certain terminology is employed in a milk control statute, it
becomes important to ascertain its meaning and the circumstances sur-
rounding its use. The industry has its own jargon which is unintel-
ligible to those not connected with the production, handling, or distri-
bution of milk or its derivative products. The usual statute is replete
with terms which require statutory and judicial definition and interpre-
tation. The same is true of statutes governing the industry in states
other than those having milk control laws.
The construction of terms employed in such statutes tends to be
fairly strict, as is shown by an interpretation of the words "producer"
and "dealer" used in an Alabama price-fixing provision as not including
one who sold milk to customers who solicited its purchase at the door
and furnished their own containers.7" A Louisiana court held that one
who had once owned a herd of cattle, but whose animals had been
reduced to a few heifers not yet in the milking stage, was not actually
engaged in the "production of milk" in such a manner as to make him
eligible for membership on a state milk administrative agency. 74 In a
now defunct Indiana milk control statute the term "producer-distribu-
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 66c, §§ 440-42 (1957).
" MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 12.615, .615(1) (1958).
" MINK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.01 to .04 (1946), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.01, .013 (Supp. 1959).
"Miss. CoDy AiN. § 4560-41 (1957).
"Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.535 (Supp. 1959).
NEBs. REv. STAT. § 81-229 (1958).
0OHio REV. CODE §§ 917.02, .03 (Anderson 1954).
ORE REv. STAT. §§ 616.005 to .025 (Supp. 1955).6GW. VA. CODE ANN. § 2038 (1955).
"WIs. STAT. ANN. §93.07(17), (20), (24) (a) (1957).
Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-15, 35-283 (1957).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-915 (1947).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2505 (1949)"; IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2504 (Supp. 1959).
"MD. ANN. CoDE art. 43, § 575 (1957).
~ORE. Rr~v. STAT. §§ 616.005 to .025 (Supp. 1955).7 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4420 (1951).2 .Rg, Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.181 to .191 (1956); Nj. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-
77 to -88 (1940).
4" Taylor v. State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 237 Ala. 178, 186 So.
463 (1939).
7, Ricks v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 32 So. 2d 643 (La. Ct. App. 1947).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tor" was employed as referring to one controlling a dairy herd who put
milk in bottles or other containers, who cooled or otherwise processed
the product, and who sold or distributed such milk. The words "such
milk" thus used were interpreted as not referring to just any milk
produced by someone controlling a herd, but as indicating milk placed in
containers, cooled or otherwise. Hence it was held that a farmer selling
milk in bulk without making any processing effort was not a producer-
distributor and therefore could not be classified as a "milk dealer" within
a statute connecting the two applications and requiring a license.75 In
another instance a California court said that the term "distributors"
used in milk marketing legislation refers to distributors of fluid milk
and cream and does not include those who manufacture or sell dairy
products of other kinds.76 In regard to rules and regulations of adminis-
trative agencies like milk control boards a similar strict construction
can be said to be the proper one.
77
A basic term used in the statutes under consideration is the term
"milk" itself. By far the greater number of state statutes define this
term as referring to the cow's or other animal's "lacteal secretion." 8
Two states of this group vary the definition somewhat in other statutes,70
and in several others different definitions exist.
80
A Virginia statute described a market as any city, county, or village
in the jurisdiction along with the surrounding territory. As here em-
ployed the term "market" was held to refer only to territory within
state boundaries.81
Sometimes a term will be used differently in conjunction with two
or more other terms. Thus the phrase "orders and regulations" has
" Milk Control Bd. v. Pursifull, 219 Ind. 396, 38 N.E.2d 246 (1941).
" In re Willing, 12 Cal. 2d 591, 86 P.2d 663 (1939)." Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
8SALA. CODE tit. 2, § 187; fit. 22, 8206 (1940); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 82-912
(1947); CAL. AGRIC. CODE 8742; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y, §8221 (Smith-Hurd
1951) ; Iv. ANN. STAT. 8 15-1726 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 65-707 (Supp.
1959); MlcH. STAT. ANN. 8 12.601 (1956); Miss. CODE ANN. § 4537 (1957);
Mo. AN,. STAT. § 196.525(37) (Supp. 1959) ; N~. RV. STAT. §881-230(7) (1958);
NI.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 184:36 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:10-1 (Supp. 1959);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §4:12A-1 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. 852-1-18 (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. AGUc. & MKTS. LAWS 846; N.C. Gmi. STAT. §8106-266.6 (Sup . 1959);
N.D. REv. CODE § 4-18A01 (Supp. 1957); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 225-1 (Supp.
1959) ; OPX. IZv. STAT. § 621.055 (Supp. 1957); S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 186
(Supp. 1959); S.D. CODE § 22.0501 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN. §52-303(5)
(1955); TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 165-2, § 2(e) (1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 4-21-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 3-346 (1950) ; WAs H. REv. CODE § 15.36.010
(Supp. 1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. §2037(a) (Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.02(5) (1957) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35-279 (1957).
7 9N.Y. AGRIC. & MxTS. LAWS § 253; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-260 (1952).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 22-127, -192, -205 (1958) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.02
(Supp. 1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-524 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 1
(1951) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 584.355 (Supp. 1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 645,
700j103 (1958); -I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 21-4-1 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§2502 (1958).
8Pet Dairy Prods. Co. v. State Milk Conmen, 195 Va. 396, 78 S.E.2d 645
(1953).
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been said to comprise those acts of administrative officials with respect
to which the legislative element predominates and which establish a
pattern thereafter to be followed, whereas the phrase "orders and
determinations" used in another provision has been construed to refer
to actions in which there is more of the judicial function and which deal
with a particular and present situation.
8 2
A co-operative which received milk in its own approved plant in
behalf of a corporation whose plant was closed was held to be a "handler"
within the terms of a federal administrative order and therefore subject
to required contributions to a fund for producers, despite the co-opera-
tive's status as a mere gratuitous bailee which had no relationship to
the transaction other than a rather nebulous agency arrangement.
83
A provision of the Federal Agricultural Adjustment Act requires
administrative officials to classify milk in accordance with the form in
which or purpose for which it is to be used. In an instance where milk
had been processed into cream at a handler's plant and then shipped to
another party to be made into ice cream, this provision was held to be
disjunctive and a right was recognized on the part of administrative
officials to classify for price-fixing purposes solely according to the use
of the product by the handler and without regard to the ultimate in-
tended use by the transferee.8 4 It was argued that the word "form"
as here employed would refer solely to the state in which the milk would
be marketed for ultimate consumption, thus indicating an ice cream
classification here. The court refused to adopt this view and declared
it would not sanction any interpretation which would obliterate the
differentiation between the terms "form" and "purpose" and thus result
in cancelling out of the statute the language concerning use. It seems
that it is the handler's use of the product that controls the operation of
the established formula. Moreover, the term "use" or the past tense
"used" as employed in the act has not been construed in a liberal man-
ner. One court has remarked that in respect to classification these words
are entitled to be given a practical significance in relation to the activities
of the handlers and their manner of doing business.8 5
A federal milk order for the New York metropolitan area followed
the familiar practice of classifying milk in accordance with its use by
the handlers. A proviso stated that if the product was moved from the
original receiving plant to a second plant and thence transferred in a
form that was in a class to which a lower price was attached by the
order's classification, it might be classified according to the utilization at
the second plant. In one instance a dairy products company which had
82Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
8 Shawangunk Co-op. Dairies, Inc. v. Jones, 153 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1946).sQueensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1943).
Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1946).
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processed milk into cream shipped its product in large refrigerated
trucks to a distributing plant of its own in Long Island City. Some
of the cream was unloaded at the plant platform and then reloaded into
smaller trucks for delivery to various customers. The remaining por-
tion was transshipped in the street alongside the plant. The court held
that the transfer to trucks was an operation at a "second plant" and
that the Market Administrator had been right in classifying the cream
on that basis.8 6 In another instance a handler sold cream from some
of the milk delivered at its country plant to a milk broker who ordered
that it be shipped by rail and truck to the refrigeration rooms of a
creamery. Later the cream was delivered in the original containers to
a candy factory in another city for use in making milk chocolate. The
court upheld the market administrator's finding that the creamery was




The statutory provisions respecting licenses or permits are many
and there is much variation in wording.8 8 A typical statute makes pro-
Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1943).Wetmiller Dairy & Farm Prod. Co. v. Wickard, 149 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1945).
8 ALA. CODE tit. 2, § 193; tit. 22, §§ 213-215, 217 (1940); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 3-607 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-915 (1947); CAL. AGRIC. CODE
§§ 4244, 4375-86, 4410, 4415; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-7(15) (1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 22-172, -173, -176 to -178, -229 to -234, -236 to -238 (1958),
as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 22-230, -236, -237 (Supp. 1959); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 3103 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.09 (1943); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 42.515, .533, to .535 .543 to .546 (1957), as amended, GA.
CODE ANN. § 42.535 (Supp. 1958) ; IDAHO CODE §§ 37-802, -804 (1948) ; ILL
ANN. STAT ch. 56Y2, §§222, 223, 228-34 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 35-2508, -2523 to -2527, -2529, -2530 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-1736 to
-1739, -1741 (Supp. 1959) ; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 192.1 to .4, 195.15 to .19 (1949) ;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-708, -722 to -24 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 260.330, .370, .440 to .510 (1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 92 (Supp.
1959) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 93, 94; ch. 33, § 5 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, §§ 570, 571 (1957) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 40-42, 42B, 43; ch. 94A
§§4-9 (1954); MICHI. STAT. ANN. §§12.609, .610 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31.61, 32.071 to .075, .09, .10 (Supp. 1959) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4540, 4543, 4545-
05, 4560-22, -26, -27, -35, -45, 4565, 4570(3), (15) (1957) ; MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 4560-24 (Supp. 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 71.720, 73.110(17), 77.560, 79.370,
196.575, .606 to .620 (1952) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 75-110(18), 196.605 (Supp. 1959) ;
MONT. R V. CODES ANN.§§ 3-2408, -2416 to -2418 (1957) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 27408 to -411 (1957), as amended, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 27-409, -410
(Supp.. 1959) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 46-232, -233 (1954) ; NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 81-238 -239, -242, -245 to -250 (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 584.180, .185, .195,
.210 (1957) ; NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 584.595, .615 (Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 183:11, 184:4 to :8, 185:1 to :3, :9, :14, :15 (1955); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 183:9, 185:4 (Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:12-2, -3, -5, -6, -14, -17, -18,
-19, -41.3, -41.4 (1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-2 to -6, -9, -10, -22 to -31
(1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-14, -16 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS.
LAWS §§257, 258a, 258-c, 258-d, 258-i; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-266.8(k), -266.9
(Supp. 1959); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 4-1802 to -1805 (1943); Omo REV. CODE
§§ 917.04 to .06, .09, .10, .18 (Anderson 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 7-6
(Supp. 1959) ; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 621.070 to .080, .161, .171 (Supp. 1957) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, §§ 646-49, 700j401 to 700j412 (1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN §§ 21-4-
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vision for the procedure and methods employed in the issuance of
licenses of various types and the manner of their renewal, suspension,
or revocation. Administrative boards or other agencies are entrusted
with the duty of carrying out the legislative mandate. These officials
may have state-wide or merely local powers.
An application for license or permit, whether it be made by a pro-
ducer, handler, distributor, or manufacturer, must be made before the
proper authorities as designated by the several statutes. If all require-
ments are met by the applicant, the administrative officials cannot refuse
to issue the proper documents. The reason for a refusal to grant a license
must be legally sufficient. Thus a refusal to license a manufacturer of
frozen desserts because the plant would constitute a traffic hazard was
not allowed to stand. The court declared that the danger of accidents
at the prospectively crowded place of business was not a sufficient rea-
son for declining to approve the application.8 9
Sometimes licensing officials are in doubt about the proper applica-
tion of statutes or regulations to various persons who come to their
attention. In one such instance a farmer who was selling about six per
cent of his total production of milk to neighbors at their request was
ruled not to be selling to the "public" within the proper interpretation
of a statute requiring licenses of persons serving hotels, restaurants,
boarding houses, or the public generally.90 The court remarked that the
statute had not been meant to require a license for every farmer who
sells a pint of milk to his neighbor. However, in a New York case
the operator of a dairy farm who sold an unstated quantity of milk
directly to consumers in a nearby city was declared to be within the
meaning of a statute requiring "milk dealers" to be licensed.9 1 A pro-
viso of the instant statute stated that "a producer who delivers milk
only to a milk dealer" would not be considered a "milk dealer" within
the statute. The court was of the opinion that the proviso could not be
extended to include a dairyman who was selling milk directly to cus-
5(g), -4-6 to -12, -4-19, -5-19, -5-20, -7-1 to -5 (1956), as amended, RI. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 21-4-9 (Supp. 1959) (compare R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-2-1 to -3
(1956)); S.C. CODE §§ 32-1610.9 to -1610.14, -1634.11 to -1634.24 (Supp. 1959);
S.D. CODE § 4.1903 to .1907 (1939), as amended, S.D. CODE § 4.1903 (Supp. 1952) ;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-313 to -316 (1955); Tzx REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts,
165-2, § 7, 165-3, § 3 (1959); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 10576 (1948); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-9, 5-2-4, -3-18, -3-20, -3-26 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1963 (1958); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 6, § 1964 (Supp. 1959); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-307, -360, -364 to -367, -398, -452 to -454, -458 to -463 (1950) ; WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 15.32.100, .110 (1951); WASH. REv. CODE § 15.36.080 (Supp. 1959); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2038(1) (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 97.04(2), .05, .06, 100.06
(1957); Wyo. Con'. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-66, 35-290 (1957). Importation permits
are provided for in 44 Stat. 1101 (1927), 21 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
89 Chamberland v. Selectmen of Middleborough, 328 Mass. 628, 105 N.E.2d
389 (1952).People v. Powell, 280 Mich. 699, 274 N.W. 372 (1937).
"Baldwin v. Burdick, 243 App. Div. 250, 276 N.Y. Supp. 675 (1935).
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tomers in the city or anywhere else. He was classified as a producer-
distributor and therefore subject to regulation and restrictions imposed
on every milk dealer. In another instance, moreover, an Indiana dis-
tributor, after expiration of a previous license, sold a large portion of
his product, and later the whole amount, in bottles bearing caps desig-
nating it as "cat and dog milk." It was understood that the public
thought of the product as being inferior but considered it fit for human
consumption. The distributor had followed the customary manner of
getting the milk to the public. The court said that this was an unworthy
attempt to process milk and sell it without a license.92 A penalty under
a milk control statute was imposed and an injunction granted.
Under broad powers given by statute a West Virginia health council
promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of milk without a permit
from county officials. This regulation was held valid, though no statute
expressly authorized the council to make the granting of a permit a
prerequisite for conducting business.9 3 The court evidently considered
the permit as a formal certification that the milk to be sold by a named
vendor had been produced under council rules.
The authority to license is often stated in such a manner as to give
the issuing official a certain degree of discretion. Unless the authority
is arbitrarily exercised or an abuse of rights is shown, the official's de-
cision is not open to question.9 4 This is particularly true where a mis-
take has been made by a subordinate official and corrected by a superior
whose discretion was in question. 95 Where there is a definite legal
right to the license, however, proper relief in the form of a writ of man-
damus must be granted.9 6
A person properly licensed under an act concerning the manufacture
and sale of ice cream and who is engaged solely in that business cannot
be forced to obtain an additional license as a milk dealer under statutes
controlling the fluid milk industry.
97
Anyone who desires to sell milk in a community may be required
to obtain a license, and this is true notwithstanding the existence of a
statute giving every farmer the right to sell his produce in any place
or market.98 It is also true that proper inspection may be required as
a condition of the right to carry on a milk business. 99
' Milk Control Bd. v. Phend, 104 Ind. App. 196, 9 N.E.2d 121 (1937).
State v. Bunner, 126 W. Va. 280, 27 S.E.2d 823 (1943).
", Walker v. City of Birmingham, 216 Ala. 206, 112 So. 823 (1927); City of
Wewoka v. Rose Lawn Dairy, 202 Okla. 286, 212 P.2d 1056 (1949).
" State ex rel. Peterson v. Martin, 180 Ore. 459, 176 P.2d 636 (1947).
" State ex rel. Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Town of Shelbyville, 192 Tenn. 194,
240 S.W.2d 239 (1951).97 Commonwealth v. Snee, 80 Pa. D. & C. 391 (1951).
City of Quincy v. Burgdorf, 235 Ill. App. 560 (1924).
City of Newport v. Hiland Dairy Co., 291 Ky. 561, 164 S.W.2d 818 (1942).
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Although a municipality is entitled to make reasonable regulations
to insure the purity of milk brought into its boundaries, its officials
cannot adopt ordinances, or measures under existing ordinances, to
guarantee such purity which at the same time will prevent the sale or
distribution in the city of milk that is in fact pure, wholesome, and in
every way unobjectionable for human consumption. A Pennsylvania
applicant for a permit to sell milk in a certain city was shown to have
been licensed by the State Milk Control Commission and there was no
evidence that the product offered for sale was impure. The reason for
the city's refusal to issue the permit had been that some of the applicant's
supplying farms were as much as two hundred miles away and that it
could prove administratively difficult and impractical for city health
officials and milk inspectors to examine all these farms and the plants
where the milk was pasteurized. These reasons were held not to con-
stitute sufficient grounds for the refusal to issue the permit.100 How-
ever, the city was given a choice in regard to the matter. Either the
officials, at their option and after such reasonably efficacious inspections
of the applicant's dairy farms, pasteurization plants, and distributing
stations as was expedient under the circumstances, were required to
make a proper decision or a mandamus might be applied for to compel
the issuance of the permit. If they found from the investigation that
the production, care, and treatment of the applicant's milk sufficiently
complied with the city's sanitary and public health regulations, a permit
would necessarily be forthcoming immediately.
A Kentucky city ordinance exempted "farm products" from payment
of sales license fees. Certain milk producers who were engaged in the
sale and distribution of milk within the city and whose product came
from outside the city limits were held not to be exempt from the payment
of these fees.' 0 '
License fees which raise only enough money to pay all or a portion
of the cost of administration are not considered to be "taxes" within the
usual meaning of the term as used in certain constitutional and statutory
provisions.' 0 2 Neither can such a fee be considered as an "occupation
tax" within a statute preventing cities from imposing such taxes upon
producers of farm products.'0 3 Moreover, license fees are not invalid
because some surplus revenue is produced, but in such case the assess-
ment must have been incidental to the regulation of the industry and
not primarily for the purpose of producing revenue. 0 4 Of course ex-
100 Otto Milk Co. v. Rose, 375 Pa. 18, 99 A.2d 467 (1953).
101 Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736, 125
S.W.2d 216 (1939).... Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d
705 (1939); Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, supra note
101. ' Dorssom v. City of Atchison, 155 Kan. 225, 124 P.2d 475 (1942).
10" Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.H. 527, 96 A.2d 733 (1953).
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cessive or unreasonable fees would be invalid, as is seen when one notes
the invalidation of a city ordinance in Oklahoma which required the
payment by processors of additional license and inspection fees which
had been levied against the producers and had not been paid by them. 0 5
A New Hampshire city ordinance limiting the issuance of non-resi-
dent permits to such applicants as already held them has been declared
invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws. 106 A very similar
New York regulation provided that an applicant for a particular class
permit to deliver milk as an independent distributor in the metropolitan
area must be of sufficient experience in the industry and must have been
a bona fide independent milk distributor therein prior to a certain date.
This regulation would certainly seem to limit any future permits to
those distributors already in business. However, the court ruled that
equal protection was not denied.' 07 The dissenting judge cited the New
Hampshire decision and wrote an opinion taking the view that the regu-
lation was invalid. It is believed that the New Hampshire view is the
correct one.
In a highly populated area like New York state the competitive
situation in the milk industry makes itself felt at all times in the struggle
for markets. Particularly is this true in days of economic depression
when markets get scarce. During such periods small business firms
may be squeezed and driven to the wall. The surviving larger com-
panies may wish to expand with the coming of better times and take
up the slack left by the bankruptcy of small business in the area. There
also may be a tendency to overcrowd existing markets. To combat
such forces the advocates of a stabilized economy have turned more and
more toward statutory and administrative controls. In New York an
application for the entrance or extension of a milk dealer's business into
an area depends upon whether the public interest is served. Adminis-
trative officials must determine whether the market is adequately served,
whether the applicant is qualified by way of character and equipment,
and whether the additional facilities will create a destructive competition
within the local marketing area. 08 On hearing the evidence the adminis-
trative officials are supposed to approve or deny the application. One
court has said that an administrative order in such cases should be con-
firmed in the absence of testimony showing that the determination was
arbitrary or capricious or that there had been no competent proof of
05 City of Henrietta v. Rose Lawn Dairy, 205 Okla. 590, 239 P.2d 774 (1952).
... Whitney v. Watson, 85 N.H. 238, 157 Atl. 78 (1931).
... Stracquadanio v. Department of Health, 285 N.Y. 93, 32 N.E.2d 806 (1941),
affirming 259 App. Div. 994, 20 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1940).
... Dusinberre v. Noyes, 284 N.Y. 304, 31 N.E.2d. 34 (1940); Elite Dairy
Prods., Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 271 N.Y. 488, 3 N.E.2d 606 (1936); Application of
Jones, 1 App. Div. 2d 920, 149 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1956) ; Application of Grandview
Dairy, Inc., 273 App. Div. 921, 77 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1948).
[Vol. 38
1960] MILK CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 433
facts that had influenced the decision. 109 The fact that dealers already
serving the community were operating at less than full capacity could
be influential in a refusal to allow additional milk concerns to enter the
area. 110 The number of dealers in a community may be largely determina-
tive. 111 When an area was adequately served it was not deemed suffi-
cient that an extension applicant could supply the communities under
consideration with milk of high butterfat content from Guernsey and
Jersey cows, there being little demand in that neighborhood for premium
milk of this type." 2  The application for an extension must be free from
false statements in regard to the areas previously served. 1 13  Delivery
of milk in certain localities without a license has also been held to be
a cogent reason for declining to approve an application. 1 14 There must
be sufficient need for additional service, and an administrative decision
that destructive competition would come about as the result of the
licensing of a second dealer in a village with a population of 2,300, the
daily deliveries of the community's lone handler amounting to 970
quarts, was held not to be contrary to the weight of the evidence."15
With respect to the matter of proving that the issuance or extension
of a license will tend to bring about destructive competition among milk
operators in the vicinity the burden of proof on judicial review is upon
the administrative officials. 116
Under provisions of the New York statute no city health officer
shall approve premises upon which milk is produced or handled or
authorize the shipment of milk therefrom for sale or use within the
state without a definite showing that the proposed added milk supply
is needed and that no other municipality will thereby be deprived of its
supply. It is also necessary to show that the new supply may be in-
spected without too great expense. All these elements must be shown
to satisfy administrative officials." 7  It would seem that under this
statute the health officials would have to show that the qualifications
had been met. Where a formal request for an extension was attached
to an existing license, however, the health officials were relieved of the
necessity of taking affirmative action to satisfy the Commissioner of
Agriculture in respect to these matters." 8
..9 Application of Bullis, 276 App. Div. 882, 93 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1949).
'"Application of Kotcher, 3 App. Div. 2d 957, 162 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1957).
.. Grimstead v. Carey, 1 App. Div. 2d 985, 150 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1956).
113 In re Ginsberg, 2 App. Div. 2d 733, 152 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1956).
113Application of Goldstein, 279 App. Div. 965, 111 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1952).
Petition of Kyes, 273 App. Div. 829, 75 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1948)..1. Application of Williams, 282 App. Div. 76, 121 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1953).
Friendship Dairies, Inc. v. DuMond, 248 App. Div. 147, 131 N.Y.S.2d 51
(1954).117Dellwood Dairy Co. v. Brown, 106 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Washburn's Dairy, Inc. v. Mansfield, 200 Misc. 1017, 112 N.Y.S.2d 274
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
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In granting a license to move into an area served by other interests
the administrator is not required to give reasons or to make formal
findings, and the courts should confirm his decision unless it can be
shown that the action was arbitrary or capricious or that the official
did not have before him all of the pertinent facts.'1 9
The economic interest of a milk dealer already entrenched in a mar-
keting area does not entitle him to be heard on matters of constitutional
rights prior to the admission of others into the territory, the due process
clause making no guarantee of freedom from economic competition in
spite of the fact that the new ventures may seriously affect the interests
of those already operating in the vicinity. 120
Where the refusal to permit an additional facility interferes with the
flow or volume of interstate commerce in milk, the Supreme Court has
held that state authorities may not promote the economic interests of the
state's own residents by refusing to allow a firm doing an interstate busi-
ness to establish an additional store within an area alleged to be over-
crowded.121 As pointed out in dissenting opinions, this holding, if not
circumscribed by a limited application, might easily destroy or badly
upset the whole fabric of a state milk control program. The language of
the majority opinion might well be interpreted to mean that an interstate
operator could not be excluded or limited even when the marketing area
was oversupplied.
In some other jurisdictions the surfeiting of the market will not always
justify a refusal to issue a license. In Oregon administrative officials
were held not to be authorized to deny a license permitting a dealer to
purchase milk in one marketing area for processing in another followed
by return to the first area for sale in the applicant's store merely for
the reasons that the community was receiving adequate service and that
the added facility would have an adverse effect upon persons already in
business. 22  The court remarked that the important question was
whether or not the applicant was equipped to render efficient and re-
sponsible service to the community. In a New Jersey case1 28 the deci-
sion in favor of the applicant seems to have been influenced a great deal
by a stipulation in the statement of facts before the court asserting that
the corporate applicant had a license authorizing it to "sell and distribute
milk in the state." The court repudiated the contention that privileges
under state permits were limited to localities named therein. The health
officials of the affected community were said to have no discretionary
;Application of Bullis, 276 App. Div. 882, 93 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1949).Application of Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, Inc., 282 App. Div. 69, 121
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1953).
11 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. y. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), re'versing 297
N.Y. 209, 78 N.E.2d 476 (1948).
122 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 198 Ore. 43, 255 P.2d 564
(1953).
123 Sheffield Farms, Co. v. Seaman, 114 N.J.L. 455, 177 AtI. 372 (1935).
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authority in a situation of this kind. The city's negative decision would
be set aside where it was based merely upon the allegations that the
present supply of milk was adequate and that the community was sur-
feited with milk dealers. The city authorities lacked funds for a thor-
ough investigation and had admitted that they had no knowledge with
respect to the quality of the applicant's milk or concerning the sanitary
conditions under which it was prduced, handled, and marketed. The
court declared that there was no justification for the refusal to grant
the permit. The applicant's right to engage in a lawful business could
not be curtailed in this manner. This case was decided under early
statutes and would not necessarily be followed under more modern
laws.
A New York license authorized a milk company to distribute its
product in places named in the application "and others." This language
was interpreted in such a manner that the distribution of milk in a city
not named in the application would be unauthorized. 24 It was apparent
that there would have to be a request for an extension.
As far as the extension or renewal of a milk dealer's license is con-
cerned, the administrative agencies and courts may take into considera-
tion past compliance or non-compliance with laws and regulations, the
adequacy of equipment, and the financial responsibility of the ap-
plicant 125
Under the police power a provision of a statute which authorized the
suspension of a permit to transport, sell, offer for sale, or store milk
or milk products has been held valid, since other provisions made it
clear that there could be no revocation without a hearing and that an
allegedly recalcitrant licensee would be given an opportunity to present
his side of the matter.'2 6 The action of the Pennsylvania Milk Control
Commission in revoking a dealer's license for failure to make minimum
monthly payments to producers as he was commanded to do by a general
order requiring payment before the fifteenth day of each succeeding
month was not disturbed upon appeal to the courts, even though the
dealer had in other months of the license year made payments in excess
of the minimum requirements which aggregated more than the below-
minimum underpayments made in the spring months.' 2 7  In the same
jurisdiction it was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable to suspend a
dealer's license for giving away free samples of milk to demonstrate new
"' Crowley's Milk Co. v. Ten Eyck, 270 N.Y. 328, 1 N.E.2d 119 (1936),
affirming 246 App. Div. 654, 283 N.Y. Supp. 166 (1935).
... Application of Echelman, 283 App. Div. 276, 127 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1954);
Buhler v. Department of Agriculture and Mkts., 2Z, Wis. 133, 280 N.W. 367
(1938).
2Sunny Brook Farms v.. Omdahl, 42 Wash. 2d 788, 259 P.2d 383 (1953).
, Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n v. Royale Dairy Co.. 73 Pa. D. & C. 431
(1948).
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products or containers. 2 8 The court noted the lack of any specific
prohibition and pointed out that the practice had been permitted in a
few instances. The court declared that it was unreasonable for the Milk
Commission, for an alleged violation, to direct as punishment that the
dealer cease all operations for a fifteen-day period, starting five days
after notice. It was said that any such order would work a hardship
upon producers and consumers as well as the dealer and would make
it very difficult for him to maintain his establishment, thereby endangering
his livelihood.
Marketing areas are usually marked out by milk control authorities
and licenses are commonly issued with these areas in mind. Thus a
license may be limited to one or more towns, districts, or counties. These
marketing areas are sometimes referred to in statutes as "milk sheds"'12
and may be altered and rearranged with impunity. 80
BONDING PROVISIONS
Under statutes concerning the milk industry bonds are sometimes
required to protect the interests of various groups. A common one is
the bond of a distributor or handler used to secure payments and thus
protect producers from the hazards of a complex economy and the
risks inherent in the marketing of a perishable commodity. These bonds
and the equalization funds set up under some statutes form the chief
protective devices which make the lot of the dairy farmer a little less
unstable. Examples of statutory bonds securing the satisfaction of milk-
purchasing agreements are seen in the laws of some states. 1 1 In a
rather early case'3 2 the Maine court held invalid an act requiring opera-
tors of milk-gathering stations, as a condition of obtaining a license, to
give a bond to secure the payment of purchases of milk and cream which
they might acquire. The statute was said to be violative of the equal
protection guarantee because the bonds would be required with respect
to the milk industry and not to others which the court deemed to be just
as important from the standpoint of amenability to regulation. The
court seemed to believe that there was no fair, just, or reasonable con-
"' Greenville Dairy Co. v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n, 68 Pa. D. & C.
597 (1949).
... See AiA. CODE fit. 22, § 209 (1940) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-524, -527 (1957);
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-528 (Supp. 1958) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.24 (1957).
18o Taylor v. State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 237 Ala. 178, 186,
So. 463 (1939).
181 See ALA. CoDE fit. 22, § 216 (1940); CAL. AGRiC. CODE §§ 4376-80, 4382,
4385; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 22-239 to -242 (1958) ; DEi.. CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§§ 3161-74 (1953); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:641 to -645, as amended, LA. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3:641; :645 (Supp. 1959) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 42A-42E
(1954) ; Nzv. Rzv. STAT. §§ 584.600 to .615, .625, .640 (Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§4:12-4, -9, -11 (1959); N.Y. ARiuc. & MKTS. LAWS §258-b; Onio REv.
CODE § 917.14 (Anderson 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j501 to 513 (1958);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 5-3-19 (1953).
182 State v. Old Tavern Farm Inc., 133 Me. 468, 180 Atl. 473 (1935).
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nection between this bonding requirement and the common good. The
view of the dissenting judge that the legislature should have the right
to enact such protective measures under the police power would be more
likely to be followed today. In fact the validity of such bonding pro-
visions seems to have been approved in a Pennsylvania case' 3 3 where
a milk dealer and the surety on his bond were both barred from denying
responsibility because of the asserted unconstitutionality of the bonding
requirements. However, the assigned reason for denying the requested
relief was that both named parties, having obtained the approval of the
Milk Control Board by tendering the required bond with the application
for a license, were not afterwards to be heard denying liability on the
bond. The view that such provisions are valid finds support in a Cali-
fornia decision approving the requirement of such bonds for the purpose
of securing distributors' indebtedness to producers. 34
In an early New York case the lower courts took the view that such
security provisions could not be supported as a proper use of the police
power. Language was employed indicating an opinion that the bonding
requirement had not been enacted primarily as a deterrent to fraud and
chicanery but with the purpose of making ordinary debts for the pur-
chase of milk more readily collectible. 3 5 However, the Court of Ap-
peals denied that any constitutional guarantees had been violated.'
3 6
A federal case from New Jersey concerned the bonds deposited with
state agricultural officials to protect producers who had supplied milk
to a corporate milk dealer who had gone into a receivership. The court
summarily directed the bonds to be turned over to the receiver for dis-
tribution to unpaid producers. 3 7 The funds arising from the bonds
would be administered apart from the other receivership assets for the
producers' benefit. Under New Jersey law the resident producers were
preferred over the non-resident producers. The proceeds from the bonds
were insufficient to satisfy the claims in full, and all resident producers
who had properly filed their claims were said to be entitled to a ratable
share of the funds.
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
The collection of statistics concerning one or more stages of the milk
marketing process is specifically referred to in the statutes of many
jurisdictions, 138 and much additional information of this kind is avail-
"' Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Ortwein, 132 Pa. Super. 166, 200 Atl.
859 (1938).
... In the Matter of Willing, 12 Cal. 2d 591, 86 P.2d 663 (1939).
135 People v. Perretta, 228 App. Div. 420, 239 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1930), affirming
134 Misc. 652, 236 N.Y. Supp. 293 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
People v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305, 171 N.E. 72 (1930).
217Young v. Pequest Dairy, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1935).
"I8 CAL. AGRic. CODE §§ 447, 448, 4403; IowA CoDE ANN. § 179.6 (Supp. 1959);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-701, 74-504b (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:932
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able, with limitations in some quarters, in required reports. Milk dealers
and distributors are required in various states to file reports which are
annual,139 monthly, 40 or indefinite as to time.14 1  Statutes in Idaho142
and South Dakota1 43 command producers to make annual reports. Some
regulatory commissions or other bodies are required by statute to make
reports, annual, 144 biennial,1 45 or even quarterly. 40
TRANSFER OF TITLE AND TRANSPORT
The production, sale, and transportation of milk may sometimes
generate special problems resulting in enough pressure to produce statu-
tory provisions enacted with the idea of meeting special needs or curing
particular abuses. State legislators have noted the varied problems as
they have arisen and have taken steps to remedy them.
Thus a few states have enacted statutes specifically making fraud in
the sale of milk an unlawful act.14 7 An Indiana statute148 makes inter-
ference with sales a felony, while a Massachusetts aCt 14 9 outlaws the sale
of sub-standard milk. North Carolina penalizes the raising of milk
(1951); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 42D, 42F, 42G (1954); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§28.506 (1938); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§32.18 to .20 (1946), as amended, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32.18, 19 (Supp. 1959) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 3-2403 (1957) ;
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 584.650, .665 (Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:12-12, :12A-
37, -54 to -56 (1959); N.Y. AGIC. & MKTS. LAWS §258-f; OHIO REy. CODE
§ 917.03 (Anderson 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 394 (1951); OKA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 295.4 (Supp. 1957) ; Om REV. STAT. §§ 621.191, .196 (Supp. 1957) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 653, 700j701 (1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-4-5(f)
(1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-400.36, -456 (1950) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 3-359.1 (Supp.
1958) (accounting systems); WASH. REV. CODE § 15.32.690 (1951); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 100.07 (1957).
"' ALA. CODE tit. 2, § 200 (1940); GA. CODE ANN. §-42-517 (1957); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 12.609 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.18 to .20 (1946), as
amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§32.19 (Supp. 1959); Miss. CODE ANN. §4552
(1957); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 584.650, .655 (Supp. 1959); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 184:75 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-256 (1952) ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 621.191,
.196 (Supp. 1957) ; S.D. CODE § 4.2207 (Supp. 1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-20-55
(1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 15.32.690 (1951).
"'0 CAL. Acic. CODE § 4400; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.09 (1943); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:932, :933 (1951) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-261 (1952); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 4-1809 (1943) ; OHIO REV. CODE: §§ 917.12, .13, .14, .17 (Anderson 1953) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 7-3 (Supp. 1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1969 (1958)
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.34.010, .020 (Supp. 1959).
141 ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 216, 219 (1940) ; MONT. REy. CODES ANN. § 27-416
(Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 183:12 (1955) N.Y. AGRIC. & MxTs. LAWS
§ 258-g; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j702 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE § 15.44.110
(Supp. 1959).
142 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-325 (1948).
'. S.D. CODE § 4.2207 (Supp. 1952).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.16 (1943) ; IOWVA CODE ANN. § 179.6 (Supp. 1959);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:10-17 (1940) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1237 (1942) ; R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-4-50 (f) (1956) ; S.D. CODE § 4.2209 (Supp. 1952) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, § 1967 (1958).
5UA CODE ANN. § 5-3-25 (1953).
140 Ore. Laws 1953, ch. 688, § 5, repealed in 1957.
147 CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 453; Ky. REV. STAT. § 217.060, .130 (1959) ; OHIO REV.
CODE §§ 3717.04, .32 to .34 (Anderson 1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 15.32.790 (1951).
"0 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4916 (1956).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 20, 22 (1954).
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from one class to another before resale 50 and sales below cost with the
idea of destroying competitors. 151 Sales tickets are authorized in New
Hampshire 2 and Vermont. 153
An exception in favor of milk is often made in respect to the Blue
Law prohibition against Sunday sales. 54 The validity of such an excep-
tion has been affirmed.155 A New York statute guaranteeing one day's
rest in seven makes an exception in the case of workers in dairies and
other milk products establishments. 56
Statutes in several states' 57 require milk to be transported in sanitary
vehicles, while a few' 58 make marking or lettering necessary. A Min-
nesota statute requiring that all railway shipments of milk in excess of
sixty-five miles be made in refrigerated cars, with an exception in the
case of products which were pasteurized, was declared unconstitutional
because it failed to distinguish between interstate and intrastate com-
merce.159
In states having milk control legislation problems concerning de-
liveries sometimes arise. The Virginia court has held that the Milk
Commission has a right, in the absence of unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious designations, to point out a proper place where producers
must make deliveries and where distributors must pick up their pur-
chases.160 It was ruled that the fact that the place designated for the
transfer was not within the marketing area to which the milk had been
assigned would not invalidate the order. A New York court approved
a provision in a license which it interpreted as requiring that deliveries
to a certain housing development be made at a central point where cus-
tomers could meet the trucks and carry the milk home and as not per-
"o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-263 (1952).1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.21 (Supp. 1959).
211 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 339:1, :2 (1955).
' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2051 (1958).
.. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-300 (Supp. 1959) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §521
(Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 578:4 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:171-6
(1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 908 (1958) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.4
1945); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 287 (1952); WAsHa. REv. CODE § 9.76.010
Supp. 1956).
. State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 123 A.2d 767 (1956) ; State v. Grabinski,
33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P.2d 1022 (1949).
N.Y. LAB. LAws § 161.
CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 530-32; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 226 (Smith-Hurd
1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 192.11 (1949) ; S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 195 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. CODE
§ 4-2011 (Supp. 1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 3-400.28 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 15.32.260, .270 (1951).
"I ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 24 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IoWA CODE ANN. § 192.5
(1949) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 24643, 24644 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-
312(3) (1955).
"" MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32.17 (1946),. declared unconstitutional in State v.
Chicago Great W.R.R., 125 Minn. 332, 147 N.W. 109 (1914).
Zo Southside Co-op. Milk Producers Ass'n Inc. v. State Milk Comm'n, 198 Va.
108, 92 S.E.2d 351 (1956).
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mitting door to door deliveries. 61 It was shown that the licensee had
misinterpreted this provision and had made such deliveries. Under
these circumstances the wholesale dealer was not permitted to challenge
the power of the commissioner to so limit the deliveries to the central
point where quantities of milk cases were shown to be available.
In New Jersey it was said that the Milk Authority had no delegated
power to regulate the hours of delivery in certain marketing areas.10 2
In an attempt to show that such power existed at that time the proponent
introduced a statement of purpose attached to an act which had repealed
a previous statute actually permitting the regulation of hours for de-
livery. This statement recited that it would be best for the Milk
Authority to control such hours. The court ruled that the statement
could not be read into the repealer in such a manner as to confer a
present authority. In California a federal court declared that it had
a duty to consider testimony concerning an alleged invasion of private
rights by a city ordinance regulating the time of milk deliveries.10 3 It
was said that such an investigation must be conducted before a decision
on the validity of the ordinance could be reached. The court declared
that the ordinance was presumed to be supported by factual circum-
stances rendering it valid. A temporary injunction pendente lite was
granted, the court being of the opinion that the enforcement of the
doubtfully valid ordinance would result in irreparable damage to the
complaining milk dealer and that little or no non-compensable damage
would result to the city if the ordinance could not be enforced for a
short while.
With refrigeration almost universal throughout the nation, it was
inevitable that milk dealers should propose deliveries on every other
day as an economy measure. In fact there are regulations in some
localities prohibiting deliveries more frequent than every forty-eight
hours. The courts have differed in their treatment of these provisions,
and there is much doubt about their validity. It may be said that the
wording of the particular statute or regulation under consideration has
greatly influenced the divergent views expressed concerning various
provisions. Such an order by an Alabama milk control agency was
approved in spite of a statute reciting that milk is a perishable com-
modity which must be produced and distributed fresh daily.10 4 The
court declared than an every-other-day staggered delivery system would
satisfy the mandate of the statute for daily deliveries, even though cus-
1.1In the Matter of Consumer-Farmer Co-op, Inc., 284 App. Div. 999, 135
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1954).162 Sherry v. Schomp, 31 N.J. Super. 267, 106 A.2d 350 (1954).
' 63Birkheiser v. City of Los Angeles, 11 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
.. Alabama State Milk Control Bd. v. Graham, 250 Ala. 49, 33 So. 2d 11
(1947).
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tomers would be compelled to become storers for a two-day supply.
However, a Pennsylvania court decided that the Milk Commission had
no authority to prohibit dealers from making deliveries more frequently
than every forty-eight hours.16 5 It was said that such a regulation
would be detrimental to dealers with an established clientele because it
would allow other dealers to make inroads into their groups of cus-
tomers by making deliveries on the days when the former could not.
The court was of the opinion that the regulation would violate the due
process guarantee. The argument that all dealers might use the same
tactics with respect to their competitors' customers was disregarded.
In a war-time case from New Hampshire a forty-eight hour restric-
tion of this kind was held valid with respect to transportation by ve-
hicles run by motor or equipped with rubber tires, there being emergency
restrictions on the use of gasoline and rubber, but void as to other
forms of transport.166 The order was not wholly void because it was
unconstitutional when applied to certain means of carriage. The court
also held that the order was not invalid because deliveries by wholesale
establishments were not as restricted in frequency as retail deliveries.
In one instance labor unions representing the employes of persons
engaged in the milk business tried to raise a constitutional objection to
an order by the Pennsylvania Milk Commission restricting deliveries
in the Philadelphia marketing area. It was the opinion of the court
67
that the order would materially affect only milk dealers, handlers, dis-
tributors, producers, and consumers. It was said that any effect upon
the employes of such persons or the unions representing them was re-
mote, indirect, and incidental, and that therefore there was no proper
ground on which the appeal of the unions could be based. The fact that
the Commission had stipulated that the unions were parties aggrieved
did not confer the right of appeal from a decision of a lower court.
TESTS AND PROCESSES
A common provision in state codes is the one concerning milk testing,
usually with particular emphasis upon the standard Babcock butterfat
test.168 In the more elaborate statutes the equipment for making the
I"5 Commonwealth ex rel. Milk Comm'n v. Hollinger, 79 Pa. D. & C. 49 (1951).
... Cloutier v. State Milk Control Bd., 92 N.H. 199, 28 A.2d 554 (1942).
"" Pennsylvania Commercial Drivers Conference v. Pennsylvania Milk Control
Comm'n, 360 Pa. 477, 62 A2d 9 (1948).%asALA. CoD. tit. 2, §§ 194, 195, 199 (1940); Amz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 3-617
(1956) (Babcock not mentioned); Anx. STAT. ANNS § 82-914 (1947); CAL.
AGRiC. CODE §§ 685-89; CoLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-6 (1953) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT.
Rnv. §§22-138 to -104, -142, -151 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §§3111-34
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 502.15 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-504 to -506.3
(1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-506 to -519, -601 to -606 (1948), as amended,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
test is described and there are certain references to techniques. A tester's
license is generally required to avoid conflicting and fraudulent analyses.
Furthermore, provision is usually made for the taking of milk samples. 10
Many of the statutes mention processing and pasteurization plants and
laboratories where the analyses are made. Homogenization, certification,
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-515, -601 (Supp. 1959) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 56T/2, § 22
(Smith-Hurd 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 15-1731 to -1735, -1737 to 1741 (Supp.
1959) ; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 192.14 to .22 (1949), as amended, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 192-14 (Supp. 1959) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-704 (1949) ; Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 260.400 to .530, .990 (1959); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:885 to :894, :896
(1951), as amended, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:889, :896 (Supp. 1959) (also
mentions Gerber test) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 190, 110 (1954) ; MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 25-30 (1954) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.631 to .634, .641 to
.644, .646, .647 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §32.25 (Supp. 1959); MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 4541, 4542 (1957) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 196.595 (1952) ; MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 3-2405, -2406, -2410 to -2414 (1957); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-253 to -256
(1958) ; Nav. Rav. STAT. §§ 584.215 to .240 (1957) ; Nav. REV. STAT. §§ 584.245 to
.295 (Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 184:9, :11, :12, :14, :63 to :74, :76
(1955) ; N.H. REv. STA. ANN. §§ 184:76a, :77 (Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4:12-41.1 to -41.25 (1959); N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAWS §§ 56, 56-a, 57; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 106-267 to -267.5 (1952), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-267.1
(Supp. 1959); N.D. REv. CODE §§4-1817 to -1826 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 917.07, .08, .15, .19, .20, 3717.07, .08 (Anderson 1953) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2,
§§ 7-32, -39, -54 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 621.231 to .246 (Supp. 1957);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 383-87 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j601-08
(1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 21-5-34 to -42 (1956) ; S.C. CODE §§ 32-1607 to
-1609 (1952); S.D. CODE § 22.0515 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-2001 to -2012
(1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-2002 to -2012 (Supp. 1959) ; Tx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5736a, 5736d (1958) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-20-17 (1953) ;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2212-18, 2251-64 (1958) (Babcock not mentioned) ; VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to -415 (1950) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 15.32.580 to .670 (1951) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§2038(1)-(11) (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§98.13 to .15
(1957) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 98.146 (Supp. 1959) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-
284, -285 (1957).
I" ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-618, -619 (1956); Ain. STAT. ANN. § 82-913
(1947); CAL. AGRic. CODE § 442; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-6 (1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 22-140, -142 to -144, -165 (1958), as amended, CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. §§ 22-165 (Supp. 1959); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 3115 (1953); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-407 (1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-506, -510 (1948) ; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 56Y2, §§ 21e, 227 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-1732,
-1737a (Supp. 1959) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 195.25 (1949) ; KAT. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-701 (1949) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 260.400, .410, .420, .460 (1959) ; LA. REV. STAT.
§§40:885, to :888 (1951) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §40;882 (Supp. 1959) ; ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 88, 95 (1954) ; Mo. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 586 (1957) ; MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 33 (1954) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.645 (1958) ; Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 4540, 4560-29, 4569 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.570 (1952); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 3-2405 to -2407, -2465, -2466 (1957) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-
244, -255 (1958) ; Nay. REv. STAT. §§ 584.245, .265 (Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REv STAT.
ANN. § 184.63 (1955); N.J'. STAT. ANN. §§4:12-41.5 to -41.8 (1959); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-1-19 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAWS §§ 51, 56-a; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 106-267.4 (1952); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 4-1704, -1822 (1943); OHIO REV.
CODE §§ 917.07, .08, .15, .19, .20 (Anderson 1953) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 7-3
(Supp. 1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 7001606 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 21-5-27, -40, -43 (1956) ; S.C. CODE §§ 32-1601, -1609.3 (1952) ; S.C. CODE, Rules
& Regs. p. 190 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. CoDE § 4.2013 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 44-2005 (Supp. 1959); Tax. RE. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5736d (1958); UTAH
CoDE ANN. §§ 4-20-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 6, §8 2214, 2251, 2253-55, 2258
(1958)I; VA. CODE ANN. § 3-408 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE §8 15.32.520, .530, .540,
.620, .670 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2038(5) (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §8 97.34,
98.13 (1957); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-285 (1957) (unfair samples).
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and the addition of vitamins are often referred to. The grading or
scoring is often provided for in varying degrees of elaborationYtO
Statutes may provide for bacterial counts17
1 or sediment tests."72
SANITATION AND ADULTERATION
Provisions calling for sanitary premises'"3 and containers or uten-
"'° ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 223 (1940); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-606 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-914 (1947); CAL. AGRiC. CODE §§ 469, 470, 476-79; CoLo.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-7(15) (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-192 (1958)
(grade names) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.04(9) (1943) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 502.04
(Supp. 1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-522.1 (1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-402,
-801 (Supp. 1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, §§ 173a, 174, 175 (Smith-Hurd
1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 172a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IND. ANN.
STAT. §35-2504 (Supp. 1959); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 195.1 to .5, .7 to .27 (1949),
as amended, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 195.3, .7, .10, .12 to .14, .22 (Supp. 1959) ; IowA
CODE ANN. § 192.10 (Supp. 1959); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 921 (Supp. 1959);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.694(3), (4) (1958); MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.491, .492
(Supp. 1959); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4540, 4562-66 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 196.640, .655 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 3-2461 (1957); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 183:8 (1955) ; N.M. § 52-2-11 to -17 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-
266.8(j) (Supp. 1959) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 4-1815 (1943) ; N.D. REv. CODE §§ 4-1816,
-18A01 (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7-53, -55, -56; tit. 63 § 295.6
(Supp. 1959); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 621.065, .216, .221 (Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-5-1, -3 to -5, -14 (1956) ; S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. pp. 190-91,
193-94, 196 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. CODE §§ 4.2002 to .2007 (Supp. 1952) ; TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 165-3, §§ 1-8 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6. §§ 2216, 2507
(1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-396, -400.1 to -400.12, -400.33 (1950) ; WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 15.36.120 to .460 (Supp. 1959) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 15.36.470 (1951) ; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 97.047 (1957); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-278, -291, -292
(1957). See 44 Stat. 1101 (1927), 21 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1958) (standards set
according to scoring methods of U.S. Department of Agriculture).
"I ARiz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 3-620 (1956) ; CAL. AGRIc. CODE §§ 460, 478; COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-7(15) (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56'/, § 184 (Smith-
Hurd 1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 187a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 192.12 (Supp. 1959) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 192.13 (1949) (dairy bac-
teriologist) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 13E (1954) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4545-
02, 4547 (1957) (milk for ice cream) ; N.Y. AGaIc. & METS. LAWS §§ 56-b, 57-a;
OHIO REv. CODE § 3717.53 (Anderson 1953) (milk for frozen desserts); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§295.1(5), 295.3, 295.6(B) (Supp. 1959); ORE. Rzv. STAT.
§ 621.082 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 660 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWs
ANN. §§21-5-13, -7-14 (1956); S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 190 (Supp. 1959);
VA. CODE ANN. § 3-400.13 (1950) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 97.045 (6d) (1957) (pas-
teurized cream). Cf. 14 Stat. 1101 (1927), 21 U.S.C. §§ 142(4), 143 (1958).1"ARx. STAT. ANN. §82-914 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §66-1-7(15)
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 187a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 195.13, .14 (Supp. 1959) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.684, .685 (1958) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 4560-01 to -06, 4567 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.670 (Supp.
1959); N.D. REv. CODE § 4-1828 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7-41, 7-57
(Supp. 1959) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 621.211 (Supp. 1957) ; S.D. CODE § 4.2008 (Supp.
195 ALA. CODE tit. 2, § 190 (1940); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-914 (1947) ; CAL. AGric. CODE §§ 526-29, 535-43, 545, 550-56;
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-1 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. RE v. §§ 22-189 to -191
(1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 502.23 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-401 to -406,
-508 (1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-316 (1948); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-317
(Supp. 1959) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, §§ 190-99 (Smith-Hurd 1951) ; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 192.11 (1949);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-706 (1949); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.. ch. 32, § 95
(1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 660, § 441 (1957) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.605, .674,
.838 to .840 (1958) ; MINN. STAT, ANN. §§ 31.28, .29, 32.13 to .16 (1946); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 4538, 4539 (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.585 (Supp. 1959); MONT.
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sils 174 are very common, and in some states it is specifically stated in
the statutes that standards are to be set by various administrative agen-
cies. 175 In many states standards of quality and cleanliness are set up
with a varying degree of elaboration and clarity. In a few others cer-
tain statutes might well be interpreted to allow the setting of standards.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 3-2422, -2424, -2425 (1957) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-258 (1958) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-15, -38 to -41 (1940) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-16, -42
(Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. AGRuC. & MxTs. LAWS § 47; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-246 (Supp.
1959) (ice cream, butter and cream); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 4-1701, -1806, -1808
(1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7-32, -52 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 621.176, .181 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652 (1958); RI. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-2-3, -13, -5-19, -7-14 (1956) ; S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. pp. 191-
95 (Supp. 1959) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-306 (1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-20-25
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2302 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-342, -343
1950); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 15.32.060 to 0.80, .240, .250 (1951); WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 15.36.155 to .200, .230 to .270, .320 to .430 (Supp. 1959) ; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 97.31, .32, .34 (1957); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 35-302 (1957). The federal
law provides that sanitary conditions at dairies or milk plants must conform to
standards and scoring methods set up by the U. S. Department of Agriculture.
44 Stat. 1101 (1927), 21 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1958).
ALA. CODE tit. 2, §§ 190, 191 (1940); AR. STAT. ANN. § 82-914 (1947);
CAL. AGRic. CODE § 461; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-8-3, -4 (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-508 (1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-306, -308, -310 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 563/2, §§ 16, 17, 200-04 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2515
(1949); IOWA CODE ANN. §§192.11, 195.23 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-706 (1949) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 95(I) (H) (1954) ; Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 578 (1957) (pasteurized milk) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94A f§ 46-48
(1954), as amended, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§46, 48 (Supp. 1959); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12.674, .680 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.08 (1959); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 4538, 4539, 4568 (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 196.590 (1952) ; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 196.585 (Supp. 1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 3-2431 (1957);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-235(1), -240, -243, -258 (1958); NEv. REV. STAT. § 584.300
(Supp. 1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 184:28, :29, :33 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§24:10-15(14) to (16), -43 to -45 (1940) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:10-16(9),
(12)', (17) (Supp. 1959); N.Y. AGiuc. & MKTS. LAWS §§47, 48, 49; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 106-247 (1952) (milk for ice cream) ; N.D. lv. Cons §§ 4-1704, -1807,
-1808 (1943); OiaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 291-93 (1949); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2, §§ 7-32, -52; tit. 63, § 295.6 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REV. STAT. § 621.186 (Supp.
1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 31, §§ 661, 681, 682 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 21-2-3, -5-31 to -33 (1956) ; S.C. Cons, Rules & Regs. pp. 194-95, 196-97 (Supp.
1959); S.D. Cons § 4.2012 (Supp. 1952); TENN. COnE ANN. §§ 52-306(2), -306(8)
(1955) ; UTAH COnE ANN. §§ 4-20-33, -23 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2171-
73 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-342, -345, -400.23, -400.29 (1950) ; WASH. REV.
ConE §2 15.36.205. to .225, .395 (Supp. 1959) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 97.32, .33, .34,
.66 (1957); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-282, -302 (1957).
I See CAL. AGicC. ConE § 411; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-152 (1958) ; FLA.
STAT. ANr. § 502.01 (Supp. 1959) ; IDAHO COns ANN. §§ 37-320 to -323 (1948) ;
IDAHO COnE ANN. § 37-402 (Supp. 1959) ; ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 562, § 40 (Smith-
Hurd 1951); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:896, :922 (Supp. 1959); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 32, §§ 100-13 (1954) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 20, 22 (1954); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 12 (Supp. 1959) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.530 (1952); N.H.
Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 184:25, :31 to :37 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:10-14 to -16
(1940), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:10-16 (Supp. 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-1-17 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-268 (1952); OHIO Rv. Cons
§§ 3717.07, .08 (Anderson 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 2, § 7-81 (Supp. 1959);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 616.075, .405 to .475, .515 (Supp. 1955); ORE. Rsv. STAT.
§§ 621.060, .176, .181, .211, .216, .405, .410 (Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 21-2-3 (1956); S.C. COnE §§ 32-1610.15 (Supp. 1959); UTAH COnE ANN. §§ 4-
20-14, -16, -21-6 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2095 (1958) ; VA. ConE ANN.
§ 3-400.32 (1950) ; WASH. REv. ConE §§ 15.32.020, .030, .36.130, .140, .290 to .320,
.450, .460 (Supp. 1959) ; WASH. REv. ConE § 15.36.550 (1951) ; W. VA. ConE ANN.
§ 2037 (Supp. 1959) ; Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-280, -298 (1957).
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In fact proper and well defined standards are essential to the validity of
any comprehensive milk control program.
t
7
Most of the states have statutes providing for some form of inspection
of dairies and distributors' plants and processing facilities. 7 7 Where
inspection of producers' plants was not required by New Hampshire
statutes then in effect and was carried out merely as a means of insuring
the continued good quality of the milk, it was ruled in a mandamus
proceeding that a municipal board of health would not be justified in
denying a license to sell milk solely because of the added cost of inspec-
tion. 78 The board had not acted in a quasi-judicial capacity in denying
the license but had merely set up a regulation in the nature of an admin-
istrative rule. The reasonableness of the regulation was said to be a
question of law which the applicant for a license was entitled to have
judicially determined. An issue was also presented in Texas where,
under a city ordinance embodying a statute, a local health officer made
no reasonable attempt to make a proper inspection effort to determine
whether a permit to sell milk should be granted. The corporate appli-
cant's products had met the federal and state inspection requirements,
and it was ruled that the health officer's refusal to issue a permit had
been shown to be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.179 A mandatory
1"" State ex re. State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq.
504, 179 Ati. 116 (1935) ; Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620,
91 P.2d 557 (1939).177 Amz. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 3-604 (1956) ; Aax. STAT. ANN. § 82-913 (1947);
CAL. AaRic. CODE §§ 490-512; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-1 (1953) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. Rxv. § 22-175 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 502.25 (Supp. 1959); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 42-402, -407, -408, -503, -522.4 (1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-302
(1948) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-401 (Supp. 1959) ; ILL. ANN. STxT. ch. 56Y2, §§ 223,
227 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 178.2, 19524 (1949); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-701 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. ANY. §§ 40:895, :935 (1951); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 25, § 148; ch. 32, §§ 88, 95; ch. 100, §§ 153-56 (1954); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 572; art. 66C, § 441 (1957) ; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 94 §§ 16K,
16L, 33 35, 36 (1954) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.608, .838 to .840 (1958) ; MINE.
STAT. AN. § 32.29 (1946); MINE. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.29 (1946); MINE. STAT.
ANN. § 32.30 (Supp. 1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 4539 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 71.720, 73.110(17), 7.560, 79.370 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 75.110(18),
196.535 (Supp. 1959); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. §§ 3-2425, -2452 (1957); MONT.
REV. CODEs ANN. § 27-415 (1955); NEv. Rv. STAT. §§ 81-244, -262 (1958);
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 584.190, .200, .205 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANE.§§ 184:1 to
:3, :61, :62 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:12-41.14 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-1-19 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. AGIC. & MKTS. LAws § 51; N.C. GEN . STAT. § 106-
264 (1952); N.D. REv. CODE § 4-1704 (1943); Oi-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7-2,
-31; tit. 63 §295.6(A) (Supp. 1959); Oas. REv. STAT. §§616.055, .070 (Supp.
1955) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 621.291 (Supp. 1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j310
(1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-2-15, -7-6, -7-8 (1956) ; S.C. CODE, Rules &
Regs. p. 190 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. CODE § 4.2013 (Supp. 1952); TEN. CODE ANN.
§ 52-320 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1175(19) (1953); TEx. Rv.
Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4420 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-20-2, -21-10 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2302 (1958); VA. CoDE ANN. § 3-361 (1950); WAsH.
REv. CODE §§ 15.32.510 to .530, .560, .36.100, .560, .570 (1951) ; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.08 (1957) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-274, -238, -287, -289, -301 (1957).
Inspection of milk products used in foreign commerce. 35 Stat. 254 (1908), 21
U.S.C. § 94a (1958) ; 44 Stat. 1100 (1927), as amended 21 U.S.C. 143 (1958).
'7'H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Boucher, 98 N.H. 399, 101 A.2d 466 (1953).
27 City of Greenville v. Cabell's Inc., 207 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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injunction was granted, but the court declared that the permit could be
canceled at any future date if the established standards were not met.
Often a question will arise concerning the power of a municipality to
enact ordinances with respect to milk inspection. The Pennsylvania
court has held that a city of a specified class may constitute the local
board of health a milk inspection bureau and confer upon its officers
authority to enforce a milk inspection ordinance. °80 The ordinance
creating the inspection bureau was held not to be invalid as being un-
reasonable or as containing material on more than one subject.
Inspection fees, set up by city ordinance or promulgated by municipal
agencies, are valid if not unreasonable and if they do not exceed the cost
of the administration of the inspection program.' 81 Such inspection fees
are not invalid merely because a sum slightly in excess of the expenses
connected with the inspection program is raised thereby. The evidence
introduced in one case so holding established that there was no excess in
the aggregate and that only in some categories did an excess exist.
1 82
The ordinance there under consideration imposed a milk inspection fee
of one and one-third cents upon each one hundred pounds of distributors'
milk and a fee of only two-thirds of a cent upon the same quantity of
producers' milk. This was ruled neither excessive nor discriminatory,
there being evidence that distributors were benefited more by inspection
than the producers.
Milk should at all times be kept free from contamination and contact
with disease germs which affect cattle and/or human beings. On the
statute books are many laws which try to carry out this policy. The
most common of these laws are those which make unlawful the sale of
milk from diseased cows. 183  A federal statute'8 4 prohibits the importa-
180 Hoar v. Lancaster City, 290 Pa. 117, 137 Atl. 664 (1927).
1 "'Coleman v. Little Rock, 191 Ark. 844, 88 S.W.2d 58 (1935); Belzung v.
State, 183 Ark. 472, 36 S.W.2d 397 (1931) ; City of Newport v. Hiland Dairy Co.,
291 Ky. 561, 164 S.W.2d 818 (1942).Terry Dairy Prods, Co. v. Beard, 214 Ark. 440, 216 S.W.2d 860 (1949).
180 ALA. CODE tit. 2, § 192 (1940); Auiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-612 to -614
(1956); CAL. AGRic. CODE § 442; CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 22-166 (1958); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-508 (1957) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9, 10 (Smith-Hurd 1935) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, § 189 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-706 (1949); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 4 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, § 456 (1957); M cE. STAT. ANN. § 12.604 (1958) (see also MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 14.23 (1956) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32.21 (1946) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 4539
(1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.545 (1952); MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. §§ 27-103
(1955); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 94-1206 (1949); Nm. RFv. STAT. § 81-235(1)
(1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 184:41 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:10-15(6)
(1940) ; N.D. Ray. CODE §§ 4-1704, 36-1402 (1943) ; OHIo REV. CODE §§ 3717.12, .31
(Anderson 1953); OHIo REv. CODE § 3717.53 (Anderson 1953) (must be pas-
teurized if used in manufacturing frozen desserts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 295.6(C) (Supp. 1959) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 621.117, .118, .119, .124 (Supp. 1957)
(must be pasteurized to permit sale and not as grade A) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 401 (1930) (must be pasteurized before using as food for animals) ; RI. GEr.
LAws ANN. §§ 21-2-3, -3-1 to -3-6 (1956) ; S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 191 (Supp.
1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-304(1) (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4474 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-21-6 (1953) (cows with diseased udders);
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tion from foreign countries of milk coming from cows which have not
had both a health examination and a tuberculosis test within one year.
Many states have statutes which require tests for bovine tuberculosis 8 5
and brucellosis or Bang's disease.' 8 6 Furthermore, some states have
legislation prohibiting diseased persons from working in or being closely
associated with dairies and/or milk plants. 87 In Illinois the personal
cleanliness of dairy workers is required8ss Moreover, it is noted that
condemnation of impure and/or unsanitary milk has been decreed by
WASH. REv. CoDE § 15.32.160 (1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1370, 2035 (1955) ;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 97.36(1) (1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 97.36(7) (1957) (limited
sales permitted if milk pasteurized or sterilized) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §5 35-
281, -303 (1957). The Nebraska, Tennessee, and Wyoming statutes include milk
from unclean or filthy cows.
18'44 Stat. 1101 (1927), 21 U.S.C. § 142(1), (2) (1958).
"' ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §3-611 (1956); CAL. AGRIC. CODE §450(b); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-26 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §22-192 (1958); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 56y2 § 189 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-
1801 to -1809 (Supp. 1959); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 165.1 to .36, 192.6 (1949), as
amended, IOWA CODE ANN. § 165.17 (Supp. 1959) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32,
§ 95(I) (A) (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.840 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 27-106 (1955); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-235(2) (1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
443:47, :51 to :54 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:5-19 to -33 (1959); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 24:10-15(4) (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-5-4, -6-2, -6-6 (1953); N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS LAWS § 78; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 295.6(C) (Supp. 1959) ;
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 597.206 to .290 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 654
(1958); S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 191 (Supp. 1959); S.D. CODE § 22.0505
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-901 to -913 (1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §-4-20-21
(1953); VT. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 1281-1339 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-400.15 (1950) ;
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-584, -589 (Supp. 1958) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 15.36.150 (Supp.
1959) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2016-18 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 95.25 (1957) ;
Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 35-299 (1957); see 58 Stat. 734 (1944), as amended,
21 U.S.C. § 114a (1958).
"' ARiz. RFv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-641 to -647 (1956), as amended, AIZ. Rv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-641, -643, to -645 (Supp. 1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 22-
192 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56%, § 220.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, §§ 74-77 (1954) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 443:47 to :50
(1955) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-6-2, -6 (1953) ; N.Y. AGoic. & MxTs. LAws § 90;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 295.6 (C) (Supp. 1959); OREL REv. STAT. §§ 597.206
to .290 (Supp. 1957) ; S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 191 (Supp. 1959) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-601 to -614 (1955) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1546 (1958) ; VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-400.15 (1950) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 3-584, -589, -593 (Supp. 1958) ; WASH.
REv. CODE § 15.36.150 (Supp. 1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1982, 1991 (1955);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 95.26 (1957) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35-299 (1957) ; see
58 Stat. 734 (1944), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 144a (1958).18 TARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-610 (1956) ; CAL. AGgic. CODE § 467, 469; CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-188 (1958) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-315, -316 (1948) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2 §§ 225 (Smith-Hurd 1951).; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y, § 213
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-706 (1949); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 95(I) (0) (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 577 (1957);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 4536 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 196.545, .630 (1952) ; NEB.
REv. STAT. § 81-235(2) (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§24:10-15(5), -40 (1940);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:10-16(1) (Supp. 1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:4-17, -18
(Supp. 1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:4-42 (1940); N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAWS
§ 47; ORE. REv. STAT. § 434.180 (1959) (venereal) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-2-3
(1956) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-307 (1955) (health certificates required) ; TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4474, 4474(24) (1951); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-400.30,
-400.31 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.36.270, .425 (Supp. 1959); WASH. REv.
CODE § 15.36.520 (1951) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35-300 (1957)."' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y2, §§ 207, 208 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
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statute in several states. 89 Four of the states having such laws, Iowa,
Missouri, Oldahoma, and Oregon, make it compulsory to put coloring
matter in the condemned milk, but two others make it unlawful to intro-
duce extraneous coloring matter into any milk whatsoever.'0 0 In fact
most of the states have milk laws forbidding or regulating diluting or
adulteration.' 19 A few states outlaw the use of preservatives for pur-
poses of conservation.
192
To discourage the use of fats or oils other than milk in milk products
the filled milk acts have been enacted by the Federal Government'0 8
and by the legislatures of many states.194 These statutes vary in length
.. CAL. AGic. CODE §§ 443, 444;, COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANNi. § 7-8-1 (1953) ; IoWA
CODE ANN. § 195.19 (1949) (cream) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-701 (1949)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.550 (Supp. 195 9) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 3-43(15)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 184:45 (1955) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-268 (1952) ; OKL.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7-5, -35, -58 (Supp. 1959); ORE Rxv. STAT. §§ 621.085, .226
(Supp. 1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 31, § 660e (1958) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-21-12
(1953).
"I MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 3-2443 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 527
(1958).
101ALA. CODE tit. 2, §§ 188, 189 (1940) ; Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-630 (1956) ;
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-1 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 22-153, -158
(1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§500.10, .13 (1943) (food in general); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 42-508, -511 (1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-313, -314 (1948) ; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1935); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-707 (Supp.
1959); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 3 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 576
(1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 94, § 19 (1954); MIc H. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.602,
.604 (1958) ; MIc H. STAT. ANN. § 28.215 (Supp. 1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32.21
(1946); MISS. CODE ANN. § 4556 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.600 (1952);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 27-103 (1957); NEv. REv. STAT. § 81-233 (1958); Nay.
REv. STAT. § 584.290 (Supp. 1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 184:41 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §24:10-15(3) (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-20 (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. Amuc. & MKTS. LAWS §§ 46, 50; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-268 (1952); N.D.
REv. CODE § 4-1704 (1943) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 4-1846 (Supp. 1957) ; OHIO REv.
CODE §§ 3717.01, .09, .31 (Anderson 1953); OHIO REv. CODE §§ 3717.44 to .49
(Anderson 1953) (evaporated and condensed milk); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 295.1 (M), 295.2 (Supp. 1959); OmE. REV. STAT. §§ 616.205 to .320 (Supp.
1955); Oam. REv. STAT. §§ 621.088 (Supp. 1957) (food in general); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, § 521 (1958) (see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 526, 527 (1958));
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§21-5-24, -7-10 (1956); S.C. CODE §32-1602 (1952);
S.C. CODE, Rules & Regs. p. 189 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. CODE §§ 22.0502, .0503, .0506
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-304(3), (4), -322 to -328 (1955); Tax. R~v.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4474 (1951); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 712 (Supp. 1959);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-20-1, -20-24, -20-26 -21-2, -21-6 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 6, § 2098 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-344, -385 (1950) ; WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 15.32.120 to .150, .36.070 (1951) ; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 15.36.030 (Supp. 1959) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1370 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 97.34, .36, .37, .38 (1957) ;
Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 35-303 (1957)."
... ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 56'A, § 23 (Smith-Hurd 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
31, § 527 (1958) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-305 (1955) (with exceptions) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 4-20-18 (1953).
88 42 Stat. 1486-87 (1923), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1958); 49 Stat.
,13)as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 64 (1958).
ALA. CODE tit. 2, §189 (1940) ; ARnx. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-919, -920 (1947);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-25 to -32 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §22-171
(1958) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 502.29 to .34 (1943); FLA. ANN. STAT. § 502.01 (Supp.
1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-1101 to -1104 (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§65-725 to -732 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 217.260, .270 (1959); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 120 (1954) ; MASS. LAws ANN. ch. 94, § 17A (1954) ; MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 12.618(21) to (27) (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.49, .53, to .533
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and some of them are very elaborate. They prohibit the use of various
oils and fats in mixtures which are represented as natural lactic products.
Many of them, together with the laws in effect in these and other juris-
dictions controlling the manufacture of ice cream and other frozen milk
products, refer to combinations of milk with other ingredients. Such
concoctions, with or without non-milk fats or oils, may contain various
named types of processed or treated milk. Quite a few of the statutes
list such usual lactic products as concentrated, condensed, desiccated,
dried, evaporated, and powdered milk, and there are more or less
frequent references to buttermilk and aerated, certified, chocolate, emul-
sified, homogenized, imitation, malted, manufacturing, modified, pas-
teurized, and skimmed milk.
While several of these filled milk acts prohibiting the use of fats
and-.oils other than butterfats were held in comparatively early cases
to be an arbitrary and unwarranted exercise of the police power, 195 the
more recent decisions have favored the validity of such legislation as a
health measure which does not deny due process.196. Approval has also
been given to statutes regulating the amount of butterfat required for
chocolate drinks197 or ice milk.198  The need for the chocolate milk
statute was demonstrated by the fact that large quantities of a sub-
standard product were being sold to children for school lunches in spite
of an inscription on the bottle cap concerning the reduced amount of
butterfat. The United States Supreme Court has also upheld the federal
act prohibiting the shipment of "filled milk" in interstate commerce. 199
A lower federal court has remarked that such legislation was enacted
with the idea of avoiding the competition of cocoanut groves with the
American cow.
200
(Supp. 1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 196.695, .710 to .715 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 3-2439 (1957); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 184:42 (1955); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-2-5 to -10 (1953); N.Y. AGPIc. & MKTs. LAWS §§ 60, 64; N.D.
REv. CODE §§ 4-18B01 to -18B05 (Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-9-14
(1956); S.D. CODE §§22.05A01 to .05A06 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 52-324 to -328 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 713a (1948); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 4-20-59 to -63 (1953) ("imitation milk") ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2131-
33 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-471 to -476 (1950) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 15.38.001
to .050 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2036 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 97.39
(1957).
195 Carolene Prods. Co. v. McLaughlin, 365 II1. 62, 5 N.E.2d 447 (1936);
People v. Carolene Prods. Co., 345 Ill. 166, 177 N.E. 698 (1931) ; Carolene Prods.
Co. v. Thomson, 276 Mich. 172, 267 N.W. 608 (1936); Carolene Prods. Co. v.
Banning, 131 Neb. 429, 268 N.W. 313 (1936).
... Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32 (1944) ; Setzer v.
Mayo, 150 Fla. 734, 9 So. 2d 280 (1942) ; Carolene Prods. Co. v. Mohler, 152 Kan.
2, 102 P.2d 1044 (1940); Carolene Prods. Co. v. Hanrahan, 291 Ky. 417, 164 "
S.W.2d 597 (1941); Poole & Creber Mkt. Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125
S.W.2d 23 (1939) ; Carolene Prods. Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa. 49, 197 At. 627 (1938).
... Thayer v. Department of Agriculture, 323 Mich. 403, 35 N.W.2d 360 (1949).
Dairy Belle, Inc. v. Freeland, 175 Kan. 344, 264 P.2d 894 (1953).
1 Carolene Milk Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304"U.S. 144 (1938).
... Carolene Prods. Co. v. Wallace, 27 F. Supp. 110 (D.D.C. 1939).
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Filled milk statutes may be validly enforced despite the correct
labeling of the product as being not up to standard or as containing
the prohibited substitutes.201 There are also decisions to the effect that
wholesomeness of the product is no defense to an indictment under the
federal act.20 2  In one case of doubtful accuracy, however, it was said
that an indictment under a valid statute of this kind may be sufficiently
answered by proof of facts showing that as pertaining to a particular
article of food the application of the act is unreasonable because the
food, though within the proscribed class, is so different from similar
products as to give no reason why its use should be prohibited, the effect
of such proof depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. 20 3
The probabilities are that reasoning such as this would receive little
support today.
The Missouri court has ruled that it must be presumed legislators
have investigated the propriety of the enactment of filled milk laws from
the public health standpoint, and that a statute should not be ruled in-
valid unless it can be shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable. 20 4  This
holding seems to state a far better rule than that stated by two cases
decided under the federal statute to the effect that the legislative body
is the final arbiter in respect to public health and that its decision cannot
be interfered with either by the judgment of a court or the verdict of a
jury.20
5
To come within the prohibition of these filled milk statutes the
product must be in semblance of milk,2 8 and, if such is the case, it will
not matter that no misrepresentation had been made concerning its true
content.
20 7
Filled milk regulations with limited scope may be found. A provision
in a Pennsylvania statute prohibited the sale of any compound containing
skimmed milk in other than five-pound cans labeled with the words
"concentrated skimmed milk" and "unfit for infants" inscribed on the
containers in letters half an inch high. This provision had as its object
the prevention of the sale of sub-standard products to or for small chil-
dren. The statute was held to be non-discriminatory even though it
failed to regulate the sale of ordinary skimmed milk, since the regular
beverage, although equally unfit for small children, was commonly
o'Carolene Prods. Co. v. Hanrahan, 291 Ky. 417, 164 S.W.2d 597 (1941);
Poole & Creber Mkt. Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S.W.2d 23 (1939).
12 Carolene Milk Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); Carolene
Prods. Co. v. Wallace, 27 F. Supp. 110 (D.D.C. 1939).
20. Setzer v. Mayo, 150 Fla. 734, 9 So. 2d 280 (1942).
... Poole & Creber Mkt. Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S.W.2d 23 (1939).
20. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Carolene Prods.
Co. v. Wallace, 27 F. Supp. 110 (D.D.C. 1939).
20 Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); Carolene Prods.
Co. v. Hanrahan, 291 Ky. 417, 164 S.W.2d 597 (1941).
207 Carolene Prods. Co. v. Hanrahan, supra note 206.
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packaged in such a manner that purchasers were not likely to be de-
ceived. The court declared that the validity of this type of regulation
rests not alone upon whether the article of food is in whole or in part
unwholesome or injurious, but also upon whether the food is of such a
character that few will eat it when they know its real nature.
20 8
During World War II there was some relaxation of restrictions on
the use of substitutes for fats and other scarce commodities needed for
the national war effort. In one instance the War Food Administrator
promulgated a food order prohibiting any person from selling or de-
livering filled cream having a total content of all oils and fats in excess
of nineteen per cent. A mixture was produced by the defendant, a
manufacturer, and sold as a substitute for whipping cream. The de-
fendant claimed that the order was arbitrary and unreasonable in respect
to his "cream" product on the ground that the restrictions in effect
might prohibit the sale of combination products of low as well as high
milk fat content. The court refused to listen to this argument and ruled
that there had been no denial of due process of law.
20 9
Several states provide by statute for the addition of various vitamins
to milk.210 A New York court has held that the action of a manufacturer
of a product known as "evaporated skimmed milk" in adding vitamin A
in the form of concentrated oil and vitamin B3 to skimmed milk did not
adulterate the product or preclude its sale.
211
A California statute required labels for "imitation milk products." A
manufacturing concern had stated its intention of making and selling a
food product containing no milk or milk fat. The product was prepared
for use by bakeries and similar establishments as topping for pies and
other confections. In considering the product the court decided that it
was not an imitative food within the meaning of the statute and that
therefore labeling was unnecessary. It was said that a contrary inter-
pretation would involve an unconstitutional and invalid application of
the statute resulting in an unreasonable interference with business and
property.212 There can be no doubt that a statute valid upon its face
may be unconstitutionally applied.
'"Carolene Prods. Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa. 49, 197 At. 627 (1938).
... United States v. Russell-Taylor, Inc. 64 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Mich. 1946).2 " CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 22-127 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56Y, § 171
(Smith-Hurd 1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5632, § 115.12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 569(p) (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 4560-11 (1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.525 (Supp. 1959); OILA. STAT. ANN. fit. 63, § 295.1 (G)
(Supp. 1959); S.C. CODE Rules & Regs. pp. 187, 188 (Supp. 1959); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 52-303(9) (1955) ; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 165-3 § 1(I) (1959) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-21-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-400.32, -416 to -424
(1950) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-424.1 to -424.6 (Supp. 1958); WAsH. REV. CODE
15.36.010 (Supp. 1959).
.1. Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. DuMond, 285 App. Div. 337, 136 N.Y.S.2d 619
(1954).
... Midget Prods., Inc. v. Jacobsen, 140 Cal. App. 2d 517, 295 P.2d 542 (1956).
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Statutes regulating the milk industry are not always held to cover the
purchase and use of milk or cream for the purpose of manufacturing ice
cream or other similar frozen desserts.213 Hence there are many special
laws covering such frozen products, and these enactments vary in length
and elaboration.
A study of the cases concerning attempts on the part of states and
various governmental subdivisions and departments to regulate the
frozen milk product industry shows the necessity for the controls. One
case involved the efforts of a purported dairy products concern to force
a Pennsylvania borough board of health to issue it a license to sell ice
cream. The board had adopted a regulation making it unlawful to use
false labels and requiring ice cream wrappers to bear the manufacturer's
name. The applicant was using labels stating that the product which
was being put on the market had been manufactured by the concern
itself. The labels referred to the applicant under a trade name. As a
matter of fact, the products being sold were manufactured by another
company. The labels were false and hence there was no compliance
with the regulation. The applicant had already obtained a license from
the state Department of Agriculture, but its issuance was deemed im-
proper as a violation of a state statute forbidding the sale of falsely
labeled ice cream. The court held that the borough board's regulation
was neither arbitrary nor capricious and that it was valid as a public
health measure.
214
Questions are continually arising concerning concoctions with unusual
or peculiar ingredients or names and their inclusion in or exclusion from
various food regulations. Thus a Nebraska statute stating that ice
cream or products made in semblance thereof would be considered
adulterated if they did not contain at least fourteen per cent butterfat
was held to be applicable to a product known as "frozen luxury" con-
taining milk, eggs, sugar, and coffee; moreover, such a statute repre-
sented a proper exercise of the police power.2 15 A New York regulation
banning "cream to which any substance has been added and for use in
fluid state or whipped," thus bringing within its terms a patented product
composed of pasteurized cream, sugar, and vanilla, into which nitrous
oxide gas had been introduced to produce foaminess, thereby giving it the
character of whipped cream, was held unreasonable and arbitrary and
therefore invalid as denying due process and equal protection.2 10  The
opinion stated that the fact that the classification was arbitarary might
appear on the face of the statute or by way of circumstances admitted
or proved.
213 New Jersey ex rel. State Bd. of Milk Control v. Richman Ice Cream Co.,
117 N.J. Eq. 296, 175 Atl. 796 (1934).
214 Simco Sales Serv., Inc. v. Brackin, 344 Pa. 628, 26 A.2d 323 (1942).
215 State v. McCosh, 134 Neb. 780, 279 N.W. 775 (1938).
.. Aerated Prods. Co. v. Godfrey, 290 N.Y. 92, 48 N.E.2d 275 (1943).
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A Wisconsin statute provided that food products must be marked or
tagged in such a manner as the Department of Agriculture might direct,
the purpose being to indicate whether the tagged products satisfied de-
partmental standards and to show other pertinent information. An-
other provision prohibited the manufacture or sale of imitation ice cream.
A food product concern began the preparation of a semi-frozen concoc-
tion known as "Dairy Queen," similar to ice cream but containing a
smaller amount of butterfat. There had been no effort on the part of
the manufacturer to sell the product as ice cream. Expert testimony
had been introduced to attempt to show that butterfat had no uniquely
nutritive value and that certain other milk ingredients were present
here in even greater quantities than in ice cream. The concoction
was shown to be both healthful and nutritious. As applied to this
product, the tagging provision was said to be inapplicable. The only
purpose of the tagging provision was to protect customers from buying
a product different from the one intended, and it was not meant to
prevent anyone from selling a food product which was nutritious and
healthful. 217 The court also refused to apply the prohibition against
imitation ice cream, ruling that any such interpretation would encourage
monopolies.
A congressional enactment covering the District of Columbia pro-
hibited importation into or sale in the jurisdiction of cream without a
health officer's permit. With respect to a product known as "Pantry
Cream" brought in from mid-western plants it was shown that milk
from Michigan farms was tuberculin tested and well inspected by health
authorities in two large cities. After being so inspected the milk was
chilled and brought to the plant manufacturing the product, there having
been no foreign matter or preservatives added. At the plant the milk
was warmed and separated and placed in hermetically sealed cans. Then
it was sterilized by raising the temperature inside the cans, the equip-
ment used for the purpose being the same at that employed in the pro-
duction of evaporated milk. The product was held to be "cream" within
the statute and hence subject to its provisions.218 The statutory regula-
tion was deemed neither unreasonable, oppressive, nor absurd. There
seemed to be no doubt that the permit could be required.
The legislature's permission to sell a named product is usually
accepted by the courts unless the evidence clearly shows that the frozen
dessert is harmful to health. Thus a New York statute expressly
authorizing the manufacture of "French ice cream," a product without
egg content and containing coloring matter to make the dessert resemble
egg yolk, was held to justify the producers, there being no violation of
It1Dairy Queen, Inc. v. McDowell, 260 Wis. 471, 51 N.W.2d 34 (1952), re-
hearing denied, 260 Wis. 478a, 52 N.W.2d 791 (1952).18Leaman v. District of Columbia, 55 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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the New York City Sanitary Code involved.210 A city health department
chemist testified that the ingredients used in preparing the coloring
matter were harmless certified dyes, and there had been no misleading
deception or misbranding of the commodity as containing eggs.
The Secretary of Agriculture, with congressionally conferred author-
ity to make regulations under the Agricultural Marketing Agreements
Act, set up a milk classification that included all milk the butterfat from
which was on hand at or moved out from a plant in the form of frozen
desserts or in the form of "homogenized mixture" used in the manu-
facture of such products. A quantity of the manufactured "mix," a
product which might have been used in preparing frozen concoctions,
was sold to a purchaser who intended to use it in making a preparation
resembling whipped cream. The court approved the classification and
held that a proper interpretation of the regulation would not require
that all purchasers freeze the product.22 0 The wording of the regulation
provided an alternative and the "mix" was lawfully sold to the pur-
chaser.
Sometimes a statute will be enacted requiring a particular kind of
label for a certain frozen product. Thus a Florida statute prohibited
the sale of ice milk unless it was "contained" in a "package" or "en-
closed" in a "wrapper" upon which the words "ice milk" were con-
spicuously printed in not less than fourteen-point type. The require-
ments of this statute were held to be met by a sale of the product with
proper sized inscriptions conspicuously embossed upon open cups or
pastry cones.
221
There have been instances involving attempts to regulate retail mar-
keting of frozen milk products in respect to the locations at which they
or their substitutes may be sold. Thus a local board of health regula-
tion in Massachusetts prohibited the sale of ice cream on the streets and
public ways. A statute gave local health boards authority to make and
enforce regulations concerning conditions under which all articles of
food might be kept or exposed for sale. The court held that the statute
could not be said to have authorized the stated regulation and that a
conviction based upon its violation would not stand.2 22 Furthermore,
the court declared that the regulation could not be made retroactive by
the enactment of an enabling act which would give validity to similar
regulations if enacted at a later date. In another instance a California
statute prohibited the sale of imitation ice cream or ice milk in any
"place" where the genuine products were sold. The court held that the
use of a general term like "place," which had no definitely accepted
219 People v. Blue Ribbon Ice Cream Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Magis. Ct. 1956).
2 Crowley's Milk Co. v. Brannan, 198 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1952).
221 Mayo v. Ar-tik Sys. Inc., 62 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1953).
2 Commonwealth v. Rivkin, 329 Mass. 586, 100 N.E2d 838 (1952).
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meaning either in general usage or in the trades and industries affected
by this legislation, had rendered the act so vague, indefinite, and uncer-
tain as to make it repugnant th the concept of due process.
22 3
CONTAINERS
Many states have statutes enumerating and regulating the sizes or
proper measures of bottles or other containers used in the marketing of
milk or its immediate derivatives like cream.224  These laws often pro-
hibit the use of containers of capacities or sizes other than those author-
ized. The validity of' such a statute with reasonable limitations has been
upheld.225  Furthermore, it has been held that a Colorado city ordinance
which had the effect of prohibiting milk or cream from being sold in
gallon bottles was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and hence not in-
valid.226  The court said that gallon bottles were easily chipped, hard to
keep sterile, and difficult to handle. But a statute prohibiting the sale
of evaporated skimmed milk in containers of less than ten pounds ca-
pacity has been ruled invalid.227  All that was required to sustain the
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute was a showing that there
was no reasonable basis for the limitation.
The great majority of the states have statutes specifically protecting
milk dealers in the use of trade marks on bottles and other containers
and making the unauthorized use of such containers unlawful.228  The
22 Market Basket, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 134 Cal. App. 2d 73, 285 P.2d 344 (1955).
2' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 3101 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 147, § 25 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1959) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83-118 (1949) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 32, §§ 100-01, 104-08, 111 (1954), as amended, ML REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32,
§ 106 (Supp. 1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.621 to .623 (1958); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 90-141 (1959) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 90-140 (Supp. 1959);
NED. REV. STAT. § 89-118 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1-10, -30 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1-31.1 to -31.10 (1955) (ice cream); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-1-
44, -45 (Supp. 1959); OHIo REv. CODE § 1327.29 (Anderson Supp. 1959); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§21-5-28 to -30 (1956); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1037
(1948); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-120 to -124 (1950), as amended, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-120 (Supp. 1958) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.93.290, .300 (Supp. 1959) ; W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 4531 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 98.12 (1957).
22 State v. DeWitt, 49 Ariz. 197, 65 P.2d 659 (1937).
... Independent Dairymens Ass'n Inc. v. City of Denver, 142 F.2d 940 (10th
Cir. 1944).
227 Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956),
affirming 285 App. Div. 337, 136 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954).
2 ALA. CODE tit. 2, §§ 402-04 (1940) ; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-626 (1956);
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 82-913 (1947) ; CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 690-702; COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 7-8-8 (1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §§ 3141-50 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 506.01 to .18 (1943) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-508 (1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-
901 to -907 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56T/, §§ 94-100 (Smith-Hurd 1951), as
amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 563/2, § 99 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 35-2516, -2517 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 192.33 to .39 (1949), as
amended, IoWA CODE ANN. § 192.33 (Supp. 1959) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-706
(1949) ; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 365.150 to .200 (1959) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32,
§§ 114-16, 118 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 275, 471-81 (1957) ; MIcH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12.675 to .679 (1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.300 to .360 (1952), as
amended, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.310 (Supp. 1959) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1228 to
-1233 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§351:1 to :4 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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usual statute applies only where the trade mark is actually used220 and
permits the use of the containers with the owner's consent, usually re-
quired to be in writing. In considering the New York statute a court
declared that a demand from an owner of marked milk cans was not a
condition precedent to his right to recover the statutory penalty for
unlawful detention.2 0 The penalty was held to have been properly
assessed against a defendant who had taken possession of the plaintiff's
milk cans and was using them without the latter's consent. It has been
held that a consumer subjects himself to no penalty under such a
statute simply by accepting the milk in a bottle and later returning the
empty container to the milk dealer, this not being the "use" the legisla-
ture intended to prohibit.
28 '
Statutes and regulations of this kind are within the police power and
have been upheld by the courts.2 2 However, such statutes must not
violate fundamental constitutional guarantees. In one instance the
equal protection guarantee was held to be violated by a North Carolina
statute prohibiting the use of receptacles designed for milk or its deriva-
tives, the name, brand, or trade mark of any person or corporation being
inscribed thereon, for any purpose other than as containers of dairy
products.233 The court declared that it could find no proper relation
between other uses of milk containers, whether by the owner or by one
in lawful possession, and the exigences of the public health, unless, of
course, there was some intention to use the receptacles, then or there-
after, for the distribution of milk products.
Some of the statutes provide for the use of search warrants in lo-
cating the milk containers. In considering such a provision the Utah
court remarked that the statute authorized the use of an essentially
§51:1-30 (1955); NJ. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§56:3-42 to -47 (1955), as amended,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-47 (Supp. 1959) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20 (Supp. 1959) ;
N.Y. AGac. & MxT. LAws §§ 70, 71; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWS §§ 270-74; N.D. REV.
CODE §§ 4-1834, -1835 (1943) ; Onio REv. CODE § 3717.54 (Anderson 1953) (frozen
milk products); OYaLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 §§ 7-121 to -123 (Supp. 1959); ORE.
REv. STAT. §§ 616.605 to .640 (Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 61-63
(1953) ; S.C. CODE §§ 32-1642 to -1650 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 4-2012 (Supp. 1952)
TEx. Ryv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 844-50 (1953) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-20-22 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2571-75 (1958) ; WAsn. REv. CODE §§ 15.32.440 to .460,
.700 (1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4531, 4552-57 (1955). A Virginia statute, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 59-120 to -124 (1950), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 59-120 (Supp.
1958), requires trade marks to be on bottles but has no use or protective features.
A similar ordinance in a Florida city was held valid. Logan v. Alfieri, 110 Fla.
439, 148 So. 872 (1933).
22 State ext rel. Otero v. McLeod, 139 Fla. 287, 190 So. 596 (1939).
280 Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n v. Ferguson, 247 App. Div. Div. 856, 286
N.Y. Supp. 954 (1936).
"' People v. Ryan, 230 App. Div. 252, 243 N.Y. Supp. 644 (1930).
23 Thompson v. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 241 Ala. 100, 1 So. 2d 381
(1941) ; State ex Tel. Otero v. McLeod, 139 Fla. 287, 190 So. 596 (1939) ; Asso-
ciated Dairies v. Fletcher, 143 Kan. 561, 56 P.2d 106 (1936) ; People v. Ryan, 230
App. Div. 252, 243 N.Y. Supp. 644 (1930).
..8 State v. Brockwell, 209 N.C. 209, 183 S.E. 378 (1936).
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criminal procedure for the attainment of civil ends.2 4 The tribunal
declared that the unusual remedy was not reasonably related to the
objects sought to be attained and therefore invalidated the statute. Such
reasoning might not stand up in view of the simple effectiveness which
might be expected to flow from an efficient enforcement of the statute.
Here the court was concerned not so much with what was actually done
under the circumstances presented in this particular situation as it was
with what the enactment made possible. In another instance the Florida
court held invalid an ordinance prohibiting the use of any milk container
bearing a name or trademark other than that of the person or company
producing or distributing the product. The court declared that the
ordinance as written would prohibit the use of milk bottles with the
trademark of the bottle manufacturer blown into the sides or bottom.2 3 5
In other words the language was too broad. The tribunal was evidently
of the opinion that if the ordinance had gone only so far as to prohibit
producers or distributors from using bottles or other containers bearing
the names or trademarks of other persons or firms in the milk business,
the legislation would then have been valid and effective as a reasonable
effort to accomplish a lawful purpose.
A familiar provision in some of these statutes is the one requiring
finders of branded bottles to make a diligent search for the owner. The
California statute also makes it the duty of the finder to return the
containers to the owner. The word "diligent" has been given its gen-
erally accepted meaning in a case where the statute was held not be
invalid as being too vague and uncertain or as violating constitutional
provisions requiring uniform operation.
23 6
There are statutes and ordinances which require certain places of
public accommodation to serve milk in original containers. Typical of
this kind of regulation is a New Hampshire act28 7 applying to hotels,
restaurants, and various other establishments which serve meals. The
Wisconsin court upheld a Milwaukee ordinance requiring such sales
of milk within the city limits to be in original containers, sealed and
well capped, the opening to be in the presence of the customer.23 8 In
the case of the instant violation the restaurant proprietor's employees had
dipped the milk from a large container in the kitchen and carried it to
the patron, thus creating a greater risk of contamination.
An Iowa statute provided that ice milk must be sold only in packages
or wrappers with the manufacturer's label inscribed thereon. In a
8.. Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 110 P2d 355 (1941).
Logan v. Alfieri, 110 Fla. 439, 148 So. 872 (1933).
888 Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court of San Francisco, 241 Cal. 668, 8 P.2d140 (1932).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 184:24 (1955).
888 City of Milwaukee v. Childs Co., 195 Wis. 148, 217 N.W. 703 (1928).
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case arising under this act cake cups and pastry cones were considered
as "packages" within this labeling requirement. 239
As paper containers came more and more into general use as utensils
for everyday milk deliveries, questions arose as to the legality of their
use under various governmental regulations. In Pennsylvania paper
containers were held to be "bottles" within the meaning of a city board
of health regulation requiring the use of bottles for milk.240 Further-
more, an ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk in quantities of less than
one gallon in containers other than standard transparent glass milk
bottles was held to be so arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory as
to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 4 1 On
the other hand, the term "milk bottle" used in a Chicago ordinance
requiring milk to be delivered in standard milk bottles has been inter-
preted to refer to the familiar glass bottle and not to a paper container.
242
A state statute governing pasteurization plants mentioned single service
containers and indicated that they might be used, but the court declared
that there was nothing in the act which could be construed as prohibiting
a city from enacting an ordinance preventing their use. At that time the
single service container had not won universal approval as a sanitary
means of packaging milk; however such cartons are in general use today.
An order of the Florida Milk Commission prohibited dealers and
distributors from purchasing bottles from customers for more than the
amount of deposits which they were required to make to offset breakage
or loss. In considering this order the court ruled that it was in no way
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or unreasonable.248  By paying
more than the deposit for the bottles a distributor increases the number
of bottles returned and as a result he buys fewer new bottles than he
ordinarily would, and thus his total cost is decreased. There having
been no injury alleged or proven except a non-actionable loss from an
anticipated increase in the cost of doing business, the court denied an
injunction directed at the Commission to restrain the enforcement of
the order. In determining whether the order was reasonable the court
took judicial notice of the general practice of those selling milk in the
areas in requiring deposits to guarantee the return of glass bottles.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Many of the early milk control laws were challenged because of
possible unconstitutionality. At that time there were many in the legal
profession and elsewhere who opposed the injection of governmental
interference into a previously unregulated field of endeavor. One of the
... Linnenkamp v. Linn, 243 Iowa 329, 51 N.W.2d 393 (1952).
240 Otto Milk Co. v. City of Washington, 363 Pa. 243, 69 A.2d 399 (1949).
-41 Otto Milk Co. v. City of Washington, 80 Pa. D. & C. 233 (1951).
2 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Chicago, 385 Ill. 565, 53 N.E.2d 612 (1944).
2.. Milk Conm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
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more common reasons advanced for the supposed invalidity was the
alleged inability of state legislative bodies to so delegate their regulatory
power to administrative bodies.
A few of the early control statutes were ruled invalid because of their
failure to set up proper administrative standards which were sufficiently
definite, the authority given by the legislation being too broad and/or
not sufficiently succinct.244 However, it has been held that there is no
improper delegation of legislative power in the case of properly drawn
statutes which definitely delineate the duties of the control agency and
leave it with the duty of formulating detailed rules and regulations for
the proper effectuation of the program.245  In selecting the instrumen-
tality to achieve the legitimate end of regulation the legislature must
choose an agency which is adapted to the purpose.246
In the field of administrative law it is generally held that legislative
bodies may enact statutes making the violation of administrative regu-
lations a crime.247  Hence a Louisiana holding248 which invalidated a
statute stating that violations of the regulations of the Milk Commission
would constitute misdemeanors is not supported by the best legal theory.
However, it is clear that an administrative agency cannot be granted
authority to give criminal status to violations of its own regulations.249
Furthermore, statutory provisions giving California administrative offi-
cials authority to fix the amount of damages for a failure on the part
of a distributor to pay certain obligations have been held to constitute
an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.
250
In construing the provisions of the federal Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act pertaining to milk, the Supreme Court ruled that there
had been no improper delegation of authority in giving the adminis-
trative agency broad powers, the enactment having clearly stated the
purpose sought to be accomplished and having provided adequate stand-
ards for the preparation of programs which might implement and carry
out the desired ends. 251  Moreover, the Court decided that there had
been no unlawful delegation of legislative power in requiring the ap-
244 State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 13 A.2d 586 (1940) ; Ferretti v. Jackson,
88 N.H. 296, 188 Ati. 474 (1936) ; Rowell v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 98 Utah
353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940).
24' Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939);
Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938); Bd. of Supervisors of
Elizabeth City County v. State Milk Conm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950).
2. Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d705,(1939).'5United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Note, 1 N.C.L. Rv. 50
(1922).
24. State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939) ; cf. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606 (1959).
. State v. Curtis, 230 N.C. 169, 52 S.E.2d 364 (1949).
250 Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940); Jersey Maid Milk
Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).'5 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
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proval of the program in any given area by the Secretary of Agriculture
and by the affected producers, since tests had been set up under the
statute for the guidance of the Secretary and adequate procedure outlined
for the producers' determination. The Court remarked that Congress
might have put the milk control program into effect without providing
for the approval of anyone and that definite limitations on the Secretary's
freedom of choice had been established. The point was made that there
was nothing improper in authorizing the Secretary to execute marketing
agreements or to issue orders establishing marketing areas and fluctuat-
ing minimum prices. Procedural safeguards were said to furnish pro-
tection against any arbitrary or improper use of properly delegated
authority. There was said to be nothing wrong in requiring the approval
of producers and providing no similar procedure for the consent of milk
handlers.
To show a proper delegation of the power to make regulations for
the milk industry a definite intention on the part of the legislative body
must be shown. Thus boards of health without specific authorization
to regulate milk generally have been held not to be authorized to make
regulations for the dairy industry which are clearly beyond the scope of
the legislation giving them power to act in a limited manner.25 2 The
administrative agency must be given the authority in clear and concise
langauge. In one instance where this clarity was lacking an administra-
tive agency was held to be without power to require producers selling
and dealers buying milk to contribute to a dairy council in Milwaukee
the sum of one half cent per hundred pounds on milk sold or bought,
the proceeds to be used in building up a fund for advertising and in
furtherance of an educational campaign encouraging greater consumption
of milk and its products.
253
To be valid any act of an administrative agency in furtherance of a
milk control project must derive its validity from the statute setting up
the program. New Jersey administrative officials adopted a regulation
prescribing a "norm and excess" plan designed to induce dairy farmers
to stabilize milk production and to combat the natural tendency of herds
to yield much more milk in the spring than in the autumn. Although
this regulation was positive and to the point, it was held that it lacked
statutory authorization. 254 Moreover, an administrative agency cannot
be permitted to override the statute authorizing it to make regulations
for the milk industry. The Connecticut Dairy and Food Commision
failed to comply with statutory provisions in setting up tests with respect
to the butterfat content of milk purchased by dealers from producers.
.5 Loftus v. Russell, 69 Ariz. 245, 212 P.2d 91 (1949); State v. Curtis, 230
N.C. 169, 52 S.E2d 364 (1949).
... State v. Dairy Distribs., Inc., 217 Wis. 167, 258 N.W. 386 (1935).
... Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
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As a result of these tests an administrative official directed a certain
dealer to pay producers additional sums. The official was held to have
no power to compel the dealer to make payments, since they were made
in violation of a statute forbidding the use of such tests as a basis for
computation.255
Questions have arisen with respect to specific powers granted to the
milk control agencies. Statutes are not rendered invalid by provisions
which permit the administrative body to designate such marketing areas
as it may deem advisable 256 or to regulate markets after they are estab-
lished.2 57 Neither are the statutes rendered unconstitutional because
they provide that they are to go into effect only upon the majority
request or vote of the producers, distributors, and/or consumers in a
designated marketing area.258 Approval was also given to a California
provision which authorized administrative officials to designate such
marketing areas as they deemed necessary for those localities where
they found "the conditions affecting the production, distribution and sale
of fluid milk, fluid cream or both are reasonably uniform." 259  Provi-
sions giving authority to set minimum prices on the basis of the economic
relationship of the price of fluid milk for the marketing area involved
to the price of "manufacturing milk" have been held to delegate a valid
authority.2 0 The same is true with respect to provisions which confer
an unfettered and positive authority to classify milk and to prescribe
minimum prices for any one or more of the designated grades. 261
GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
MILK CONTROL LEGISLATION
The first big test of the validity of milk control legislation with
price-fixing features was brought before the public eye in Nebbia v.
New York,20 2 where in one of its famous five-to-four split decisions of
the New Deal years the Supreme Court ruled that such regulation of a
commodity as important to the public welfare as milk was not uncon-
stitutional. The majority, of the Justices were of the opinion that it
was not necessary for an industry to be a public utility to legitimize
such unusual controls. The price-fixing features of the New York
Hammerberg v. Holloway, 131. Conn. 616, 41 A.2d 791 (1945).
Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).
State ex rel. Department of Agriculture v. Marriott, 237 Wis. 607. 296 N.W.622 (1941).'s Alderman v. Puritan Dairy, Inc., 146 Fla. 345, 1 So. 2d 177 (1941); Milk
Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940) ; Holcombe
v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d 705 (1939);
Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers, Inc. v. Miller, 170 Md. 81, 182 Atl. 432 (1936).
J' ersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).'OO Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
: Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).
"-62291 U.S. 502 (1934), affirming State v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E.
694 (1933).
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statute were approved, the Court holding that there had been no viola-
tion of either the due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. The chief purpose of the legislation was to eliminate cut-
throat competition which depressed prices below production cost, thereby
establishing a monopoly. The extension of the public interest concept
to price regulation in respect to an industry of this kind was evidently
more than the four dissenting Justices could stomach. These conserva-
tives of the old school were of the opinion that a state's police power
could not be so extended.
Since the Nebbia decision there has been no doubt about the validity
of the basic patterns of state milk regulation. The proposition that a
state may regulate the milk business and set prices in furtherance of
that policy has been reiterated in many opinions, and the validity of
such programs, when proper standards are set, is no longer in doubt. 213
A state constitutional provision like the one in California requiring
uniformity of operation on the part of all general statutes is not violated
by a provision dividing the milk industry into two classifications, one
governing the marketing of fluid milk and the other controlling the mar-
keting of "manufacturing milk" or the milk that goes into the making
of milk products.264 Neither was there a violation of this uniformity
provision where the statute punished a dereliction in respect to the
unfair practices clauses of a stabilization program with a 500 dollar civil
penalty, notwithstanding the fact that the penalty was to be exacted only
from culprits in a marketing area where a stabilization plan was in
effect.2 5 Another point made in the case so holding was that there
had been no violation of uniformity because certain license fees required
to be paid by distributors, whether or not they operated in a stabilized
marketing area, were to go into a fund for the enforcement of the act
or any program put into effect thereunder. Furthermore, it was ruled
that neither the provisions for assessments on producers and distributors
nor the exemption of retail stores from licensing requirements destroyed
uniformity. The court added that there was no lack of uniformity,
though the statute was said to contemplate a classification program with
different prices established for each of the four classes mentioned. It is
quite evident that the interpretation given this uniformity provision is
263 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Franklin v.
State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295 (1936) ;
Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940) ; Jersey Maid Milk Prods.
Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939); Miami Home Milk Producers
Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 124 Fla. 797, 169 So. 541 (1936) ; Bohannon v. Duncan,
185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190
At]. 713 (1937) ; State ex rel. State Bd. of Milk Control v. Neward Milk Co.,
118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 AtI. 116 (1935) ; Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257,
186 Atl. 336 (1936) ; Board of Supervisors of Elizabeth City County v. State Milk
Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950).
2', Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
' ' Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).
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much the same as the familiar reasonable classification analysis with
respect to equal protection.
It is not every inequality that will render a statute setting up classi-
fications in the milk industry unconstitutional. The states possess a wide
discretion in making reasonable groupings. Under the equal protection
guarantee, however, classifications must be based upon substantial dif-
ferences. Moreover, it is necessary that there be a reasonable relation
to the subject of the legislation. Thus a classification will not be con-
sidered arbitrary or unreasonable unless, when viewed in the light of
facts made known or generally assumed, the content of the statute pre-
cludes the supposition that the classification rests upon a rational basis.
Here the burden of proof would rest upon the party asserting that the
statute was invalid. With these principles in mind the Vermont court
held that clauses exempting charitable organizations from certain price-
fixing provisions of milk control legislation and permitting continued
distribution among members of producers' co-operatives of the proceeds
of milk sales, pursuant to contracts between the co-operatives and their
members, could not be considered as being discriminatory.2 6 Certain
groups in the industry may be given preferred treatment without invali-
dating the legislation. Thus a Pennsylvania milk control statute was
not rendered invalid because its application might have resulted in spe-
cial privileges for producers.267 However, there must be a reasonable
basis for such privileges.
Milk control laws regulating the industry and setting up certain
standards have been held not to be repugnant to state constitutional
provisions prohibiting the taking of private property without just com-
pensation.2 68 Of course the standards have to be reasonable. It would
seem that the operation of such a constitutional provision would be very
much the same as that of a due process clause.
The New York Court of Appeals has said that a proper milk control
statute will set up an administrative agency along with procedural
directives, guarantee adequate hearings upon proper notice, delineate
powers and outline matters which must be considered as a basis for any
decisions or orders which are capable of proper enforcement, and make
provision for an effective judicial review.26 9 Every matter mentioned
here seems to be an essential element in any valid milk control program.
In fact a lack of enforceable standards was held to invalidate a milk
program in the state of Utah.
2 70
"' State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
217 Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 At. 336 (1936).
208 Albert v. Milk Control Bd., 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936) ; State ex rel.
State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116
(1935).
(l "'Noyes v. Erie & Wyo. Farmers Co-op. Corp., 281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334
(1939).
270 Rowell v. State Rd. of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940).
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In spite of earlier decisions approving the usual type of milk control
laws,2 1 the Georgia Supreme Court evidently changed its mind and
ruled that a similar statute was invalid because the milk industry was
not sufficiently affected with a public interest. The tribunal held that
this was true in spite of the fact that it concluded that the legislature had
been correct in finding that the milk industry is large, that milk is a
product of virtually universal use throughout the state, that it is a
perishable commodity, important as a human food, and that the health
of the people demands the sanitary safeguards surrounding its produc-
tion and distribution, and in finding further that it is of the greatest
importance that an adequate and constant supply of milk be kept flowing
to markets at a fair price to both the producer and the consumer. It
was said that such legislation violated the concept of due process. The
court declared that the alleged right of a seller and a buyer to agree upon
a price, in other words the right to contract, was a property right pro-
tected by the due process clause of the state constitution, and, in the
absence of a dedication to public usage, a private interest like the dairy
industry would not be subject to state regulations of the price-fixing
variety. The court stated that the previous decisions were not binding
because they were not full-bench determinations, whatever that means.272
This case is one of those anomalies which sometimes creep into the law
and which can be disregarded as being contrary to the overwhelming
current of judicial opinion. It is interesting to note that there is now a
milk control statute273 in Georgia and that no case has been found
invalidating this program.
It has been said that it is the province of the legislature to decide
whether unrestricted competition in the milk industry has brought about
ruinous conditions and created an intolerable economic situation.2 7 4 The
legislature will often limit the operation of a milk control statute to a
definite period and may even state that the enactment shall be in effect
only for such time as the present emergency exists. In the absence of
such a provision the fact that there have been several sessions of the
legislature at which a milk control statute might have been repealed or
terminated by a simple resolution would tend to show that there had
been no intention to abandon a program already in effect. 273 One court
has said that the failure to so limit the operation of such a statute will
not render the act invalid so long as conditions prevail which could
75 "Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d
705(1939) ; Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938).
'
7 Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951).278 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-501 to -561 (1957), as amended, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 42-513, -528, -532, -535, -554, -559 (Supp. 1958).274 Shiver v. Lee, 89 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1956).
Board of Supervisors of Elizabeth City County v. State Milk Comm'n, 191
Va. 1, 60 S.E2d 35 (1950).
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justify its existence.276 Expressions in some opinions would make it
appear that an emergency of some kind is necessary in order to justify
the enactment of milk control legislation.2 7 7  There may be varied
emergencies at different times, and it would not matter that critical
circumstances existing during a later crisis were of a different character
from those which prevailed at the time the statute was originally
enacted.2 78 The courts will usually accept a statement in the preamble
of a statute with respect to the existence of an emergency, 279 although
it might be that judicial interference would be justified where the in-
dustry was in no particular economic trouble.
There may be situations where a legislature has enacted two or more
statutes dealing with the general subject of milk and its sale to the pub-
lic. The lawmakers may grant a general authority to an established
agency like the state Department of Agriculture and then a few or many
years later enact another statute setting up a special agency as the con-
trolling authority without repealing the first enactment. The passage
of two or even more control laws of the administrative or commission
type is not unheard of, and questions arise concerning interpretations
and possible conflicts. In one instance the Vermont court said that two
statutes dealing with the sale of milk are in pari materia and must be
construed as part of one legislative system.280 Where a seeming conflict
exists, the court would of course try to adjust the differences and in this
effort should be guided by the judges' opinions concerning legislative
intent.
When milk control legislation provided that the act would not go
into effect except upon the petition of a body of representative producers,
the term "representative group" used in the statute was not so indefinite
as to render the act unenforceable for lack of clarity rendering it con-
trary to the concept of due process.28 1 A Michigan statute, insofar as
it required purchasers of milk and cream for resale to make monthly
payments to producers, commanded that milk sold contain at least three
per cent butterfat, and required revocations of licenses in case of viola-
tions, was held not to be unconstitutional as denying due process, the
provisions being neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.28 2  The United
States Supreme Court decided that a Virginia provision making it pos-
"NJersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
" Franklin v. State ex. rel. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 232 Ala 637,
169 So. 295 (1936); Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938);
Board of Supervisors of Elizabeth City County v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60
S.E.2d 35 (1950).
Como Farms, Inc. v. Foran, 6 N.J. Super. 306, 71 A.2d 201 (1950).
' Board of Supervisors of Elizabeth City County v. State Milk Comm'n, 191
Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950).... 'In re Swanton Market Area, 112 Vt. 285, 23 A.2d 536 (1942).
"'1 Milk Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
2 2 Johnson v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 314 Mich. 548, 22 N.W.2d 893
(1946).
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sible to cancel prices established on a particular market upon the request
of the majority of the producers and distributors in the affected area
could not be held invalid.
28 3
An order promulgated by a milk commission, though having the
effect of a legislative act, cannot be declared invalid because it is opera-
tive only in an area selected by the commission with a view to setting
up a control program for that particular market, the abortive theory
in the cases so holding being that the order amounted in effect to a "local
act" or "special act" and hence allegedly violated state constitutional
provisions requiring laws to be general and of uniform operation through-
out the state.28 4 The legislative program was said to be general for the
reason that it was worded in such a manner as to become applicable to
any particular area as and when the administrative officials determined
in conformity with the machinery set up by the statute that a control
plan would be in force in that area.285
The fact that a statute conferred upon the Virginia Milk Commis-
sion authority to collect sums needed for its own operating expenses by
levying assessments on producers and distributors without giving notice
thereof has been held not to render the act invalid, such persons needing
no notice because the amounts of the assessments were based upon
reports which they were required to file.2 8 6 The tribunal was of the
opinion that an assessment of this kind could not be regarded as a tax.
A milk control statute is not violative of state constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing a jury trial because it fails to provide for a jury in
hearings before the administrative agency.2 8 7 The same is true with
respect to a New Jersey Reorganization Act to the effect that an appeal
to the Appellate Division in cases of this kind should be conducted by
its judges without a jury.
2 8 8
A joint suit by various groups, such as dealers, distributors, and
consumers, to restrain the Georgia Milk Control Board from proceeding
under the control statute on the ground that the act was unconstitutional
was held by the state court not to be "a suit against the state" in such
a sense that the action could not be maintained without the state's
consent.
2 8 9
Where the power to enact milk control legislation is conceded or
well-established, it may be said that no further consideration of alleged
283 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
"8 Alderman v. Puritan Dairy, Inc., 146 Fla. 345, 1 So. 2d 177 (1941) ; Milk
Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
28. Milk Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., supra note 284.
... Reynolds v. Milk Conim'n, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507 (1935).
2 Franklin v. State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 232 Ala. 637,
169 So. 295 (1936)._88 Como Farms, Inc. v. Foran, 6 N.J. Super. 306, 71 A.2d 201 (1950).
288 Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d
705 (1939).
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unconstitutionality will be taken up unless a litigant shows by proper
pleadings that he comes within the purview of the act and that some
feature of the statute or of the orders or regulations issued under its
authority have caused or are threatening to cause him injury.290
THE FEDERAL PROGRAM AND INTERSTATE
TRANSACTIONS
The federal milk control program was set up under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act291 of 1937. This statute, applying to other
farm products besides milk, was enacted with a view to filling the void
created when the Supreme Court in 1935 declared the original Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act invalid.2 9 2 The Secretary of Agriculture was given
authority to establish the milk program. The constitutionality of federal
milk orders issued under authority of the act was soon questioned in
the courts. The basis for federal regulation of the industry was of course
the commerce clause, and in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc.
293
in 1939 the validity of the federal program was definitely established.
In this important decision the highest federal tribunal reaffirmed for
the federal milk program the things it had said about public interest in
the Nebbia case294 where state regulation was the theme. The Court
declared that "the people of great cities depend largely upon an adequate
supply of pure fresh milk." In fact the opinion states that milk is so
essential "for health that the consumer has been willing to forego un-
restricted competition from low cost territory to be assured of the
producer's compliance with sanitary requirements, as enforced by the
municipal health authorities." It is to be remembered, however, that
this opinion was written some twenty years ago and that in some areas
at least the consumer's experience with control programs and high mini-
mum prices may have cooled his ardor somewhat. The distributor has
a definite stake in the program, and among some people there is a sneak-
ing suspicion, perhaps more pronounced in regard to state administrative
boards than to federal agencies, that some of the segments of the indus-
try itself have a little too much to do with the regulation of their own
economy.
The requirements imposed upon the federal government by the ap-
propriate guarantees of the fifth amendment seem to be identical with
those which burden the states under the due process clause of the four-
teenth.295 These guarantees have been invoked in many cases involving
"' Noyes v. Erie & Wyo. Farmers Co-op. Corp., 281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334
(1939)50 Stat. 246 (1937) (codified in scattered section of 7 U.S.C.)
292A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
-O"307 U.S. 533 (1939).
... Discussed in text accompanying note 262 sipra.
... Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
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the validity of the federal legislation and the many and varied kinds of
orders promulgated under the authority granted by its provisions.
A decision fundamental to the federal program for milk control was
made when the Supreme Court in the Rock Royal case upheld the bit-
terly opposed provision for an equalization fund designed to make the
program fairer to all concerned. The abortive contention was that the
machinery of the fund took one persons's property to alleviate the bur-
dens of another and that the fundamental conception of due process was
thus violated. The refusal to adopt this view was considered a decided
boost for the backers of the milk control program. In addition the Court
declined to rule that discrimination existed because of provisions of a
New York area order commanding proprietary handlers to pay a uni-
form price while excepting bona fide co-operatives from such obligations,
or because of requirements making it mandatory for handlers selling
milk both inside and outside the marketing area to expend minimum class
prices with respect to milk made available in the marketing area or
moving through a plant located therein.
Other issues involving due process have arisen with respect to federal
milk marketing orders. At about the same time that the Rock Royal
case came before the courts a creamery company operating in the same
area had been ordered by federal milk officials to pay certain obligations
arising out of the Secretary of Agriculture's milk marketing program
for the New York area. The lower court decision in the Rock Royal
case had gone against the government and the operation of the milk
marketing order was suspended. Prior to this action, however, the
creamery had refused to pay certain obligations which bad accrued
under the program. When the Rock Royal case was reversed by the
Supreme Court some months later, the question of the status of the
past-due obligations was revived. The federal appellate court said that
the creamery had had three alternatives. It could have complied with
the order, quit business entirely, or continued doing business without
compliance. Having made the latter choice, the creamery bad com-
mitted itself, and it could not be said that coercion was involved. The
court declared that nothing retroactive was involved here and that
enforcement of the past-due indebtedness was not a "taking" without
due process of law.296 In another instance certain handlers raised the
point that there had been a denial of due process because administrative
officials' judgment in conducting hearings and rendering decisions might
well be influenced by the fact that a certain portion of the money col-
lected to cover the costs of administering the control program and the
expenses connected with marketing services was allegedly used to extend
the influence and bureaucratic powers of the Secretary of Agriculture
... United States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1939).
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and his subordinates. It was claimed that they should be disqualified
from making decisions which might redound to their advantage. The
tribunal ruled that the imputed interest in the outcome of hearings was
so remote as to be insignificant and that the judgment of the officials
would not thereby be affected. Therefore the true character of a fair
hearing which is inherent in the concept of due process could not be
said to have been violated in this instance.297 There is a grain of truth
in the argument of the proponent, however, and it would not be amiss
to consider the bureaucratic dangers, especially with respect to the se-
lection of personnel on the administrative boards.
According to a federal order pertaining to a middle western market-
ing area all milk was classified. There was class one, including milk
the utilization of which would not establish it as being in class two, and
class two, consisting of the product used or disposed of in any form
other than fluid milk. The order provided that handlers selling milk
in both classifications had to allocate the milk of local producers to class
one usage to the extent of ninety-five per cent of the particular handler's
class one usage before an allocation was made of imported milk. This
regulation was held not to violate the due process guarantee.29 8  The
argument was made that this order violated two other federal constitu-
tional provisions, one stating that all duties, imposts, and excises must
be uniform throughout the nation, and the other providing that no pref-
erences shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the
ports of one state over ports of another. The court stated that the
instant situation involved no duties, imposts, or excises. With respect
to the preference provision it was argued that the advantages given the
city of St. Louis under the order violated the fundamental law of the
land. The court dismissed this contention with the remark that the
Constitution forbids discrimination between states as units but not dis-
crimination between individual ports located in the same or different
states. The handler made the point that the order would have the effect
of limiting interstate commerce in milk between Chicago and St. Louis.
The court answered that there was no constitutional repugnance here,
since, consistent with due process alone, the fundamental law does not
prevent federal restrictions upon any portion of interstate commerce,
there being no guarantee with respect to uniformity.
The whole fabric of the federal milk control program rests basically
upon the power of Congress to legislate with respect to interstate and
foreign commerce. Most of the litigation in the federal courts would
seem to revolve around definitions of the term "interstate commerce"
as a fundamental concept of American constitutional law and the reach
2 ' Kewashkum Dairy Co. v. Brannan, 8 Agri. Dec. 834 (1952).
B . Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1946), affirming
Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Jones, 61 F. Supp. 209 (E.D. Mo. 1945).
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of the commerce clause into transactions which might appear to be
merely local in 'character. Of course matters which neither interfere
with nor affect interstate business are considered purely intrastate trans-
actions and hence not subject to federal regulation. As sanitary and
refrigeration facilities and safeguards have increased in efficiency, the
milk and dairy product business in the nation as a whole has tended to
reach out into broader horizons and to become less localized. The
complex industry of today with complicated interrelations with the rest
of the commercial world is a far cry from the four or five cow dairy unit
which was so common in years not too long past.
Two basic lines of inquiry developed with respect to the incidence
of the commerce clause upon the varied facets of the dairy industry.
One line of cases involved the controversies concerning the extent to
which a state or its political subdivisions may regulate interstate busi-
ness activity. The second line contained the decisions which determined
to what extent the congressional power can reach into the state's eco-
nomic scheme.
It is clear that a state will not be permitted to establish economic
blocks with respect to milk being transported across its borders. In an
early opinion the Supreme Court decided that the state of New York
could not enforce minimum price regulations concerning milk brought
across the state line from Vermont.299 In another instance a Massa-
chusetts corporation serving the city of Boston had for some time been
distributing milk produced in New York state to supply the city's needs.
Needing to increase its three receiving stations, this distributor applied
to the New York milk control authorities for a permit to operate an
additional facility. The application was turned down because of allega-
tions that the establishment of the fourth receiving station would not be
in the public interest and would introduce destructive competitive dan-
gers into a market alleged to be adequately served. A state statute gave
the milk authorities power to make such decisions. The basis for not
granting the permit was a desire to aid local interests by restricting
outside competition and to promote an increased local supply for the
consuming public. The Supreme Court found that the refusal to ap-
prove the application had thrown a barrier in the way of interstate
commerce and that there had been a violation of the commerce clause.
It was said that a state could not thus benefit its own industrial interests
by limiting the number of receiving stations a firm doing an interstate
business might have. The Court refused to listen to the argument that
the establishment of the additional facility would take supplies needed
for local consumption. The state authorities contended that refusal of
the permit did not obstruct interstate commerce because the licensed
"' Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 499 (1935). The federal district
court's decision in this case is discussed in Note, 13 N.C.L. Rav. 500 (1934).
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distributor had been allowed to operate at its other plants without limita-
tion upon the quantity of milk it might buy. The Court refused to make
such a ruling. The state statute under which the action was taken was
declared invalid.300
Some state statutes have provisions limiting their operation to milk
which is to be furnished to consumers within the jurisdiction. In one
instance such a provision was placed in a forward section of a Virginia
milk control law. It was held that this limitation in the power-granting
portion of a comprehensive law would qualify the later provisions of the
act, including the section authorizing the fixing of prices, and that there-
fore no power had been conferred upon administrative officials to fix
prices to be paid Virginia producers for milk sold and processed in that
state for distribution in Kentucky and Tennessee, two states which had
no milk price control legislation of their own.30 1
A Virginia county ordinance levied a license tax on peddlers. A
question arose with respect to the application of this ordinance to out-
of-state milk distributors who were selling their products from trucks
which moved in from other jurisdictions. In the case of a District of
Columbia dealer certain sales were consummated within the county after
the milk products had been transported across the state line. It was
decided that these transactions were purely local in character and that
the application of the peddler's tax to them would impose no burden
upon interstate commerce.30 2 With respect to deliveries across the state
line in response to orders previously made by Virginia citizens, how-
ever, the court decided that such transactions constituted interstate busi-
ness which the county as a subdivision of the state could not lawfully
tax. It was declared that the fact that a portion of the distributor's
business was interstate commerce which could not be taxed locally
would not prevent its purely local activities from being so taxed.
According to an interpretation given to a Virginia statute distribu-
tors' sales were not to be affected by pricing restrictions unless the
business was transacted within the boundaries of a designated marketing
area located in the state. With this interpretation in mind the United
States Supreme Court held that no burden upon interstate commerce
had been imposed by the incidence of a provision of the statute defining
the term "distributors" used therein as referring to persons, whether
located or operating within or without the confines of the state, who
purchased, marketed, or handled milk for resale as the fluid product
within state boundaries. 30 3 The Court held that the pricing provisions
00 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
... Pet Dairy Prods. Co. v. State Milk Comm'n, 195 Va. 396, 78 S.E.2d 645
(1953)."0',Thompson's Dairy, Inc. v. County Bd., 197 Va. 623, 90 S.E.2d 810 (1956).
3°3Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937), affirming 16
F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1936).
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of the act were inapplicable to a concern which had a plant for pasteuri-
zation and treatment located outside the state, bought milk for its plant
from Virginia farmers, and sold its entire output of the bottled product
to a company which had retail outlets in the state and elsewhere for the
sale of milk, ice cream, and other dairy products. Here the statute
would not apply until a local resale.
Nothing is better established in our federal system than the proposi-
tion that a commodity, be it milk or something else, is not fully im-
munized by the commerce clause from state legislative control by reason
of its out-of-state origin. The important inquiry is whether or not a
particular state or municipal regulation casts a burden on the movement
of the commodity across state lines. Sometimes a case will discuss
various provisions of a milk control regulation and approve some while
rejecting others. In one such instance a New Jersey court refused to
uphold a public health regulation requiring monthly reports of persons
doing an interstate business in respect to non-local transactions, a regu-
lation requiring that all plants approved for the distribution of fluid milk
have their permanent permits so conditioned that state authorities could
control fifty per cent of the approved milk at all times during the periods
the permits were in effect, and a regulation providing that the label of
any packaged milk sold locally for fluid consumption state unequivocally
the place from whence the product came, whether the source was within
the state or beyond its borders; but it gave its approval to a regulation
that shipping tags attached to and bills of lading accompanying shipments
of fluid milk entering a sanitarily approved plant specify the classification
of the milk in transit.,
0 4
A different aspect of the above labelling regulations can be illustrated
by a Florida case. A statute required all persons selling milk or ship-
ping it into the state to label containers, with the idea of informing
customers with respect to the producers and their state and county resi-
dences. Since this act applied to Florida residents as well as those of
other states, it was held not to be violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection guarantee as making it practically impossible
for milk from other states to compete with milk produced in Florida. 05
The out-of-state dealers did not raise the question with regard to the
commerce clause.
Under certain regulations West Virginia health officials were re-
quired to inspect all dairy farms and milk plants every six months.
Other regulations prescribed that milk products from beyond the limits
of routine inspection were not to be sold in the jurisdiction unless they
were produced and pasteurized under equivalent rules. In a controversy
"o" Welsh Farms, Inc. v. Bergsma, 16 N.J. Super. 295, 84 A.2d 631 (1951).
805 Noble v. Carlton, 36 F.2d 967 (S.D. Fla. 1930).
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involving these regulations the health officials declined to issue a permit
to a Pennsylvania dairy concern for the distribution of milk in West
Virginia. Testimony of Pennsylvania witnesses adduced that only ten
per cent of the dairy farms and plants in that jurisdiction were inspected
as often as four times each year. It was shown that an inspection rou-
tine was usually carried out by the employees of the producer or shipper
and that this procedure had been followed in the instant case. The
federal appellate court ruled that there had been an abuse of authority
with respect to the refusal to issue a permit.30 6 The federal court had
taken jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The issue
of the incidence of the commerce clause does not seem to have been
raised in this case, and it might be that the controversy was considered
to have involved a health regulation which would have little or no
effect upon interstate milk shipments. If the matter had been con-
sidered, an issue might have been raised with regard to double inspection
and any possible effect it might have upon interstate transactions. This
theory is graphically illustrated by an Arkansas case involving the acts
of municipal health officials operating under a city ordinance in author-
izing inspection services in addition to those required by the laws of
Texas, the state from which the milk came. This action was held to
impose unnecessary burdens upon interstate commerce, the court de-
claring that the pyramiding of inspection fees might well result in the
erection of prohibitive trade barriers. 07
As applied to out-of-state plants or dealers, city ordinances or health
regulations prohibiting the sale of milk or cream unless it was produced
within a prescribed distance from a specified point in a city have been
held to be invalid as a burden upon interstate business. 08
In matters affecting interstate commerce which require a diversity of
treatment because of special local conditions, the general rule is that a
state is free to legislate, under the usual interpretation of the commerce
clause, until Congress sees fit to act with respect to the particular subject
under consideration. An issue arose concerning the application to inter-
state transactions of a Pennsylvania statute setting up milk price control
and requiring all dealers to obtain licenses and keep records. An attempt
was made to apply this statute to a company-operated receiving plant
which cooled milk before shipping a small part of it to another state. The
milk processed at the plant was shipped across state lines and it was de-
cided that the matters regulated were mainly of a local nature. With the
above construction of the commerce clause in mind the Supreme Court
held that the effect of the legislation upon interstate commerce was only
80 Sleeth v. Dairy Prods. Co., 228 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1955).
"7 McClendon v. City of Hope, 217 Ark. 367, 230 S.W.2d 57 (1950).0'Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) ; Miller v. Williams,
12 F. Supp. 236 (D. Md. 1935).
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incidental and that no interference could be said to have been presented
here.309 The Court has also approved the application of state-imposed
minimum resale prices to sales of milk by District of Columbia handlers
to customers in Virginia.310 It seems safe to say that a state milk con-
trol law is not invalid merely because it indirectly or incidentally affects
interstate business transactions.
One court has declared that protection of interstate commerce might
involve the incidental regulation of business intrastate in character.311
This tribunal went on to say that the shipment of milk which has not
been taken across a state line but has been distributed together with
other milk moving interstate into the marketing area in such a manner
that the transaction represents, from the public viewpoint, a single
marketing operation involving both intrastate and interstate milk, will
be subject to regulation under federal law whenever it can be said to
have been obstructive to interstate business.
In United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. 31 2 the Supreme Court
held that milk moving strictly intrastate might be regulated under orders
issued by federal agricultural officials if during the marketing process
it moved in competition with other milk which was being transported
across state lines. In this instance a distributor in the Chicago area
purchased milk from Illinois producers and processed, sold, and dis-
tributed it solely within the state. However, it was shown that thirty
per cent of the milk sold in the metropolitan area came from other states,
and the Court declared that the incidence of the intrastate product upon
the price structure set up under the instant federal order was enough to
confer jurisdiction over the local milk upon federal agricultural officials.
The Wrightwood case has been followed in an instance where a sub-
stantial portion of the milk was moving in the current of interstate
commerce.313 In fact the right of federal officials to regulate intrastate
milk has been upheld where the proportion of the product moving inter-
state was very small.3 1 4 Early opposing opinions 15 stating the lack of
federal power to control the intrastate portion of the milk or derivative
products can now be disregarded.
Questions may arise with respect to *hether a particular transaction
is intrastate or interstate in character. In one instance a milk dealer
80. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
810 County Bd. of Arlington County v. State Milk Comm'n, 346 U.S. 932
(1954); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
United States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1939).
812315 U.S. 110 (1942), reve r 123 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1941).
... Cruli v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1943).
814 Belazs v. Brannan, 87 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ; Beatrice Creamery
Co. v. Anderson, 75 F. Supp. 363 (D. Kan. 1947) ; United States v. Telling-Belle
Vernon, 7 Agri. Dec. 848 (1948).
"'United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy Co., 10 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mass. 1935);
Royal Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934) ; Edgewater
Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
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with a plant in Pennsylvania was accused of doing business in New York
without a state license. The New York statute specifically exempted
interstate transactions from the operation of its provisions. The dealer
had made contracts with New York producers, providing for delivery
f.o.b. dealer's plant. However, his truck drivers were instructed to go
to the dairies and pick up milk containers and carry them to the Penn-
sylvania plant, the producers paying only the amount it would have cost
to carry the milk to the nearest plant located in New York. As a part
of the deal coolers had been loaned to certain producers for use on their
farms. The New York appellate court considered both the sale and
the point of delivery to have been outside the producing state, and so
decided that federal and not state law would be applicable.316 The fact
that the ultimate destination of the shipment was in another state seems
to have had much to do with this decision, the tribunal declaring that
the act of taking the milk from one state to another constituted inter-
state commerce. The opinion stated that in such a transaction the pro-
ducers' payment of inadequate transportation charges plus a fixed point
of delivery, even if it had been located in the producing state, would
not have made the contract an intrastate one. It was said that a similar
conclusion would have been reached with respect to the Pennsylvania
dealer's solicitation of the producers' business, even though the actual
negotiations for the agreement had taken place in New York. The
result would not have been affected even though title was considered to
have passed in New York and even if the dealer could have disposed of
the milk within the state, where he did not do so but took it to his plant
across the state line. The court decided that no intrastate business was
involved and that no state license could be required.
In considering the entire program established under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act one court, in a case involving transactions in
milk, has stated that its objective was to establish such orderly condi-
tions for the marketing of agricultural commodities in interstate business
as would maintain prices paid to farmers at a proper level.31 7 To main-
tain the economic position of the dairy farmer Congress inserted in the
statute a provision establishing price supports for milk and its derivative
products at not more than ninety nor less than seventy-five per cent of
parity.3 18 A "parity price" was defined by the statute as one which will
give the producers of agricultural commodities a "purchasing power
with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing
power of agricultural commodities during the base period."3 19
... De Korte v. Du Monde, 273 App. Div. 188, 76 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1948).
"" Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1946)....The present provision is 63 Stat. 1052 (1954), 7 U.S.C. § 1446 (1958).
48 Stat. 32 (1933). The provision was amended in 1948 to conform to that
in 62 Stat. 1257 (1948), 7 U.S.C. §1301(a)(1) (1958). See also Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 F.2d 87
(8th. Cir. 1946).
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THE FIXING OF PRICES
There has been no doubt about the constitutionality of the broad
concept of price fixing by state and federal milk control administrative
agencies since the NebbiC °20 and Rock Royal321 decisions. In fact the
validity of legislation giving such powers to administrative boards or
officials has been reiterated in cases3 22 where the statutes were more or
less similar. There is authorization for these officials to set milk prices
in the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act8 28 and in the milk
control laws of Alabama,324 California,
32 5 Connecticut, 32  Florida,82 7
Georgia, 2 8 Maine,3 20 Massachusetts, 3 0 Mississippi,8 '1 Montana,8 2 New
Hampshire,33 New Jersey,8 4 New York,83 5 North Carolina, 8 0 Penn-
sylvania,337 Rhode Island,
8 South Carolina,339 Utah,
840 Vermont,841
and Virginia.3 42 Some of these statutes mention resale prices specifi-
cally while the language of others may leave the impression that pro-
ducers' prices alone were meant to be regulated. A majority mention
minimum prices alone and some are worded in a somewhat hazy fashion.
In five states, however, both maximum and minimum prices are men-
tioned. Thus the Florida and Virginia acts refer to "minimum and maxi-
mum" prices while those in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Ver-
mont read in the alternative in some such vein as "minimum or maxi-
mum." The wording of the Virginia statute has been interpreted to
22 Discussed in text at note 262 supra.
321 Discussed in text at note 293 supra.
2E.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939) ; Shiver v.
Lee, 89 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1956); Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk
Control Bd., 124 Fla. 797, 169 So. 541 (1936) ; State ex rel. Milk Control Bd. v.
Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 AUt. 116 (1935) ; Noyes v. Erie & Wyo.
Farmers Co-op. Corp., 181 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334 (1939) ; State v. Auclair, 110
Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
-2248 Stat. 30 (1933), 7 U.S.C. §608c(5) (A), (18) (1958).
.. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 223 (1940).
"I CA. AGRiC. CODE §§ 4229, 4230, 4230.5, 4231, 4246, 4250, 4259, 4280, 4281,
4292-95, 4350-55.5, 4357, 4359-63.
I" CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-215 to -219 (1958). These provisions have
been repealed as of Dec. 31, 1960, Conn. Pub. Acts 1959 ch. 116, § 7.
"'I FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.04, .13 (1943).
32 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-554 to -561 (1957), at amended, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-
554, -559 (Supp. 1958).2"9ME REv. STAT. Am. ch. 33, § 4 (Supp. 1959).
230 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 94A §§ 10-12A (1954).
231 Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4560-51 to -62 (1957), as amended, Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 4560-52, -56, -59, -60 (Supp. 1958).
222 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 27-407 (Supp. 1959).
23 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 183:7 (1955).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:12A-21 (1959).
28 N.Y. AGRuC. & MxTs. LAW § 258-m.
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.8(j) (Supp. 1959).
PA. STAT. ANN. it. 31, §§ 700j-801 to -809 (1958).
832R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §21-4-5(c) (1956).
32" S.C. CODE §§ 32-1634.33, .34, .41 to .50 (Supp. 1959).
* UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-4(b)5, -3-11 (1953).
"'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 § 2506 (1958).
81 VA. CODE ANN. § 3-359 (1950).
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give the Milk Commission authority to fix minimum and maximum
prices in conjunction with one another and not to authorize the setting
of minimum prices alone.343 The New Jersey court has said that it is
legitimate to set a price for milk which will operate both as a maximum
and a minimum, 44 the administrative officials showing a somewhat un-
usual concern for the walfare of the consumer.
Where no maximum resale price had been authorized for New York
dealers and a complaining dealer had not been making what he con-
sidered to be a reasonable profit, an administrative order requiring
dealers to pay minimum prices to producers was said not to be conflisca-
tory merely because the officials had nullified a previous order setting
dealers' minimum selling prices.3 45  Each dealer had an equal oppor-
tunity to sell milk at a price that gave a reasonable return. The court
declared that the officials were under no compulsion to fix minimum
selling prices at such a figure as would yield a reasonable return to
every milk dealer.
A milk control law is not unconstitutional because it authorizes the
administrative agency to designate "natural marketing areas" for price
fixing purposes.3 46 In the various localities or markets set up by admin-
istrative edict separate and differing prices may be established.3 47 Under
a recent interpretation of the Virginia act, however, it seems that the
Milk Commission has no authority to approve differing prices for the
same grade of milk in various localities within the state. But the lack
of such power was held not to prevent the authorization of discounts in
price for quantity sales.3 48 A "natural marketing area" has been defined
by the Vermont court as an area where milk is sold in response to con-
sumer demand, the word "natural" being interpreted as meaning normal
and the term "market" denoting geographic location.34 9
Some of the more modern milk control laws contain provisions
authorizing an equalization of prices. The New York provision has
been approved by the state Court of Appeals.3 50  To establish uniform
prices to producers a marketing order may provide for the pooling of
their milk. These pooling arrangements are of two kinds. There is the
marketwide pool by the terms of which all milk handlers in the market-
ing area are obligated to pay a minimum uniform price to producers,
there being various adjustments for butterfat content, transportation
... Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Milk Comm'n, 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769 (1955).8. Abbott's Dairies Inc. v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372 (1954).
... Muller Dairies, Inc. v. Baldwin, 242 App. Div. 296, 274 N.Y. Supp. 975
(1934).
... State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
... Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 RI. 409, 97 A.2d 578 (1953).
"" Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Milk Comm'n, 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769 (1955).
... State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
alo Noyes v. Erie & Wyo. Farmers Co-op. Corp., 281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334
(1939).
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expense, or other factors. The other type of arrangement is the indi-
vidual handler pool which provides for a differing uniform price, the
figure depending upon the use to which the particular quantity of milk is
put. The use would determine the class and the handler would be
required to pay the producer the minimum class price set for the mar-
keting area. The individual handler pool would of course have varying
arrangements for one-product and multi-product operations. Under
the federal act a producer majority of three-fourths is required for the
establishment of an individual handler pool, while the marketwide pool
may bet set up if just two-thirds of the producers approve. In pooling
arrangements generally the money set aside for the satisfaction of pro-
ducers' claims is known as the producer settlement fund.
In the important Rock Royal case8 51 a federal marketing order set
up a program for the New York City area. This plan established quotas
for producers in the area and established an equalization pool making it
possible for each producer doing business with a proprietary handler to
receive for his milk a uniform or weighted price with differentials pro-
vided for location, quality, and other market variants. The pooling
provisions of the order were held not to violate the fifth amendment's
due process clause.
In a somewhat similar pooling arrangement price differentials were
set up based on the location of the producers' farms. A federal appellate
court ruled that such differentials were not unlawful, refusing to accept
the contention that the only differentials of this sort authorized were
those based upon the location where delivery was to be made.85 2 The
court made the point that neither the dealers nor the handlers could
challenge this plan where the differentials had no effect upon the cost
of the milk to these persons as computed on the basis of established
minimum prices but affected only distributive shares to be paid producers
out of the equalization pool. The court also refused to deny the validity
of provisions of the order excluding from computation of the blended or
uniform price the milk of handlers in default with respect to required
equalization payments "for milk received during the delivery period
next preceding but one." It was evidently believed that the purpose of
these provisions was to minimize the risk that the equalization pool
would not be self-liquidating for a later delivery period because of the
failure of handlers obligated to the pool to make the required payments.
The court reasoned that a failure to meet these obligations for one de-
livery period was indicative of an intention to refuse to make future
payments.
Under an Oregon milk control program an order established quotas
and authorized the pooling of returns, thereby making possible the pay-
' Discussed in text at note 293 supra.
Green Valley Creamery, Inc. v. United States, 108 F.2d 342 (lst Cir. 1939).
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ment of a uniform price to producers. Certain producer-distributors of
grade A raw milk claimed that they had not received the established
minimum price for their entire quotas. Pool companions of these grade
A dairymen produced grade B milk and also lactic fluid which was
being prepared to go into grade A pasteurized products. It was claimed
that these grade B producers had failed to make full sales of their quotas,
thereby allegedly diminishing the pool shares of grade A dairymen.
The proponents maintained that grade A milk was superior and cost
more to produce than the inferior grades. They stated that they were
not producing more than they could sell. Taking the program set up
by the statute as a whole, the court was of the opinion that there had
been no violation of the basic guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws. The advantages of the pool and quota program were
said to offset the alleged disadvantages at least to a certain extent. The
tribunal defended the employment in the statute of terms in common use
in the industry like "pooling" and "basic averages" and said that no
fatal vagueness or ambiguity could be pointed to here.
3 53
Some milk control statutes authorize the establishment of production
quotas. When this has been done the quantity set by administrative
officials is called "quota milk," while any excess production is known as
"surplus milk." According to contracts between a California milk
distributor and producers in two marketing areas the former was re-
quired to pay for "quota" milk at class 1 prices, with provisions included
stating that "surplus" milk must be paid for at the class 4 rates unless it
was intended to be used in categories covered by other class prices.
The agreements provided that each producer's milk would be deemed
to be pooled with the milk of other dairy farms at all times. In con-
struing the contracts the court declared that they authorized the dis-
tributor to pool the entire milk supply of all the producers in each
marketing area without regard to the distinction between "quota" and
"surplus" milk, but did not permit him to pool the whole milk produc-
tion of all dairy farms in every area under consideration. 54
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act prescribes uniform
minimum prices to be paid by handlers in respect to each use classifica-
tion. A New York area marketing order added to the cost of non-pool
milk and milk products a charge based on class prices in the area where
the milk was produced rather than the actual cost to the handler. The
payments required by the order were to be made through the producer
settlement fund and were intended to be considered in the computation
of the "minimum price." The federal appellate court considered this
charge a penalty and not a compensatory payment. It was held that
.. Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 91 P.2d 273 (1939).
"5 Marin Dairymen's Milk Co. v. Brock, 100 Cal. App. 2d 686, 224 P.2d 374
(1950).
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penalty payments of this kind resulted in price discrimination between
handlers who purchased non-pool milk products and those who bought
from a pool, even though both had made the same use thereof. Since
such penalties were considered as being in conflict with the statutory
guarantee of uniformity, the order could not be sustained under any
reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision permitting anything
"incidental to" and "not inconsistent with" the stated requirements. 55
The dissenting judge, the eminent Learned Hand, believed the charge
to be a proper one.
A provision of the federal order considered in the Rock Royal case850
limited the application of the minimum price regulations to milk which
was sold in the marketing area covered by the order or which passed
through a plant located therein. A handler selling milk in this marketing
area alone claimed that this regulation was discriminatory in that it
would permit handlers who sold milk both inside and outside the mar-
keting area to offset losses, sustained because they were required to pay
minimum prices to the area producers, with profits made from the un-
priced milk sold outside the area. The Supreme Court refused to follow
this reasoning, declaring that this was a competitive situation which the
order did not create and with which it did not deal.
Administrative agencies are not supposed to ignore or transgress
statutory limitations upon their authority to fix prices, even to accom-
plish what may be thought to be desirable ends. In one situation which
developed in Virginia the Milk Commission had indulged in unauthor-
ized price-setting practices for a rather lengthy period. Certain indi-
viduals and companies had acquiesced for many years in the Commis-
sion's unauthorized acts. The court declared that a chain grocery store's
failure to object could not be said to preclude it ultimately from testing
the validity of the administrative practices. The grocery store was
said to be a "person aggrieved" and therefore entitled to raise objections
to adverse decrees.3 57 A complainant who wishes to contest the validity
of allegedly unlawful minimum milk price orders issued by a legally set
up milk control agency must not only show a loss but must also prove
that he had not been losing money before the offending orders went
into effect and that others similarly situated were unsuccessful under the
protested program.3 58
A loss or lessening of milk supply may be an influential factor with
respect to the initial establishment of a control program or the changing
of milk prices in an existing authorized marketing area.850
.5. Kass v. Brannan, 196 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1952).
..6 Discussed in text at note 293 supra.
... Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Milk Comm'n, 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769 (1955).3 'Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934).
It re Swanton Market Area, 112 Vt. 285, 23 A.2d 536 (1942).
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Sometimes a statute or administrative order will grant an exemption
from price-fixing provisions of milk control laws. The Vermont court
ruled in favor of an exemption of charitable institutions.360 A New
York court approved a so-called exemption which permitted certain
wholesale distributing stations operating through the Welfare Depart-
ment to sell milk at a figure lower than the price set for ordinary retail
sales.
36 1
A New York statute contained a provision stating that dealers in
unadvertised milk would be permitted to sell the fluid product to stores
at a price one cent a quart below that fixed for milk sold by companies
with well-advertised brands, the stores being allowed to resell at the
same differentials. The Borden Company, with one of the more im-
portant brands in the nation, claimed that discrimination was present
here and that the equal protection guarantee had been violated. There
had been a similar voluntary differential in effect even before regulation.
The Supreme Court declared that the differential was not unreasonable
under the circumstances and held that the statute was valid.36 2  The
opinion stated that in a situation like this judicial inquiry should not
concern itself with the accuracy of legislative determinations, but should
place more emphasis upon the reasonable basis for the findings. A short
time later, however, the High Court refused to approve a similar one
cent differential unfavorable to name brands and having application only
to those dealers in non-brand milk who had been in business at the time
the statute was originally enacted. 363  The differential was said to be
discriminatory against those dealers in unadvertised milk who had gone
into business after the statute had first become effective.
Under the present New York statute there seems to be no doubt
that differentials in price may be set up in favor of the milk of certain
breeds of cattle.364 The basis for the higher prices has been said to be
the goodly percentage of butterfat in the milk of Guernsey and other
allegedly superior cows. To be proper beyond criticism it is necessary
that the order setting up such breed differentials contain findings or
determinations of facts upon which the administrative action is predi-
cated. To a great degree production costs will enter into the determina-
tion of the issue, but there are other factors which must be considered
.00 State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
... People, ex rel. McDonough v. Bratowsky, 154 Misc. 432, 276 N.Y. Supp. 418
(Magis. Ct. 1934).
"'Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934), reversing 7
F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S.
251 (1936), affirming 11 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
... Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936), reversing May-
flower Farms, Inc., 267 N.Y. 9, 195 N.E. 532 (1935).
"'4 See Noyes v. Landel, 18 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div.
1108, 21 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 749, 34 N.E.2d 906 (1941); New
York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Noyes, 284 N.Y. 197, 30 N.E.2d
471 (1940).
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in deciding whether the differential should be granted, including other
quality criteria, location or distance, and the efficiency of the services
rendered. 0 5 A differential of this sort cannot be put into effect where
there is no conclusive proof of the superior quality of the milk of the
particular breed of cattle in question.8 66 In a case from the New York
City marketing area a federal milk order established a butterfat differen-
tial of four cents a hundredweight for each one-tenth of one per cent above
or below a stated butterfat test percentage figure. A Guernsey co-
operative objected to the order and alleged that the result of this formula
would be that over a period of years the use of the milk of the Guernsey
breed would decline if it did not cease altogether. A decrease in the
supply because of inadequate returns would inevitably result in a de-
crease in the riarket and the reestablishment of the market would be
difficult. An additional "grade" or "quality" differential was urged,
but the court declared that the evidence supported the decision of the
administrator that no such differential be granted. The tribunal stated
that the failure to provide the favored treatment did not violate the
constitutional rights of the producers of Guernsey milk.
67
There is no doubt that a higher minimum price may be set for milk
where the container is furnished than where it is not.868 However, the
courts seem less sure when considering differentials in price which are
based upon the different types of containers used in delivering the
product. The California,36 9 Oregon,3 70 and Virginia87 ' courts have re-
fused to approve differentials favoring milk delivered in paper con-
tainers over that delivered in the time-honored glass bottle. The Cali-
fornia court said that a fiber container had no inherent quality that would
give it a peculiar value. The Oregon court took the view that the
price-fixing provisions of the statute must make a rather definite grant
of this power, and if the language cannot be considered to authorize
differentials of this sort, then any attempt to put them into effect would
be unlawful. In Massachusetts a one-cent differential for store sales
of milk in paper containers was established. The validity of the increase
was said to depend upon whether the use of the containers for which the
extra charge was made was a more expensive method of marketing
365 Niagara Frontier Co-op. Milk Producers Agency, Inc. v. Du Mond, 297
N.Y. 75, 74 N.E.2d 315 (1947).
N oyes v. Landel, 18 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Supp. Ct. 1940) ; New York State Guern-
sey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Noyes, 284 N.Y. 197, 30 N.E.2d 471 (1940).
... New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Wickard, 141 F.2d 805
(2d Cir. 1944).
"' American Can Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453
(1C9hallenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Parker, 23 Cal. 2d 137, 142 P.2d 737
(1943).... Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Ore. 305, 193 P.2d 543 (1948).
71 Lucerne Cream & Butter Co. v. Milk Comm'n, 182 Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 397
(1944) (with strong dissent).
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milk than the use of containers of other types with respect to which no
additional charge had been imposed.372 The administrative order allow-
ing the increase in price was declared to have been unjustified, but the
court refused to approve a provision which would have had the effect of
preventing the future promulgation of directives imposing a non-refund-
able container charge with respect to milk or cream to be delivered in
paper cartons. When one considers the consensus of judicial opinion as
portrayed in these decisions, it can scarcely be said that the courts have
been favorably disposed toward these container differentials.
From what has been said in one opinion from Oregon,3 7 3 it would
seem to be reasonable to suppose that the courts would not disapprove
of differentials in price between cash and credit sales and price variants
depending upon whether house deliveries are made by dealers or stores.
Furthermore, an Oregon statute37 4 authorizes differentials for the various
grades of dairy products. A generally applicable South Dakota statute 7 5
provides for bona fide price differentials.
Fair hauling charges may be set by administrative officials3 7 6 acting
under control legislation. In pricing milk they may make transporta-
tion and related allowances and base them upon the distance which must
be covered in carrying the product to market. In one case a federal order
for the Philadelphia area established three zones, each being determined
by the distance of the milk plants from the City Hall. For the closer
zone the order made no provision for any such allowances; for the next
zone stated transportation allowances were authorized; while in the
farthest zone a receiving station allowance was added. The latter allow-
ance was in addition to the one for transportation and compensated the
handler for weighing, testing, and cooling services rendered at his estab-
lishment. These allowances were approved as being fair and non-
discriminatory. 377  The California court affirmed the validity of an
administrative order establishing minimum prices to be paid by dis-
tributors in the San Diego marketing area for fluid milk purchased
"F. 0. B. distributor's plant" and stating that any distributor who re-
ceived milk for sale or distribution within the area might deduct from
the minimum prices specified an amount not in excess of the lowest rate
for transportation to the distributor's area plant.3 7 8 The regulation was
sustained as a reasonable stipulation in implementing the minimum price
program. It was said to violate no basic guarantee of the fourteenth
17' American Can Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453 (1944).
Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Ore. 305, 193 P.2d 543 (1948).
""ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 621.221 (Supp. 1959).
375 S.D. CODE §§ 4.2004, .2014 (Supp. 1952).
171 State ex rel. N. C. Milk Comm'n v. Galloway 249 N.C. 658, 107 S.E.2d 631
(1959).
W5 awa Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Wickard, 149 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1945)... Knudson Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d 485, 234 P.2d 26 (1951).
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amendment and to create no "creeping monopoly." The delivery to the
distributor was considered a marketing cost factor which would affect
the price payable to producers for raw milk, while other expenses which
might develop with respect to later stages of handling the product would
be considered as distributive rather than production factors. The court
considered the freight expense of shipping the milk to a distant market
as a marketing cost over which the producer would have no control.
Therefore this item would not be a proper one to be considered in the
calculation of the minimum prices to be paid to producers.
In New Jersey milk authorities provided for "cartage" allowances
only in instances where the retailer's establishment was located more
than six miles from the wholesaler's plant. This regulation was held
to be invalid as discriminating against metropolitan wholesale milk
plants, as many more of their retailers were within a six mile radius.87 9
An administrative body will commonly set producers' minimum
prices and dealers' minimum selling prices at the same time. In the
early days of the milk control program in New York the resale prices
were annulled for certain metropolitan areas while producers' minimum
prices were left in effect. One inferior court took the view that this
action was discriminatory and constituted a denial of due process.8 80 In
another case arising the same year, however, the Appellate Division
was evidently of the opinion that action of this kind was not invalid as
confiscating the complaining dealer's property. 81 The decision by the
inferior court was severely criticized, the appellate tribunal declaring
that the primary purpose of the milk control program was to help the
producers, not the dealers, and that it could not be said that the concept
of due process would demand that the administrative body fix a minimum
selling price for dealers which would yield a reasonable return to every
one of them with no consideration for the efficiency of the operator.
The New York Milk Control Law enacted in 1933 made no provi-
sion for the regulation of prices in transactions between dealers, the
administrative officials not being given such authority until the 1934
act went into effect. A contract for the sale of milk was made by two
dealers before such authority was granted. The selling dealer breached
the contract by charging more than the agreed price and tried to justify
himself by claiming that the Milk Control Law had forced him to raise
prices. The court held that the buying dealer could recover the in-
creased charge he had paid for the period before the proper officials had
... Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Armstrong, 31 N.J. Super. 61, 105 A.2d 884
(1954)..8 Baldin v. Dellwood Dairy Co., 150 Misc. 762, 270 N.Y. Supp. 418 (Sup.
Ct. 1934)... Muller Dairies, Inc. v. Baldwin, 242 App. Div. 296, 274 N.Y. Supp. 975
(1934).
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acted under the 1934 statute and not afterwards. 3 2  Prior to the
administrative action there had been nothing to justify the breach. The
setting of prices for transactions between dealers was said to have been
unauthorized under the interpretation 388 given to an early New Jersey
statute. Hence it would appear that the authority to set such prices will
not be readily implied.
Several states384 require milk dealers to post prices to be charged to
customers for various grades of milk and make it necessary to publish
them by a certain time for the next selling period, usually on a monthly
basis. Typical of this kind of requirement is a New Jersey regulation
which compelled every licensed dealer, processor, and retail storekeeper
to post lists enumerating the prices for the succeeding month, the dealers
and processors being required to file on the twenty-sixth day of the
passing month and the retail stores on the last day. This regulation
was held to be a reasonable and valid one.385 Furthermore, a somewhat
similar California statute providing for compulsory filing before any
offer to sell was made was deemed paramount to certain inconsistent
municipal charter provisions concerning sealed bids with respect to
contracts to supply milk.
38 6
UNFAIR PRACTICES AND COMPETITION-
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Many milk control statutes contain provisions outlawing vatious
unfair practices which had been common in the industry prior to regu-
lation. Price cutting is often made the subject of particular reference,
and sometimes a statute will point out the illegality of discriminstory
prices.38 7  In fact discriminatory price-cutting practices are sometimes
outlawed by statute in states3 88 which have no truly representative milk
control programs.
... Knoeller v. Karsten, 157 Misc. 130, 283 N.Y. Supp. 58 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935).
... Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co. v. Duryee, 116 N.J.L. 75, 181 At. 908 (1935).
"I CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 4362; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-702 (1949); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 4564 (1957) (cream) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 196.665 (1952); A{ONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 3-2468 (1947) (butterfat) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-251 (:958) ;
NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-261 (1958) (co-operatives excepted); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:12-13 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.9 (Supp. 1959); N.D. REv, CODE
§ 4-1816 (Supp. 1957) (cream); ORE. REv. STAT. § 621.221 (Supp. 1959) (dairy
products); S.D. CODE §4.1802 (1939); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §35-293 k1957)
(cream or fat).838 Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 NJ. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 1950).
... Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. App. 2d 146, 217 P.2d 704 (1950.
.. See, e.g., Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2441-44 (1958), as amended, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, ch. 2441 (Supp. 1959).
.88 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-1001 to -1010 (1948), as amended, IDAHO CODI ANN.
§§ 37-1003a to -1003f (Supp. 1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.11, .12 (Supp.1959) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 416.140, .150 (1952); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 59-509, -1001 -1002
(1952) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 584.570, .585, .590 (Supp. 1959) ; TENN. COD ANN.
§§ 52-331 to -341 (Supp. 1959).
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The unfair practices provisions of the milk control or related laws
of several states point out various methods employed by persons en-
gaged in the industry to gain a competitive advantage over others.
Among these are discounts, rebates, and other schemes which are aimed
at the customer's desire for an immediate bargain. The control programs
seek to eliminate such practices. For example several states, some of
which have no true control programs, have statutes3 9 outlawing rebates
or making them possible only with administrative or some other sort of
public approval. Some of these statutes enumerate and proscribe other
unfair practices as well. In an appellate opinion from New York, one
of the states making rebates unlawful, a contract calling for the return of
a portion of the purchase price of milk has been held to be illegal and
void.3 190 In a California case3 91 it was alleged by administrative officials
that a dairy company had sold fluid milk to school district authorities
at a price below the minimum figure set by the officials in pursuance
of the authority invested in them by the Milk Control Act. The trans-
action was said to be connected with another agreement or offer to sell
other dairy products like butter and cheese to the school authorities at
a price below cost. An injunction was sought and the court decided
that there had been no sale or effort to sell at a figure below the fixed
price. The consensus of the evidence supported the trial court's findings
that the distributor's bids in response to the official requests with respect
to the various desired products were severable and that there was nothing
to show that there had been sufficient relation between the several trans-
actions as to amount to a rebate, discount, free service, or gift in con-
necion therewith. It was shown that the distributor and the milk con-
trol officials used different cost accounting systems. The distributor's
acccuntant testified that no product had been sold below cost and there
was other evidence which seemed to confirm this view of the matter.
The court refused to grant the requested injunction.
In general it may be said that milk control legislation does not forbid
free services, combination sales, extensions of credit, and other similar
schenes when price-cutting is not effected thereby. In Pennsylvania a
milk dealer furnished retail grocers with refrigerated display cabinets
of tie self-serving type. By agreement the title to the cabinets remained
8'ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 223, 228 (1940); CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 4280, 4361;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-1003 (1948); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94A, § 14 (1954)
Miss. CODE ANN. § 4560-58 (1957); NEv. REV. STAT. § 584.570 (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. AGRIC. & MxTs. LAWS § 258-m; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.9 (Supp. 1959);
PA. ETAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j-807, -809 (1958); R.I. GEm. LAWs ANN. § 21-4-16
(1956); S.C. CODE § 32-1634.67 (Supp. 1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-332(f)
(Supl. 1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 5-3-12(a) (1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.201
to .26 (1957).
3 'Bossom Dairy Co. v. Rockdale Creamery Corp., 258 App. Div. 961, 16
N.Y.E.2d 720 (1940).
"'Jacobsen v. Dairy Mart Farms, Inc.., 154 Cal. App. 2d 287, 315 P.2d 932(1957 .
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in the dealer who was servicing them at his own expense, the grocers
being obligated to furnish operational electric current alone. The dealer
bore the cost of amortization and only his products were allowed to be
shown. Products other than milk were displayed and the grocers'
existing equipment was freed for other uses. However, there was
nothing to show that the additional space thus afforded had been of any
particular advantage to the grocers. In fact it seemed that the sole
purpose of the scheme was to promote the sales of the dealer by making
his wares more convenient and conspicuous. It was decided that this
arrangement could not be held invalid.3 2 It would not matter that a
somewhat similar scheme might conceivably be set up which would, in
fact, be a price-cutting device. The difficulties which milk officials might
experience in making proper distinctions could not be allowed to influ-
ence the court in a matter of this nature.
In North Dakota certain portions of a statute prohibiting various
trade practices in the dairy industry limited wholesalers in furnishing
advertising matter to retailers, permitted payments to wholesalers for
the storage or display of dairy products, and restricted wholesalers in
making loans to retailers. In a recent case these provisions were ruled
unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of contract and as being
violative of the concept of due process.3 93 The court remarked that
these provisions could not reasonably be related to practices creating
monopolies or restricting competition in the dairy industry.
There are some state statutes39 4 applying specifically to the milk
industry which outlaw agreements to fix prices for the purpose of gain-
ing a competitive advantage. It is also worthy of note that a North
Carolina statute39 5 prohibits the sale of milk below cost for the purpose
of destroying or injuring competitors.
In a case arising in California a complaining ice cream company
claimed that a large concern, a corporation with diverse interests, had
attempted to destroy its competitors in the ice cream business by cutting
prices on that particular product and compensating for its sales below
prices customarily and necessarily charged in nearby markets with profits
from other branches of its dairy and milk product business. An action
was brought under the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton
Act,3 96 and the claim was made that the defendant had acted unlawfully
and was liable for treble damages as provided by the statute. The court
202 Sylvan Seal Milk Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Conm'n, 74 Pa. D. &
C. 289 (1951).
... Fairmont Foods Co. v. Burgum, 81 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
"'See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-128 to -133 (1950); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 196.660 (1952); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 59-1001, -1002 (1952) (see also NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 59-509 (1952)) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-331 to -341 (Supp. 1959) ; WASH.
REv. CODE § 15.32.780 (1951).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.21 (Supp. 1959).
06 49 Stat. 1526-28 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1958).
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decided that the conduct of the defendant was actionable and allowed a
recovery.
397
A Minnesota statute prohibited any firm, corporation, or other person
buying milk, cream, or butter from paying a higher price in one place
than in another, thus outlawing discriminatory sales on the basis of loca-
tion. The statute provided for differing transportation allowances. The
act was alleged to have been meant to prevent buyers with unusual
purchasing power from establishing a monopoly by excessive bidding in
an effort to stifle competition. As the statute was worded in such a
manner as to be operative irrespective of motive, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that contract rights had been interfered with to an
extent which would violate fundamental rights under a proper interpre-
tation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.30 8
In an action brought under Wisconsin anti-trust laws the maximum
statutory penalty was demanded from foreign and domestic corporations
and partnerships for conspiracy to control milk prices and to restrict
competition. The prosecution asked for an injunction and the cancella-
tion of the defendants' charters and licenses to do business within the
jurisdiction. Though the pleadings did not specifically allege an agree-
ment by the individuals involved to fix or maintain prices prior to their
concerted action in fixing identical prices at the same moment, it was
ruled that enough had been stated to make such detailed allegations
unnecessary, thereby making the pleadings sufficient to withstand de-
murrer.
399
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act provides that the Secre-
tary of Agriculture shall have authority to enter into marketing agree-
ments with processors and others engaged in the handling of agricul-
tural commodities without risking violation of the anti-trust laws. Par-
ties placing themselves under the federal program submit to supervision
and regulation. The statute has been held to authorize the use of a
classification plan for computing the prices distributors must pay pro-
ducers, both groups being said to be immune to prosecution under the
anti-trust laws. The Secretary had adjusted the price of milk in the
District of Columbia milkshed area, his orders affecting both the dis-
tributors and the association of producers, in accordance with the fluc-
tuations of prices on the New York Commodity Exchange. However,
the producers' co-operative association withdrew its assent to the mar-
keting agreement embodying the classification plan. Thereafter the
association continued to execute "full supply" contracts with the dis-
tributors, these instruments containing provisions which were not unlike
... Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal.
195,1. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
... State v. Golden Guernsey Dairy Co-op., 257 Wis. 254, 43 N.W.2d 31 (1950).
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the classification provisions of the Secretary's program. It was held that
these latter "full supply" contracts, being executed after withdrawal,
were in effect agreements to fix prices in restraint of trade and therefore
invalid under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.4 00
In the Rock Royal case 0" it was contended that producers' co-opera-
tives having a vital interest in the establishment of an efficient marketing
system in the New York City area were stimulated by ulterior motives of
corporate aggrandizement in putting pressure on handlers to compel
them to agree to a certain order prepared by administrative officials of
the Department of Agriculture. Even though such motives might be
established, it was declared that there could be no infraction of the law
unless there had been a violation of the anti-trust statutes. The Supreme
Court refused to rule that there had been a violation of the Sherman
Act here despite the fact that there was very little doubt that the net
effect of the arrangement under the statute and order would be to give
the milk co-operatives a practical monopoly in this marketing area.
Some states, notably Michigan 40 2 and North Carolina,40 3 exempt
dairy co-operatives from the operation of the local anti-trust laws. Thus
it is proper for the milk producers in these states to combine in co-opera-
tives and thus gain a competitive advantage. They are freed from certain
worries about acting in restraint of trade.
APPLICATION OF STATE LAWS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
Price regulations promulgated by state milk control agencies are
applicable to sales to agencies of the federal government consummated
within the jurisdiction.40 4  State price regulations have been held by
the Supreme Court to be applicable to a milk handler who did business
with a military installation located on ground leased from a state but
still under state control.405 The tribunal was of the opinion that the
regulations imposed no unconstitutional burden upon the federal govern-
ment through interference with its necessary or proper functions or with
its announced policy of competitive bidding. It was declared that there
could be no immunity from state regulation despite an army rule pro-
viding that invitations for bids for supply contracts would not have to be
in accordance with state law. The Court remarked that there had been
no expression of any congressional desire to take over the regulation of
' United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers' Ass'n, 90 F. Supp.
681, (].D.C. 1950).o Discussed in text accompanying note 293 supra.
'0 1 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.31 (1938).
' 3N.C. Gm. STAT. § 106-266.19 (Supp. 1959).
88. Patterson Milk & Cream Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 118 N.J.L. 383, 192 Atl.88(1937)." Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943) (with
Justices Black, Douglas and Jackson dissenting), affirming 344 Pa. 635, 26 A.2d
431 (1942).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
milk prices for military installations in general and that a policy to that
effect would not be inferred. This decision should be contrasted with
another Supreme Court case4 6 from California. Here the federal gov-
ernment made a large and expensive purchase of land from the state
for the purpose of setting up an air force base. A milk handler made
selling bids to supply the base, and an issue arose concerning the appli-
cability of state price regulations. The federal government was said to
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the base, and it was decided
that the handler, in the absence of positive congressional directives, could
not be compelled to abide by state price regulations.
CO-OPERATIVES
Courts usually look at milk co-operatives very thoroughly to deter-
mine their exact status in respect to the milk marketing process. An
Arizona statute imposed a tax upon any "person" engaged in bottling
or otherwise preparing agricultural products for sale. This act was held
to be applicable to a non-profit co-operative which was manufacturing
milk products as an agent for and on behalf of the dairymen who formed
the association.407  Statutory provisions in New York408 imposed a
penalty upon any person or corporation buying milk or cream from a
producer without possessing a license. The term "producer" was said
by a state court to refer to those persons who obtain milk from cows
and was held not to be applicable to a co-operative association which
received milk from many producers, blended it into a fluid mass, and
distributed the funds received from its sale ratably among its members.
The court declared that the statute had not been intended to cover pur-
chases from co-operatives. 40 9 Moreover, in a situation involving the
amount of payments into an equalization pool, a federal appellate court
declared that the term "producer" employed in the appropriate portion
of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act could not be construed
in such a manner as to have reference to a co-operative organization
which had been established by officials and stockholders of a pre-existing
corporation engaged in handling milk. The co-operative had taken
over the business of the corporation. Title had been taken to the farmers'
cattle, return mortgages and stock being given to them in consideration
thereof. The co-operative had not taken possession of the cattle and
there had been no substantial change in the farmers' status. The court
was of the opinion that the co-operative could not avoid making large
payments into the equalization pool on the ground that it was a pro-
406 Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943),
reversing 19 Cal. 2d 818, 123 P.2d 442 (1942).
4
0 7 Arizona Tax Comm'n v. Dairy & Consumers Co-op. Ass'n, 70 Ariz. 7, 215
P.2d 235 (1950).
408 A former version of the present N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAWS § 257.
People v. Shoemaker, 228 App. Div. 314, 239 N.Y. Supp. 71 (1930).
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ducer.410 However, producers' co-operatives have been held to be
"distributors" within the Vermont Milk Control Act and hence subject
to its provisions regulating prices. 411
Co-operatives are frequently mentioned and are sometimes given
specific treatment in the milk control laws of the various states. Some-
times an exemption will be given with respect to pricing412 and other
provisions of these statutes. Nebraska exempts co-operatives from the
duty of posting prices.413  As a contrast, however, the Massachusetts
lawmakers deemed it proper to insert a provision stating that minimum
prices are applicable to co-operatives. 414 These are only a few of the
references to co-operatives and they have received increasing attention
as their importance in the industry has grown.
The federal act415 and several of the more recent state statutes41 6
have provisions permitting dairy co-operatives to blend prices or pro-
ceeds or both and pay the resulting sums ratably to their members.
With a provision of this type in force along with other clauses applicable
to co-operatives, a New Jersey court has said that a bona fide association
would not be bound by minimum prices which administrative officials
had set for the payments of others.41 r If the co-operative had been set
up as a mere automaton, however, its application for a dealer's license
should be denied. Here it was ruled that the pseudo-co-operative in-
volved in this case was a mere "barebones" organization established for
the purpose of circumventing lawful and expedient price regulations.
The evidence indicated that pressure had been put upon the producers
to form the organization for the purpose of enabling the applicant to
purchase milk below the minimum prices set by administrative officials.
In the Rock Royal case 418 the Supreme Court found that the provisions
of the federal act concerning blending were valid.
According to an early New York statute a bond was required as
security for payment in situations where milk was bought by dealers
from producers but not where the transaction was between dealers. In
a case arising under this statute a dairy co-operative, without buying
milk from its member producers, contracted to sell milk to a dealer and
arranged to have each producer deliver at his place of business. Accord-
Elm Spring Farm, Inc. v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1942).
State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
"' UTAH CoDE ANN. § 5-3-29 (1953).
"'NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-261 (1952).
.4 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 94A, § 15 (1954).
49 Stat. 753 (1935), 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (F) (1958).
'16 ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 228 (1940); CONN. GFN. STAT. REV. § 22-218 (195 )
(repealed as of Dec. 31, 1960, Conn. Pub. Acts (1959), ch. 116, § 17) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.14 (1943) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:12A-31 (1959) ; N.Y. AGlIc. & MKTs.
LAWS § 258-m; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-809 (1958) ; S.C. CODE § 32-1634.50
(Supp. 1959).
'" re Welsh Producers Co-op. Milk Marketing Ass'n, 40 N.J. Super. 318,
123 A.2d 16 (1956).
"' Discussed in text accompanying note 293 supra.
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ing to the agreement the dealer would pay the co-operative and all pay-
ments by him would be merged in a fund belonging to all members,
certain deductions and charges being authorized before distribution.
The dealer and his sureties were held liable on the executed bond, the
co-operative being considered a mere agent and not a dealer within the
contemplation of the statute.
419
The provision of the federal statute permitting administrative offi-
cials to make regulations which are "incidental to" and "not inconsistent
with" the act was given close scrutiny in Stark v. Wickard,420 a case
from the Boston marketing area. Here an inconsistency with the statute
was claimed with respect to payments to co-operatives authorized by
administrative order. Milk officials directed that certain deductions be
made from an equalization pool belonging in equity to all the area milk
producers subject to the program and that the sums involved be turned
over to certain co-operatives. A question was raised with respect to
the right of individual producers to maintain an action to enjoin the
enforcement of these directives. The argument was advanced by ad-
ministrative officials that these producers lacked an interest sufficient
to give them standing in a federal court to raise the issue concerning the
legality of the payments to the co-operatives. On the first hearing the
Supreme Court refused to go along with this contention and held that
the producers had an interest which the federal courts must consider.
The Court left the legality of the payments to the lower court on the
remand. When the case came up a second time, the Court in a split
decision reaffirmed the right of the producers to sue and ruled that the
payments to the co-operatives had no statutory authorization. It was
declared that non-member producers would get little or no benefit from
the payments. 421 But where the co-operatives render marketwide serv-
ices beneficial to all producers and not just association members, pay-
ments in return for these services were held to be legitimate and not
inconsistent with the statutory provisions concerning the setting of
uniform prices.
422
In the Rock Royal case4 23 proprietary handlers claimed that the
federal act discriminated against them because co-operatives were
exempted from paying uniform minimum prices to their members. The
Supreme Court refused to hold the exemption invalid, declaring that
"when proprietary corporations lower sales prices, they naturally seek
to lower purchase prices. Their profit depends on spread. On the
... Pyrke v. Brundo, 243 App. Div. 493, 278 N.Y. Supp. 353 (1935).
420 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
'2 1 Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), afflrming 185 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1950), affirming 82 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1949).
42 Grant v. Benson, 229 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
422 Discussed in text accompanying note 293 supra.
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other hand, the co-operative cannot pass the reduction. All the selling
price less expense is available for distribution to its patrons."
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS TO REGULATE PRICES
A hearing before an administrative body for the purpose of fixing
milk prices must of course conform to proper concepts of due process.
4 24
Before a commission, board, or official may promulgate or revise a price-
fixing order, some pertinent or substantial evidence must be presented
to show that the proposed prices are justified.42 5  Suppositions and
presumptions cannot be substituted for facts which are important in
the determination of material issues.426  In the absence of evidence to
the contrary a presumption exists that a proper hearing has been held
and that competent evidence has been introduced to support the
findings.
427
The sufficiency of the evidence for the purpose of inducing a de-
cision that established minimum prices should be revised with general
mark-ups is a matter for administrative judgment, and conclusions
reached are not to be overturned unless there has been a capricious
refusal to take up items which should have been considered, an exami-
nation of irrelevant items, or a failure to give proper weight to testimony
of a persuasive nature.428 When such errors have been committed, the
proper procedure is to return the case to the administrative body for a
new hearing.
429
Sometimes those attending a hearing will request or suggest that
the administrative agency undertake an independent survey of condi-
tions affecting the milk industry in order that more informative data
may be collected and applied with respect to the determination of fair
prices. Even in an instance where the available information could not
be said to have been complete, the court was of the opinion that an
administrative agency could not be compelled to make an independent
survey, especially where the matter at issue was not the promulgation of
an original order but the revision of an existing one.
43 0
To provide a fair return for producers and dealers and to insure
proper consumer prices a cross-section of representative investments
' National Dairy Products Co. v. Milk Control Bd., 133 N.J.L. 491, 44 A.2d
796 (1945).
12 Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co. v. Duryee, 116 N.J.L. 75, 181 Atl. 908
(1935) ; Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Conm'n, 70 Pa. D. & C. 223
(1949)
'( Royce v. Rosasco, 159 Misc. 236, 287 N.Y. Supp. 692 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
," Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co. v. Duryee, 116 N.J.L. 75, 181 Atl. 908 (1935).
""8 Milk Control Conm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d
818 (1949); Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1
A.2d 775 (1938).,20 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Conm'n, supra note 428.
.. Milk Control Comm'n v. United Retail Grocers Ass'n, 361 Pa. 221, 64 A.2d
818 (1949).
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and expenses of normally efficient dealers and producers in the industry
should be utilized in obtaining data from which accurate calculations
may be made leading to the establishment of prices fair to all.
48 '
SUSPENSION OF PRICE CONTROLS
Sometimes it may seem feasible to discontinue a pricing program
for a long or short while. In Florida the action of the Milk Commis-
sion in a recent suspension of price controls was taken without giving
any notice of its intention to do so, without affording an opportunity for
those opposed to present evidence, and without the formal hearing pre-
scribed by the statute. Under these circumstances the Commission's
action was said to have no legal effect, and the administrative body was
required to continue the enforcement of its latest price orders until their
revocation, amendment, or revision by orders properly promulgated.
432
About a decade ago the Governor of New Jersey decided to recommend
as an experiment that all resale prices for milk be eliminated for an
indefinite period. The Director of the Milk Industry was persuaded to
adopt this course. Certain dealers objected because there had been
no notice and hearings, and the matter was carried to the state courts.
It was argued that by following the Governor's suggestion and adopting
the proposal the Director had unlawfully surrendered the duty imposed
upon him by law. Testimony was introduced to the effect that the
Director had become convinced that the course the Governor had recom-
mended was the right one. As no evidence to the contrary had been
offered, it was decided that the Director's action in this instance had not




The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 43 4 gives the Secretary of
Agriculture authority to hold referendums among producers in any
area within federal jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether
a milk control program is to be established therefor. The Secretary is
empowered to make rules and regulations concerning the participants
and methods of conducting the voting. The authority is of a somewhat
elastic nature. In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases 435 involving
the federal program administrative officials refused permission to vote in
a referendum to producers outside the milkshed whose milk could not be
sent into the Boston marketing area in fluid form because the handlers
,58 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d
'Adams v. Lee, 89 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1956).
':'Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
" '49 Stat. 753 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1958).
"" H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939), afflrming
26 F. Supp. 672 (D. Mass. 1939).
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with whom they dealt were not licensed under Massachusetts law to
sell milk there. However, producers who had no registration certificates
were permitted to vote in the referendum wherever their milk was sold
in the marketing area by handlers who had licenses. Such action on the
part of administrative officials was deemed to be well within the authority
granted to the Secretary. As far as the validity of the referendum was
concerned the Court said that it was immaterial that less than fifty per
cent of the milk at some of the collecting stations had been shipped to
the area during a representative period by approving producers. It was
deemed sufficient that the handlers of these producers' products did send
part of the milk produced into the area and could have sent it all. It
was also said to be immaterial that some handlers to whom voting pro-
ducers delivered milk had shipped only cream during the representative
period. At other times these handlers could have sent fluid milk into
the marketing area and in most instances actually did so. Under the
statute the approval or disapproval of persons to be affected by the pro-
gram was a matter to be determined by the Secretary or his agents.
Additional referendums with respect to the members of co-operatives
were said to be unnecessary, since the votes of co-operatives in behalf of
their members in favor of the promulgation or amendment of a market-
ing order were binding upon all. This case illustrates some of the issues
which may arise with respect to the machinery involved in referendums
of this sort.
PETITION FOR STABILIZATION PLAN
The provisions of a California statute stated that petitions asking for
the promulgation of a plan to control milk marketing and to stabilize
the industry had to be signed by sixty-five per cent of the producers in
the area whose major interest was the production of milk and cream.
This language was interpreted in such a manner as to make these
provisions applicable to all important producers in a given area except
certain large distributors who had been engaging in the production of
milk as a side line to their regular business. Therefore it was ruled
that participation in the determinative hearing on a stabilization plan
would be limited to those producers whose paramount concern was the
production of milk as compared to their interest in the distributive phase
of the business. An intrinsic difference was said to exist here. The
distinction was said to be a reasonable one and the statute was held not
to violate the uniformity provision of the state constitution.
438
LEGAL, EQUITABLE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Issues concerning the type of remedy to be employed may sometimes
arise with respect to actions brought under or having reference to milk
'" Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
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regulations. Thus where the New York Commissioner of Agriculture
refused to renew the license of a dealer and the latter claimed that this
failure to act had been arbitrary and amounted to a practical confiscation
of his property, a proceeding authorized by statute against licensing
officials was deemed to be an adequate remedy at law which would pre-
vent the maintenance of an equitable action within the familiar rule to
that effect. 43 7 But note may be taken of a Connecticut statute48 which
permitted the Milk Administrator to seek an injunction to compel milk
dealers to pay minimum prices to producers despite the availability of
a legal remedy.
439
Under the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act adminis-
trative remedies, including application for review, must be exhausted
before a complainant may resort to the federal courts, and a case may
be thrown out for a failure to do so.440 The same would be true under
state milk laws generally.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPACTS
In a good many states, most of which have milk control legislation,
there are statutes authorizing officials with a varying degree of power
over the industry to make compacts with control agencies of the federal
government and the respective states.441 Thus administrators may co-
ordinate their programs with those of other jurisdictions.
MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF MILK INDUSTRY
Municipal ordinances concerning the local regulation of the milk
industry and its sanitary aspects must be reasonable and not arbitrary
and must conform in general to the proper concepts of procedural and
substantive due process.442 Such ordinances must operate upon various
groups of persons and types of things in accordance with the usual:. Gillespie v. Du Mond, 189 Misc. 403, 72 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-254 (1958).
... Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596, 46 A.2d 420 (1946).
"0 United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946); United States v. Turner
Dairy Co., 166 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Gudgel v. Iverson, 87 F. Supp. 834 (W.D.
Ky. 1949); United States v. Hogansburg Milk Co., 57 F. Supp. 897 (N.D.N.Y.
1944).
" ' ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 229 (1940) ; CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 4257; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§501.15 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-558 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94A.
§§23, 24 (1954); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §27-421 (1955); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 584.540 (Supp. 1959) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 183:17 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:12A-25 (1949); N.Y. Acaic. & MKTS. LAWS § 258-n; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 106-266.8 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REV. STAT. § 621.105 (Supp. 1959) (out-of-state
milk permitted by reciprocal arrangement); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-311
(1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §214-5(h) (1956) ; S.C. CODE §32-1634.2 (Supp.
1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-318 (1955) (reciprocal inspection agreements);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-21-13 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2508 (1958) ; VA.
CODE ANN. § 3-352 (1950).
4,2 City of Des Moines v. Fowler, 218 Iowa 504, 255 N.W. 880 (1934) ; Crea-
ghan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 442, 104 Atl. 180 (1918) ; Grider v. City
of Ardmore, 46 Okla. Crim. 33, 287 Pac. 776 (1930).
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reasonable classification doctrine under the equal protection clause. In
one instance it was said that practical necessity justified the enactment
of an Oklahoma City ordinance classifying milk facilities into three
groups, pasteurization plants, "farm dairies" which limit their deliveries
to pasteurizing concerns, and "inspected dairies" which offer raw milk
for sale to consumers alone, and fixing license fees accordingly.443 How-
ever, approval was denied with respect to an ordinance of the same city
denying eligibility to receive a permit to sell raw milk to anyone who
had not been licensed at the time the ordinance was enacted.444 The New
Jersey court refused to approve an ordinance imposing license fees for
the owners of milk vending machines which were greater than those
charged to competitors who did not use machines, there being no evi-
dence that the difference in treatment was justified. It was pointed out
that the machine owners and their competitors were required to abide
by state-controlled price regulations.
445
There seems to be a general rule that where a state has general
statutes which thoroughly cover a particular and definite aspect of the
milk industry, county or municipal governing bodies may not enact
ordinances which conflict with or add qualifications or conditions to the
general law.446 However, it is worthy of note that some states have
statutory provisions447 authorizing municipalities to set up standards for
milk which are stricter than those established under the general law.
A Tennessee town established standards which were additional to those
set up by the state and considerably higher than those of a neighboring
community where the milk of certain producers had been given a very
good rating by the local health authorities. The additional qualifications
having been established after the trial in the instant case had started,
the producers of the nearby rural area were given time to comply with
the added requirements. 448 The court commented that the statute per-
mitting the establishment of higher standards would not give a munici-
pality the right to enact an ordinance which disregarded the state's
regulatory milk laws or denied fundamental rights. But municipal ordi-
nances which merely complement the general laws of a state pertaining
to milk and dairies are not objectionable. Where ordinance and general
, Stephens v. City of Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 190, 1 P.2d 367 (1931).
'"Oklahoma City v. Poor, 298 P.2d 459 (Okla. 1956).
". Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114 (1956).
. City of Flagstaff v: Associated Dairy Prods. Co., 75 Ariz. 254, 255 P.2d
191 (1953); Associated Dairy Prods. Co. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393, 206 P.2d 1041
(1949).
"I4FiA. STAT. ANN. § 502.24 (1943) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-522.5 (1957) ; N.D.
REv. CoDE § 4-18A07 (Supp. 1957) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 621.090, .095, .291 (Supp.
1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 6606 (1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 21-2-16,
-5-15 (1956); S.C. CoDE § 32-1610.25 (Supp. 1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-317
(1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-21-20 (1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 3-400.37 (1950).
.. State ex rel. Beasley v. Mayor .of Fayetteville, 196 Tenm. 407, 268 S.W.2d
330 (1954).
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statute both make provision for the commonly mentioned bacterial plate
count an added alternative microscopic count has been approved.449
However, an ordinance requiring that all milk offered for sale in a
Texas city have a milk fat content of at least four per cent was ruled
invalid as being in conflict with the standards established under state
statutes and regulations.
450
There appears to be a difference of opinion concerning the validity
of a city ordinance or health regulation requiring the pasteurization of
milk. Local pasteurization requirements have been ruled valid in Ari-
zona 51 and North Carolina 52 on the basis of the maintenance of the pub-
lic health. Requirements that made it necessary to pasteurize all milk
sold to consumers save the certified product were approved in California,
the court being of the opinion that the legislature had left the door open
for the establishment of higher standards of this type in the municipali-
ties.453 A city board of health regulation stating that only pasteurized or
grade A certified milk could be sold in a New York community was held
to be valid.454 However, ordinances prohibiting the sale of milk without
pasteurization have been declared unconstitutional in Connecticut,
455
Missouri,4 6 and Texas.457  The Connecticut decision was quite evi-
dently influenced by the accompanying declaration that the state's gen-
eral statutes covered the same ground as the ordinance. The court
remarked that a later statute covering the same general subject matter
would supersede an ordinance. In the Missouri case local conditions
were not so bad that raw milk could not be sold without endangering the
public health, and this lack of peril seems to have influenced judicial
opinion. The better view appears to be that an ordinance requiring
pasteurization cannot be invalidated unless special circumstances such
as those mentioned above militate against it.
There would seem to be no doubt about the constitutionality of an
ordinance prohibiting the sale of non-pasteurized milk as the pasteurized
product.458
If there is no conflict with the general milk laws of the state, it would
appear to be true that municipalities can legislate with respect to sanita-
tion, transportation, supply, and other aspects of the milk industry
"" Leach v. Coleman, 188 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
450 Cabell's, Inc. v. City of Nacogdoches, 288 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
City of Phoenix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372, 72 P.2d 580 (1937).
42 State v. Edwards, 187 N.C. 259, 121 S.E. 444 (1924).
". Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 20 Cal.
2d 101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942).
"Moll v. City of Lockport, 118 Misc. 573, 194 N.Y. Supp. 250 (Supp. Ct.1922).
"1 Shelton v. City of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433, 150 Atl. 811 (1930).
... State ex rel. Knese v. Kinsey, 314 Mo. 80, 282 S.W. 437 (1926).
..7 Melton v. City of Welasco, 301 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
S I5 Lang's Creamery, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 224 App. Div. 483, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 368 (1928).
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within the city limits. 459  Of course a conflict with a state statute4 60 or
health regulation46 1 will render the municipal legislation invalid. Fur-
thermore, the Illinois court has held that a city cannot make provision
for the convenient location of milk plants in order to subject them to
regulation.
462
Under regulations promulgated by controlling state health officials
in Texas a local health officer must satisfy himself that milk sold by
distributors whose plants were located outside the limits of a city's
routine inspection area was produced and pasteurized under specifica-
tions equivalent to those adopted by the state authorities. It was pro-
vided that a municipal permit must be issued before any sale was con-
summated. A compliance with the requirements was said to be in-
dispensable for anyone who wished to receive or retain a permit, but
the court remarked that there was no intention to bar permanently past
violators who were actually ready to comply. Unless there had been
a violation of state regulations a distributor who had been awarded a
permit in one Texas city was entitled to operate in another city without
a permit in the second city, and the evidence in the instant case sustained
a finding that a milk company from a nearby county had brought in
milk of sufficiently high quality to entitle it to a city permit.468  Under
this system of state regulation a court refused to approve a city ordi-
nance providing that milk pasteurized outside the city limits could be
sold only by authority of permits issued by the city health officer upon
the establishment of a health service rating of ninety per cent.464 Since
a state statute set up a different grading standard, the ordinance was
struck down as imposing an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction under
a standard different from the established formula and one which could
not be said to have been legally authorized. Disapproval has also been
voiced of an ordinance providing that no milk or cream pasteurized
outside county boundaries should be sold within the city limits, except
as such sales might be authorized by the city health officer. The court
declared that this ordinance clothed the city health officer with authority
to make arbitrary decisions and went beyond the power extended to
municipalities by the general statutes concerning pasteurization, han-
" Witt v. Klimm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929) ; Wright v. Rich-
mond County Dep't of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936) ; Felt v. City of
Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1269, 78 N.W.2d 857 (1956).
. LaFranchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. 2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301 (1937) ; City
of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-op. Dairy Co., 330 Mich. 694, 48 N.W.2d 362
(1951).
156 City of Port Arthur v. Carnation Co., 238 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.
11Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949).
'te City of El Paso v. Russell Glenn Distrib. Co., 237 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
a City of Electra v. Carnation Co., 207 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
)499
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dling, and the sale of milk and its derivatives.40 5 A like decision was
rendered in a case from Kentucky where plants constructed beyond the
city limits were prohibited by an ordinance from supplying milk in the
city except as such business was permitted by the municipal health
authorities. The court said that the health officials might act in a dis-
criminatory manner.466 These decisions would seem to establish the
proposition that a blanket authority of this kind without proper direc-
tives or standards will probably never receive judicial approval.
Municipal health officials may sometimes wish to regulate the ship-
ment of dairy products into their cities for reasons of sanitation or be-
cause they desire to set up barriers to products coming in to compete
with local interests. A Georgia health edict banned the shipment of ice
cream into a municipality "from outside the inspection area of local
board of health within a radius of 60 miles." The most logical inter-
pretation of this language is that shipments from a distance of more
than sixty miles were prohibited, since a construction which would out-
law shipments from outside the inspection area and yet within sixty
miles while permitting deliveries from further away would appear illogi-
cal in the extreme. Even though there was a general statute covering
various phases of the dairy industry, the court was of the opinion that
the regulation was not invalid as a special law.4 7 It was also held that
there had been no violation of due process. As a contrast, however, a
New Jersey court refused to uphold a borough board of health's regula-
tion prohibiting the sale in the municipality of milk produced outside
the state.4 68 The court decided that a milk company had been deprived
of its right to engage in business in the community and that the regula-
tion violated the equal protection clause as being discriminatory against
importers of out-of-state products. The milk company failed to raise
the apparently justiciable issue under the commerce clause. While
being different in various aspects, the factual situations in these two cases
are enough alike to offer an interesting comparison. The New Jersey
decision seems to present the better view.
Occasionally there will be a statement in some case to the effect that
a municipal milk ordinance can have no extraterritorial application except
as permitted by statute.46 9 In the application of this declaration one
court has remarked that regulation beyond the city limits cannot be
accomplished by permitting local sales or distribution only on the condi-
tion that there be a compliance with municipal regulations. 470 However,
... Prescott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
400 Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 257, 82 S.W.2d 283 (1935).
467Wright v. Richmond County Dep't of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815
(1936).
40" Borden's Farm Prods. Inc. v. Board of Health of the Borough of Somer-
ville, 36 N.J. Super. 104, 114 A.2d 788 (1955).
... Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949).
410 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949).
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the following discussion of cases concerning inspection fees and pasteuri-
zation makes it doubtful whether this generalization is fully accepted.
There appears to be a difference of opinion as to whether a munici-
pality may require milk companies with plants outside its boundaries to
pay inspection fees for the privilege of selling their products within the
city. Such fees have been approved by decisions in Iowa40 7 1 and Ore-
gon 472 and disapproved in Illinois473 and Texas.474  In some of these
cases the payment of license fees was also required. The difference in
the wording of the statutes under which the several municipalities acted
could have had much to do with the contrariety of opinion here.
There is also a marked difference of opinion concerning the validity
of ordinances requiring all pasteurized milk sold within the city limits
to be pasteurized locally. Such ordinances have been upheld in New
York 75 and Wisconsin476 but were declared invalid in Florida,477 Illi-
nois,478 and Minnesota. 479 Objections advanced to defeat the ordinances
were based upon extraterritorial invasion and the violation of property
and contractual rights. In California a rather peculiar situation de-
veloped. In the early case, Witt v. Klinm, 480 an appellate court upheld
a San Francisco ordinance requiring that milk be pasteurized locally
within the city or county. Here the milk had been brought in from
another of the inspection districts established under state statutes. The
court declared that the ordinance was neither unreasonable nor dis-
criminatory and that there was no conflict with the milk laws covering
the state in general. A few years later a very similarly worded ordi-
nance came before the state Supreme Court in La Franchia v. City of
Santa Rosa.481 In this instance the milk came from a producer within
the same state inspection district as the municipality. In respect to the
milk from this producer the ordinance requiring pasteurization within
the corporate limits was held to be invalid. The court explained the
apparent conflict with the Witt case by pointing out that in the instant
controversy a milk inspection service had been established for this par-
ticular district in accordance with the procedure outlined in the state
milk laws. Much emphasis was placed upon the fact that the milk had
,71 Felt v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1269, 78 N.W.2d 857 (1956).
'72 Korth v. City of Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927).
'"Dean Milk Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill. 204, 90 N.E.2d 112 (1950) ; Higgins
v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948).
,71 Falfurrias Creamery Co. v. City of Laredo, 276 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955.'?5Lang's Creamery, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 224 App. Div. 483, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 368 (1928).
'" Dyer v. City Council of Beloit, 250 Wis. 613, 27 N.W.2d 733 (1947).
,17 Gustafson v. City of Ocala, 53 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1951).
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949).
'71 State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 138, 251 N.W. 121
(1933)."8097 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929).
4818 Cal. 2d 331, 65 P,2d 1301 (1937).
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come from the same district. As the milk had been inspected and graded
in accordance with state standards, it was held that no municipal agency
located in the district could enforce any limitation or restriction not
recognized under state laws. The line drawn here is a very thin one,
and it may be said that some justification exists for criticism.
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION
There has never been a real test of the validity of the North Carolina
Milk Control Law of 1953. Since the basic conception behind the statute
has been approved in other states, there appears to be little doubt of the
constitutionality of its fundamental provisions. However, this does not
mean that the program has escaped criticism, some of which has been
acrimonious in the extreme. One of the chief objections is that the pro-
gram established under the statute permits the control of the milk indus-
try by a self-interested group. The original act set up a commission
of seven members consisting of one producer, one producer-distributor,
two distributors, one retail store operator, the Secretary of Agriculture
serving ex-officio, and one public representative who was supposed to
protect the interest of the consumer.482  The Secretary of Agriculture
was a producer-distributor and hence the control agency was top-heavy
with representatives of the industry, particularly its distributing segment.
This unfairness having been clearly pointed out, the General Assembly
of 1955 added two public members to the control agency.488 The three
public representatives now serving are a bank official, a former member
of the State Highway Commission who is a past president of the State
Association of County Commissioners, and a member of the North
Carolina Bakers Council. Only the latter could be said to have much
interest in keeping milk prices down, and he only with respect to whole-
sale prices. Hence it is submitted that the consumer still has no adequate
representation on the agency which regulates the state's dairy industry.
Furthermore, the heavy distributor representation is not calculated to
satisfy those engaged soley in the producing segment of the business.
Perhaps a smaller commission with a minimum of industry representa-
tion would be the answer.
There is no doubt that the North Carolina milk industry has had
material growth since the milk control program was put into effect in
1953. The farm economy has been given a big boost just at the time
when diversification was most needed to offset difficulties with respect
to the marketing of crops which had been of the greatest importance
in the state's agricultural scheme for many years. Much capital has been
poured into the industry and it bids fair to become a very important one.
"2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 1338, § 2.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.7 (Supp. 1959).
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The Milk Commission has helped to give stability and to encourage
farmers to build up adequate herds and to construct modern dairy barns
and silos. The equipment and sanitation requirements were raised to a
point where many small producers were unable to operate profitably.
Many marginal producers were driven out of business. There is no
doubt that a great number of these farmers were not equipped to produce
milk of a quality sufficient to satisfy proper health regulations. But there
may be those who produce milk which would be healthful and yet be
graded down because of some building or equipment regulation which
is not essential. There has been a decrease in the number of dairy
operators in North Carolina during the years that the milk control pro-
gram has been in effect.48 4 The Commission has said it regrets this and
has reasoned that it is uneconomical to operate a small dairy business at
the present time.4 5 Of course many of those who were forced to quit
were marginal operators who should have been compelled to get out of
the field. However, there is the possibility that powerful interests might
influence the Commission to set up inordinately high equipment stand-
ards and then pick up the business as the small operators drop out one
by one. The health of small business is very important and it does not
necessarily follow that the public welfare would be enhanced by a con-
centration of the industry in the hands of a few big companies, even in
the name of greater efficiency.
The lack of efficiency of an adolescent industry has been used to
justify the higher prices for milk in North Carolina as compared to
prices in other states where the dairy industry is well established.48 6
If the weeding out of small operators continues, this argument will lose
much of its force. The state Commission sets the minimum prices which
may be paid to producers for milk of the various grades. It does not
set retail or wholesale prices to be charged by dealers and distributors,
although a 1959 amendment 48 7 gives it power to do so in emergency
situations. Supporters of the present system contend that unfair prac-
tices such as secret rebates or discounts are less likely to occur if the
distributors are permitted to use price as a weapon of competition.488
There have been periods during the last few years when prices paid to
producers remained static while retail prices were increasing. It has
been said that there has been a wide profit margin in favor of the dis-
tributor or processor at the expense of both the producer and the con-
sumer.489 The distributors would probably deny this claim. According
"I N.C. MmIr COMM'N, NORTH CAROLINA MILx, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND To-
MoRROW (1958).' N.C. MIIa: CoMM'N, op. cit. supra note 484.
... Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel, Dec. 1, 1957, p. -, col. -.
"
8
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.8 (Supp. 1959).
"" Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel, supra note 486.
... Carter, State Regulation of Milk in the Southeast, XXIV SOuTHERN Eco-
NOMIC JOURNAL 63 (1957).
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to figures released by the Commission in 1957, the distributor's profit
margin was one-half cent a quart.490 It would seem that this profit would
not be excessive, but one would have to break down the figures with
respect to salaries, wages, overhead, the cost of equipment and trans-
portation, and other expenses to get a true picture. The distributor must
publish his selling prices for each succeeding month by a certain day in
the previous month, 49 1 and this requirement offers the consumer a
measure of protection from sudden increases without proper notice.
There is nothing to prevent retail price hikes except consumer resistance
and the competition of other milk interests. A 1955 amendment492 gave
the Commission power to outlaw sales below cost for the purpose of
injuring competitors. Thus the distributor is protected from price wars
without any legal responsibility to keep consumer prices within reason.
It has been suggested 493 that the Commission has been reluctant to test
the validity of the pricing provisions of the 1955 amendment.
It is incumbent upon the Commission to be fair to producers, dis-
tributors, and consumers alike. It has been pointed out that prices paid
to producers in 1956 were less than in 1953, the year the milk control
program went into effect, and that during the same period there was a
definite rise in retail prices. 494 Of course there are other distributing
cost factors to be considered here, but at least the figures show that
producer's profits were not to blame for the increase. The burden of
inflationary costs would seem to bear as heavily upon the producer as
it does upon the distributor, but this would be the case only to the extent
that the producer furnished his own equipment and other supplies. Many
distributors provide the producers from whom they buy with milk
tanks, cooling units, and other aids to dairying.
There is the long range danger that high retail prices may decrease
consumer demand for fluid milk. Already discernible is a trend to
powdered and other types of unregulated milk on the part of certain
elements in the consuming public.
Large companies from other sections of the nation were attracted to
the controlled market and began to pour capital into the local dairy
industry and its processing plants. Some of the well-established interests
expanded their facilities and the industry made rapid progress. The
growth has been signalized by high consumer prices and bigger and
more efficient plants. There is no doubt that a thriving and relatively
new industry has been added to the state's farm economy and that the
milk control program has helped to bring this about. There had been
... Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel, supra note 486.
... N.C. GF.. STAT. § 106-266.9 (Supp. 1959).'92 N.C. GEr. STAT. § 106-266.21 (Supp. 1959).
'o' Carter, spra note 489, at P. 70.
Ibid.
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some fear that the Commission's licensing power might be used to keep
new enterprises, both foreign and domestic, from entering the field, but
provincialism has not been the bugaboo that the critics believed it to be.
The success of the milk control program in North Carolina will
depend upon the manner in which it is administered. There must be a
recognition of the rights and interests of all affected groups. Too much
concern for the building up of a new industry can lead to results which
may be detrimental to the welfare of the state as a whole. If the Com-
mission realizes its responsibilities and gives everyone impartial treat-
ment, it can render a useful and beneficial service.
